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1 | Introduction 
The grey sky domed overhead as a cold breeze picked up, stuttering through the alley, 
scattering the late-Autumn leaves and leafing through the old, discarded newspapers strewn 
between the industrial bins and the part-clogged drains.  I pulled the collar of my coat tighter 
around my neck, raised my pace, and turned left, right and right again, through the network 
of backstreets, before emerging about half a mile north of Holborn underground station.  Like 
a river basin, with a plethora of tributaries, a central stream of trudging feet increased in 
volume along Southampton Row as I – one of many – joined a steady flow of people making 
their way through the drizzle to their various destinations, keeping the Sisyphean wheel of 
the London mill turning. 
Narrowly dodging the loss of an eye to the hands of numerous commuters clasping 
umbrellas, wielded with the sensitivity and consideration traditionally reserved for a mace, I 
took the next available alley that was not an excessive detour and, along with others with the 
same idea, passed by billboards for the latest Hollywood reboots and groups huddling 
together like penguins outside office entrances, smoking shoulder to shoulder.  Before too 
long I reached the building at which I was currently employed.  I presented my pass to 
security, passed through the electronic gate, headed upstairs to the third floor and towards my 
designated desk.  On my arrival at about ten minutes past nine, there was a sharing of glances 
among the other employees.  I logged into the computer in front of me and checked my 
emails – I was in an ongoing debate with a client regarding the validity of the information 
they had provided me, which showed little sign of abating.  Another chain of emails – from 
my ‘middle manager’ – informed me that the approach I recently innovated to doing my 
work was not protocol, and encouraged me to do things as I had been trained and instructed 
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to do, as everyone else did.  I sat back and stared out of the window as the rain began to 
subside, replaced by a welcome sliver of silver sunshine, and longed to be free. 
The world had not always been this way, surely?  Of course, historically, there are a myriad 
of examples of zealous control as a form of social organisation.  Yet, day to day routine this 
pervasive, as structured as it is in modern corporate offices, reminded me of ‘soft’ slavery.  
There might be an option to ‘climb the ladder’, but arguably this just means changing one set 
of routinised practices for another set of routinised practices.  I do not feel free to choose, to 
determine my own actions, apart from within a predetermined set of routinised practices set 
by other people, most of whom I have never met.  I feel chained by routine to the post of 
protocol, the further I move from the post, the more tension builds in the chain, until I am 
prohibited from moving any further away.  The alternative is to be cut loose, and to be left to 
fend for oneself, outcast from society.  Not much of a choice.  As self-indulgent as it may 
sound, the world around me had begun to feel like Endgame by Samuel Beckett – a play that 
ponders whether routine is a genuine means of providing meaning to one’s life, and 
concludes that no, it isn’t, yet we nonetheless become melded to our routines, drawing 
certainty and comfort from them, a form of shelter against the uncertainty of the universe – a 
crampon to ward against the shifting powder, the Brownian motion, of real life. 
Something in my chest refused to quell, I had not been able to shake this feeling for months, 
that society has become ever more afraid of spontaneity, that office life, the dominant form 
of work in neoliberal societies, is endemic of this trepidation of the novel, of the unseen, the 
unpredicted – we fear change and seek to control it, by creating an illusion (or delusion) of 
control.  This is a game that only works if everyone is subject to it, and buys into the 
pretence.  The game might ‘work’, but only in the sense that the pretence takes hold and 
maintains itself – uncertainty is not actually replaced by control just because we tell 
    4 
ourselves it can be and has been.  The response to an unpredicted financial crash?  Tighter 
control.  The response to terrorist threats?  Tighter control.  The response to the forecasted 
population crisis…? 
In what I can only describe as a moment of clarity (or despair) my resolve became fast, I 
could no longer play the game – this was no way to live – I could find no meaning to life in 
these arbitrary routines.  I wondered whether other people feel the same way, or not, maybe 
some do and some don’t – how many?  I left the job and took a different direction, perhaps I 
could find satisfaction in another form of work.  A few years later it came to my attention 
that the change I had had rejected that day had since become part of standardised practice at 
the company.  I’m not sure how I feel about this.  The approach I was instructed not to use 
was how I wanted to complete my set task at that time, but who is to say that there is not 
someone sat in that office today, tasked to follow the procedure I proposed, who feels they 
have an innovative way to complete the task that is perhaps more suited to their way of 
working, but are told by their middle manager to do as they’re directed – that their innovation 
is not protocol.   
These events got me thinking – when and how does innovation cease to be innovative; 
moreover, what defines innovation, who defines innovation?  My previously rejected 
innovation had become incorporated.  Why, what changed?  Furthermore, in being 
incorporated it had been standardised, had become routine.  Innovation and standardisation 
are mutually exclusive concepts – the routine cannot be innovative; and the innovative is 
never routine.  Has my innovation, as routinised practice, contributed to a sense in others of 
alienation from their right to self-determination?   
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When/if the now standardised practice denies opportunities for change, it no longer 
represents innovation, it even begins to have shades of repression.  This is not to say that 
standardisation has not brought with it much to be lauded, a certain degree of equality in 
social interactions, but there is arguably a point beyond which standardisation ceases to be 
about equality, and becomes a potential tool of social repression. 
The ethos of this thesis is to temper the zeal for standardisation, on the basis that routine can 
easily become counter-productive, even unethical.  This thesis researches the political and 
ethical issues around innovation in organisations, with a focus on power relations and 
decision-making.  To engage with the ethics of power relations and decision making in 
organisations means turning to organisational strategy.   
1.1 | Strategic Management: Overview and Problem Setting 
It could be argued that, since the turn of the century, organisational strategy has arguably 
become a somewhat static topic, largely assumed to have been figured out, perfected, 
maximised for efficiency, and filed under common sense; the dour concept of strategy 
gathers dust while more exciting and contemporary topics of research draw the eye of 
researchers keen to cut the coat of their careers according to the more colourful cloth of 
topics such as sustainable development and corporate social responsibility.  Nonetheless, 
organisational strategy is more relevant than ever, due to the rapidly changing technological 
and ecological environment, and the social and cultural changes they are associated with. 
It would seem to be a well established observation that strategy is ‘fundamental to the study 
of organizations’ (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007: 420).  How a strategy originates and is 
(re)formed has been the subject of substantial research – both empirical and theoretical (e.g., 
Stinchcombe 1965; Bower 1970; Mintzberg 1987; Burgelman 1991; Bhide 2000; Siggelkow 
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2002).  Yet, how the concept of strategy emerges and forms has not been engaged with 
particularly closely or, arguably, with due diligence by researchers and practitioners alike.  It 
could be inferred that the question of ‘where does a firm’s concept of strategy come from?’ 
has been neglected by organisation research.  Considering that ‘strategy is, perhaps, the 
master concept of contemporary times’ (Carter, 2013: 1047), the lack of consideration over 
the concept of strategy itself is, to me, a little disconcerting, as arguably ‘organisations create 
the conditions within which we all must live’ (Huff, 2001: 129).   
The motivation for this research is that organisations play a significant role in our lives – by 
this I don’t simply mean business and work organisations, but the immense variety of social 
formations that exist now, in the past, and in the future, the myriad of cultures associated 
with each and every one of these multitudinous groups, churning in a dynamic interaction of 
ideas and practices – and whether the business organisation is dominating our experience of 
these social organisations, and how we conceive society.  For some reason, ‘too many of us 
have resolutely looked away from the longer-term, social consequences of organizational 
activities’ (Huff, 2001: 129), and therefore the social consequences of the concept of 
organisational strategy.   
While corporate social responsibility and other ethical critiques of business activities have 
become visible and gained traction, how the concept of strategy in business organisations 
might alter how we perceive society, and the ethical implications of this, is a research path 
less well trod.  ‘At a time when critics argue that the global financial crisis is being used to 
legitimize changes that have significantly negative effects for employees (e.g., Centre for 
Research on Socio Cultural Change, 2009)’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325) it seems fitting 
to scrutinize the legitimacy of the foundations that comprise the concept of organisational 
strategy.  For this thesis, the foundations upon which mainstream concept of strategy is based 
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are analysed regarding their legitimacy – more specifically, the foundations are analysed as 
being a benchmark by which change (including innovation) is judged.   
This thesis scrutinizes the relationship between the construction and reproduction of ‘shared 
values’ – a common strategic aim (see, for example, Porter and Kramer, 2006; 2011) – and 
the capacity for innovation in an organisation.  If there is any form of hypothesis in this 
thesis, it is that the construction of shared values provides a context in which innovation can 
be judged, while also debilitating the capacity for innovation.  This thesis explores the 
ideational implications of shared values, and analyses how strategy can impair the ability for 
innovative or adaptive ideas to gain credence and traction within a priorly established value 
system.  Moreover, that this impairment is political, is the realm of power relations within 
social interaction, as the foundations on which the system of values is based are not a priori 
truths, but socially constructed habits. 
In the construction of shared values lies the source of a reduced capacity for innovation, but 
also the source of radical innovation: the system of values disregards alternatives on the basis 
of their incongruence to the status quo, while radical innovation is radical on the basis of its 
incongruence to the status quo.  In this way, the politics associated with constructing shared 
values is the source of problems regarding a lack of innovation, while also the source of the 
solutions to a lack of innovation.   
Therefore, for this thesis, to analyse the foundations of the mainstream approaches to 
organisational strategy means analysing the foundations of the shared values in the concept 
of organisational strategy.  By extension, to analyse power relations legitimised by the 
organisational strategy means analysing how power relations are legitimised by the system of 
shared values in the concept of strategy.   
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The purpose of the research is to analyse the legitimacy of the foundations on which a system 
of shared values is constructed and reproduced, and in doing so to analyse the legitimacy of 
the dismissal of alternative ideas and practices.  This thesis proposes that by honing in on 
some of the core concepts of organisational strategy, in the mainstream literature and 
research, and by reflecting on the political foundations of the system of shared values, 
organisations might be able to develop their capacity for radical innovation.    
The construction of shared values can be traced within the history of the concept of 
organisational strategy, beginning with the social construction of time and space. 
1.1.1 | Synchronization: GMT and Railway Time 
An old adage is that if a job is worth doing, it is worth doing well.  If I am going to consider 
the foundations of shared value systems in organisations, where better to start than the basic 
foundations of experience: the passing of time and movement through space.  ‘We in the 
West are, after all, living only a short time after Copernicus and Darwin and the geologists 
demolished whatever certainty we might have had about our place in the universe’ (Clarke, 
2000 [1968]:  xv) 
Initially, perhaps, to suggest such a grandiose sounding focus as the shared values of time 
and space may sound ridiculous, however, time and space are concepts that are so ingrained 
into our experience of reality that we sometimes do not stop to pay them much reflective 
attention.  They are a core aspect of strategy.  Perhaps it is viewed with satisfaction, or 
maybe just not largely acknowledged, or thought of as having much consequence, that our 
contemporary notion of time has been constructed as part of social organisation: religion, 
empires and economics.  As children we learn that the calendar is based on the motion of the 
Earth around the Sun – the passing of day and night is one rotation of the Earth, after 365 
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rotations the Earth has circled the Sun once – but there is no basis of the months in the orbit 
around the Sun.  The months, we learn, are based on the orbit of the moon around the Earth, 
which does not divide perfectly into the Earth’s orbit around the Sun: we divide 365 rotations 
into 52 groups of 7 days, which results in one rotation being missed out as 52 x 7 = 364.  
Hence, leap years.  This calendar, known as the Gregorian calendar, is the most widely lived 
by today, and was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582. 
That there are different calendars is not simply a semantic issue, that the months by any other 
name would be as long – we are all familiar with the months of the year, yet this is just one 
calendar that exists today, and one of many more through history, that have grappled with 
how best to reconcile the moon’s orbit and the Earth’s orbit into a unified calendar system, 
and each reach different means of doing so.  There have also been calendars that are not 
based on the lunar cycle and focus only on the Earth’s orbit of the sun, and some that are 
only based on the lunar cycle.  What is clear is that our sense of time, and how we 
collectively organise ourselves by constructing a shared value of calendar systems, are 
intimately related to our experience of the celestial.  These days, when we look at the digital 
numeric figures on our smartphones and tablet screens, do we remember that they denote a 
social construction based on an approximation of celestial motion? 
For millennia, seafaring humans have navigated their ships by the position of the sun at day, 
and by the stars at night, sometimes using devices to assist them.  As the Earth rotates the sky 
appears to move, and the constellations by which ships navigate appears different in different 
locations: on Earth, around the world, time is local.  In the 19th century, as the recently 
formed nations around Europe developed their economies and militaries, they increased their 
operations at sea.  The ships tracked their time and position using timepieces, devices 
calibrated to the stars.  There were often multiple timepieces per ship, not as back ups, but 
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because local time around the surface of the Earth had been divided into meridians, like 
segments of an orange, that are the basis of the longitude system, a system of coordinates that 
denotes a position on Earth in terms of an East-West axis.  The Earth rotates across its North-
South axis, with the equator providing a natural basis for ‘segmenting’ a coordinate system: 
zero degrees latitude.  Calculating longitude was a problem for centuries, and was solved by 
a device called the marine chronometer, by John Harrison (Sobel, 1996). 
The invention of the chronometer is often taken as a textbook example of applied creativity, 
of innovation with purpose, practical utility, and arguably has influenced a sense of what 
forms of innovation are worthwhile.  Arguably, due to the chronometer being invented in the 
UK, and with the British Empire at its most expansive – for a while, ‘the sun never set on the 
British Empire’ – the meridian at Greenwich was set as zero degrees Longitude.   In this way, 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) – mean means average – is taken as being at the centre of the 
east-west planetary axis.  This is a purely political construction: an empirical measurement 
system derived from an empire’s global hegemony, and geo-centric perspective.  If you buy a 
map in any nation, chances are that the map will have the nation in which you purchased it at 
the centre.  This spatial-centrism is fairly common.  What is less usual is the temporal 
centrism of GMT. 
At this same period of recent history, each town in the UK set their time according to the 
movement of the sun across the sky.  From east to west, each town began their day slightly 
later, such that, 12 o’clock for one town would be quarter past 12 for another.  Travel 
between towns, up to this point, could take hours or days, and the time difference could be 
corrected on arrival by changing the hands of a watch or some other timepiece.  With the 
advent of the steam train, and the early rail networks between different towns, a problem 
emerged: the discrepancy between local times led to practical issues with running the trains.  
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Great Western Railway began designing a timetable of standardised time – they set it 
according to GMT.  This became known as ‘railway time’ and is now simply known as the 
time. 
In this way, local time became synchronised, and we largely forgot about the process of its 
construction.  With the standardisation of GMT, our concept of time, space and motion were 
changed, and fixed.  Many might argue that this provided a platform for great economic 
development, and they would be right – nonetheless, this is a system of shared values, and it 
is arguably not in the same interests of economic development to treat a system of values as 
an a priori system of facts, if doing so reduces the capacity for innovation.  Whether, and 
how, the synchronisation of time could possibly have this effect is one of the research 
questions explored by the thesis. 
1.1.2 | Science, Military and Mass Production: Ford Motor Company 
With the foundation in place of a socially constructed sense of shared time and space, the 
construction of shared values in organisational strategy can then be traced more directly to 
the practices of work organisations. 
A further consideration of the basic concepts of strategy is how organisations are organised 
within time and space.  In terms of modern organisations, structures and working routines are 
generally guided by the strategy.  Arguably, we need only look back as far as the early 20th 
Century, to the automobile industry in America – more specifically, to the company run by 
Henry Ford – to find the origins of the ideal concept of a business organisation.  It is 
reasonable to say that, for business management, Ford Motors is such a textbook example of 
strategy and innovation, as to have become cliché.  For this reason, we might consider the 
strategy of Ford to be a major influence on the concept of strategy for practitioners and 
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theorists alike.  While there has been the emergence of what are known as ‘post-Fordist’ 
organisations, they are arguably a minority, and remain defined in relation to their departure 
from the Ford model. 
The success of the company was not based on the innovation of a new product – Henry Ford 
did not invent the car – but on the innovation of a new method of manufacturing that made 
cars substantially cheaper to make and therefore sell.  Ford, by proxy, brought motor travel to 
the masses, instead of being the reserve of the financial elite.  This was not simply an 
altruistic objective, Ford believed that low-cost cars were the future of the industry and 
would expand the market, therefore to be the first organisation to produce widely affordable 
cars would be a significant competitive advantage over rival constructors. 
As a strategic goal, Ford’s strategy to move away from expensive cars was not without 
controversy.  There was an associated contest for control of the organisation that led Ford to 
buy the shares of investors set on continuing the strategy of constructing expensive cars 
(Ribuffo, 1980; Barnard, 2002).  Doing so gave Ford a competitive advantage regarding 
decision-making within the organisation – a political competitive advantage – with which he 
gained strategic control and the power to implement his plan.  This also provides a trace of 
how the construction of shared values in organisational strategy is not necessarily a shared 
responsibility, but a system of power relations in which the values of a minority (in the case 
of Ford, a minority of one) are pushed onto a majority.  Politics in organisational strategy is 
in this way closely related to the construction of shared values – a hierarchical structure that 
is a system of values in which the imposition of values is the process, not a system in which 
shared values are constructed democratically. 
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To produce affordable cars, Ford developed a means for organising the company that he 
directed, known as the assembly line.  The assembly line is a concept that combines 
previously disparate ideas: replaceable parts and the conveyor belt.    Replaceable parts are a 
military innovation, although the emergence of the concept most likely reaches further back 
into history, the modern approach can be traced to the promotion of the standardisation of 
measurement (required for replaceable parts) within the manufacture of firearms in the U.S in 
the 19th Century.  The conveyor belt was an idea borrowed from the slaughterhouses – the 
disassembly lines – in which the carcasses were moved past the workers, who each 
performed a small part of the deconstruction, repeatedly.  Ford reversed the process, such 
that car bodies were constructed as they moved through a succession of sub-stages.  Before 
Ford’s impetus for change, a car would be produced in its entirety by a small group of 
workers, each working on multiple aspects of the construction, and each car would likely be 
a little different.  With Ford’s approach, car parts were standardised, and the cars produced 
were almost identical. 
What was worked out at Ford was the practice of moving the work from one 
worker to another until it became a complete unit, then arranging the flow of these 
units at the right time and the right place to a moving final assembly line from 
which came a finished product (Sorensen, 1956: 116). 
The division of labour was also a concept borrowed from scientific management, more 
specifically, to the ideas of Taylor (1911).  Taylor developed an approach to strategy that 
emphasised that efficiency of process was of paramount importance, and can be measured, 
controlled and increased.  Taylor describes what he calls a scientific approach to strategy that 
organises labour by breaking down the process of production into a linear sequence, ideally 
to the point where each stage cannot be divided into smaller constituent stages, then 
assigning roles to workers wherein the remit of each role is defined by one discrete stage of 
production.  The repetition of the work and lack of work satisfaction because of this was 
compensated by high wages.   
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Taylor’s ideas were to be influential on Ford (Drucker, 1990).  Taylor viewed all employees 
as naturally lazy – that, when faced with monotonous tasks, workers will default to the 
slowest pace that does not result in punishment – and referred to this concept as soldiering, 
associating workers with military conscripts (Kanigel, 2005).  That high wages would 
motivate workers was an idea relatable to Taylor.  There was an additional reason for the 
high wages: Ford wanted the workers to be able to buy the products they produced.  
Arguably, this aspect of the strategy has been left behind, while the specialisation of labour 
has continued.  Production methods devised according to scientific management borrowed 
more than the manufacturing techniques of weapons from the military, but also an attitude 
toward employees.  The military perspective of organisational members has also been taken 
up in the hierarchical structure of many organisations.  Indeed, the connections between 
military and business have also found their way into politics, again, interestingly, in context 
of Ford.   
Robert McNamara studied economics at Berkeley before attaining a Masters at Harvard 
Business School in 1939.  In 1943 he joined the U.S. Airborne as an analyst and strategist.  
Shortly after World War Two, McNamara was recruited by Ford, along with nine of his 
associates from the military strategic group (Anthony, 2003).  In 1960, McNamara had just 
been appointed president of Ford – the first time the position had been held by someone not 
from the Ford family – when he was chosen by President Kennedy to be the Secretary of 
Defence.  McNamara held this position before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
Vietnam War, and was influential in the decision to escalate the conflict in Vietnam 
(McNamara, 1965). 
McNamara played a major part in the development of the flexible response military strategy 
of the Kennedy government, which means the capability to initiate a variety of options in 
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nuclear warfare, aimed at working towards mutual deterrence.  Mutual deterrence is also 
known as mutually assured destruction (MAD), and refers to the strategy wherein whole-
scale military attack between opposing sides would result in the annihilation of both.  In 
other words, having powerful weapons at your disposal deters your enemy from using their 
powerful weapons.  This is a strategy described as a Nash Equilibrium (1951), a non-
cooperative situation in game theory (economics), in which the strategy that results in the 
best outcome for an individual participant is the same strategy as that which results in the 
best outcome for all participants.  Here we can see that economic theory has had a direct 
influence on politics and military theory, and, by extension, on the concept of strategy.   
This may be a quirk of history, but it does ask us to consider what the qualities, the traits, 
were in McNamara, at Ford Motor Company, that Kennedy felt made him an ideal candidate 
to be Secretary of Defence.  McNamara’s career provides some association between the close 
natures of military strategy with business strategy, if a military leader is chosen for showing 
aptitude at business strategy.  Unless, of course, all strategy is assumed to be the same thing – 
if this is the case, perhaps it says something about human nature that we can comfortably 
apply the same schemata, set of rationale, that we do to economics and working organisations 
as to warfare and military garrisons.  The social construction of shared values of time and 
space, applied to organisational practice, has been combined with a militaristic approach to 
organising labour, in the ethos of scientific management.   
1.1.3 | The Politics of Innovation: The Case of GM Biotechnology 
The scientific-militaristic approach to organising organisations produces a hierarchical 
system with little scope for employees to adapt the tasks that they have been set.  To research 
the relationship between power relations in an organisation, and a capacity for innovation, an 
example of radical innovation will help to illustrate the study and ground the analysis.  An 
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organisation does not operate in isolation, therefore, to focus on innovations and power 
relations within an organisation, wider society needs to be included too.  To scrutinize the 
impact of this conception of strategy, the thesis will explore the case study of GM 
biotechnology, which is a radical technology for the potential changes it could bring to our 
world. 
In distinction to evolution through natural selection of genetic mutations, humans have 
practiced artificial selection for as long as civilization has existed.  Like the selection criteria 
for promotion in business and military organisations, artificial selection is also interested in 
‘traits’.  It has become commonly accepted, at least within the scientific community, that 
‘ever since the Stone Age, humans have selected for increased quality and quantity in 
domesticated crops and animals.  In the Bronze Age, around 4000 BC, Jacob knew how to 
breed for color in sheep, whatever his explanation (Genesis 30, v-37-43)’ (Winter et al., 
2002: 358).  Notwithstanding the close relationship between artificial selection and the 
advent of civilization, a form of innovation in genetic research emerged in the 1970s, and 
being relatively recent in context of the history of artificial selection, remains radical and 
divisive at the time of this research.  The political and ethical issues associated with this 
radical technology have been the basis of a longstanding political debate taking place in 
many countries and international federations (for instance, the European Union).  For this 
reason, GM biotechnology provides an example of a disruptive innovation that is being 
evaluated in wider society, but is being produced at the level of single research organisations.  
In this way, GM biotechnology is a nexus for power relations associated with innovation, 
both within organisations and in context of its surroundings. 
‘The new genetic knowledge and techniques now available make it possible to do things 
which were impossible before’, and can range between ‘procedures that are clearly 
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beneficial’ and applications akin to ‘science fiction horror’ (Winter et al., 2002: 353).  In 
other words, ‘the uses of genetics fall on a spectrum from “obviously” good to “obviously” 
bad, and the critical ethical decisions are about where to draw the line between the two’ 
(Winter et al., 2002: 355).  In this way, GM biotechnology, and its produce, are a concern of 
moral and ethical issues, and the decisions made regarding their design and proliferation 
introduce these concerns into a consideration of strategy: ‘moral decisions, in genetics as 
elsewhere, depend on the balance between the perceived good and bad aspects of those 
decisions.  In the case of genetics, it is the uses to which genetic techniques and knowledge 
may be put’ (Winter et al., 2002: 356). 
‘As with all moral choices, the problem is in drawing the correct line in difficult decisions, 
which are ultimately a matter of personal opinion’ (Winter et al., 2002: 356).  If moral choice 
is closely related to personal opinion, then the power relation between personal opinion and 
the system of shared value promoted by the organisational strategy, provides a focal point for 
analysing the politics of innovation regarding GMOs within an organisation that designs and 
constructs them.  This is then set in context of the wider socio-political evaluation.  The 
political and ethical issue of GM is analysed as a case study, with a focus on an organisation 
that constructs GM organisms, and the power relations between staff within, and between the 
organisation and wider society.   
The aim of the case study is not to provide an answer over GM, but to elucidate the 
foundations for the concept of innovation, and possibly critique the legitimacy of these 
foundations when they are used as the basis for judging innovation, either for or against.   
‘Moral decisions require individuals and societies to draw lines between good (or the lesser 
of two evils), that is permitted, and bad, which is not allowed.  These decisions are arbitrary, 
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based on comparing benefits with the disadvantages, and affected by cultural and religious 
attitudes’ (Winter et al., 2002: 353).  The conditions of knowledge – the construction of 
shared values – in which innovation is formed and evaluated is the focus of the thesis – in 
other words, this thesis analyses the conditions of knowledge as influenced by the social 
construction of shared values, by the system of politics that lies within organisational 
strategy.  For this reason, political discourse theory (PDT) can be a helpful approach for 
evaluating whether the status quo is maintained for legitimate reasons, and for analysing the 
conditions of power, the power relations, involved in the emergence and evaluation of 
innovation.  PDT is drawn on to study the knowledge in strategic management discourse, and 
the power relations in organisations regarding the strategic management of knowledge, 
illustrated with the case of innovation in genetics. 
The minutiae of this system of politics are studied in context of a case organisation that 
specialises in the construction of GM organisms.  The intention of this focus is to study the 
dynamics of the construction of shared values in an organisational strategy, and how 
innovation is constructed within the conditions of knowledge that the strategy (re)produces.  
Moreover, the thesis makes links between the capacity for innovation in an organisation, and 
the facilitation, by the strategy, for alternative values to surface that are not swept up into the 
system of shared values as constructed by the organisational strategy.  In short, this thesis 
focuses on the politics of innovation, in the case of GM biotechnology: how the imposition of 
a system of shared values can debilitate, as well as facilitate, a capacity for innovation. 
1.1.4 | Summary 
The thesis scrutinizes organisational strategy as a system of politics in which the construction 
of shared values involves the imposition of the values of a minority onto the values of a 
majority, and in which deviance in values is judged negatively according to a militaristic 
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system of intolerance towards dissent.  The impact of this system of politics is explored with 
regard to the capacity for innovation within an organisation; more specifically, with regard to 
the construction of shared values regarding the concept of innovation. 
The issue that this thesis focuses on is the political and ethical issue of innovation and power 
relations in organisations.  The research turns to strategy, treated as a guide by which 
organisations (corporate, political, social, etc) determine whether an innovation is good or 
bad, enacted by those in positions of relative power.  A focus on power relations between 
individuals and the organisation they are a member of is too limited, therefore a 
consideration of wider social context needs be included too.  Therefore, the Political and 
ethical issue of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is analysed as a case study, with a 
focus on an organisation that constructs GM organisms, and the power relations between 
staff within, and between the organisation and wider society.  The aim of this thesis is not to 
provide an answer to the question of GM, but to elucidate the foundations for the concept of 
innovation, and possibly critique the legitimacy of these foundations when they are used as 
the basis for the judgement of proposed innovation, either for or against.  In short, in terms of 
the case study at least, this thesis is a discursive genealogy of biological genealogy. 
1.2 | Methodology: Genealogy and Political Discourse Theory 
This thesis will go on to propose that there are three core concepts that underpin the 
mainstream strategic management discourse.  These are inertia, friction and adaptation.  
Drawing on the discourse theory of Foucualt (1969), and the Political Discourse Theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985), this thesis will perform a genealogy of these three concepts, and 
an analysis of the implications of their combination within the concept of organisational 
strategy.  The approach of this thesis performs a philosophy of method that may be 
considered to be atypical by comparison to the majority of strategy research.  For this reason, 
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I here detail the philosophy of my research, before embarking on the literature review that 
takes place in Chapter 2. 
1.2.1 | Archaeology and Genealogy: Ontology and Epistemology 
 Strategic management typically follows an ontological position of objectivism and 
positivism (as will be discussed and supported by the review in Chapter 2).  Positivism treats 
events in time and space as objective – this independent reality is considered as providing a 
benchmark by which to measure and make predictions and test hypothesis.  In short, 
mainstream organisational strategy approaches its subject in the same way as the natural 
sciences.  A central tenet of scientific epistemology is that objective truths can be 
demonstrated by a reality that is independent of the mind.  Strategic management typically 
develops methods that are empirical, deterministic and quantitative – as with, for instance, 
organisational ecology research (Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Hannan et al., 2007).  The 
positivist methodological approach has become the norm in strategy research.  Organisational 
strategy, both in corporations and in academia, typically draws from methods that aim to 
reach a certain conclusion, a fact, about the performance of the organisation in context of 
organsational goals set by the strategy.  In context of this favoured philosophy of strategic 
management, the philosophy and discursive approach of this thesis can be situated.   
The discursive approach of this thesis leans on the critical theory developed in large part by 
Foucault.  As Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, writing in the 1980s: ‘to situate Foucault, it is 
important to realize that the sciences of man have in the past two decades been split between 
two extreme methodological reactions to phenomenology’ (1982: xix).  They distinguish 
between structuralist approaches and the polarised alternatives sometimes referred to as post-
structuralist.  ‘The structuralist approach attempts to dispense with both meaning and the 
subject by finding objective laws which govern all human activity’ (1982: xix), whereas ‘the 
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opposed position […] gives up the phenomenologists' attempt to understand man as a 
meaning-giving subject, but attempts to preserve meaning by locating it in the social 
practices and literary texts which man produces’ (1982: xix).  In keeping with this distinction 
the favoured approaches of strategic management can be described as structuralist. 
A discursive perspective views the typical methods of mainstream strategy as inappropriate, 
or at least open to critique with regard to its aims of finding objective laws which govern all 
human activity.  ‘Structuralists attempt to treat human activity scientifically by finding basic 
elements (concepts, actions, classes of words) and the rules or laws by which they are 
combined’ (1982: xix-xx).  This statement places emphasis on the elements of knowledge.  
This terminology itself is important to the conceptual framework of this thesis.  This 
importance will be elaborated.  
In contrast to the struturalist application of objective laws to human activity, for Foucault 
(1969), an historical event – an event in time and space – is ‘more than the place and date of 
its appearance.’  In the communication and telling of the event, and the patterns and 
repetition of practices, events are ‘too repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatial-
temporal coordinates of its birth’.  In other words, events are not a purely material entity, an 
event is ‘more than a law of construction governing a group of elements’.  Nonetheless, 
neither is the event a purely ideational entity, this is because the statement is ‘too bound up 
with what surrounds it and supports it to be as free as a pure form’ (2002: 117-118).  An 
event is something to be participated in, and should neither be treated as purely material, nor 
purely ideational.  For Foucault, the event is discursive.   
Ontologically, for Foucault the categories of object and subject are blurred in the concept of 
statements, which he proposes as an alternative to the objective treatment of events as found 
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in material science.  In struturalist science, things are defined by their properties, which are 
fixed and universal – think periodic table – for Foucault, statements have a temporal 
permanence, such that they persist through time, due to repetition, but statements do not have 
an independently defined and permanent set of meanings, of properties.  Epistemologically, it 
might be argued that, for Foucault, statements are not defined by their meanings, they are 
more like vessels, or cups, that can hold meanings, and that could contain alternative contents 
such that their discursive meaning could be different.  In some cases discursive meanings 
change.  For Foucault, statements/events are entities that are defined by their capacity to be 
imbued with meaning.  In short, statements have a temporal permanence, and a definitional 
impermanence. 
What this clarification illustrates is that the methodology of mainstream strategy research is 
at odds with that of discourse theory, insofar as discourse theory takes a contrasting 
ontological and epistemological position by locating meaning in social practices and texts.  In 
a way, these different approaches might be considered to be alternative strategies for 
accumulating knowledge about knowledge.   
The Foucaualtian approach of this thesis shares similarities with the work of Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1982) and Rabinow (1996).  Dreyfus and Rabinow propose an approach that 
involves archaeology, genealogy and critical analysis.  For Rabinow and Dreyfus, 
archaeology involves identifying concepts as part of a past conceptual framework (1982: 
xxv-xxvi, 17-18), genealogy unfreezes concepts from frameworks by showing the history of 
their contingent construction and selection (1982: xxvii, 103-106), while critical analysis 
scrutinizes the contextual appropriateness of applications of a given concept or conceptual 
framework (1982: xxv-xxvi, 216).   
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Archaeology 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault describes the method and the rationale 
behind it.  Dreyfus and Rabinow state that ‘Foucault makes clear that his archaeological 
method, since it must remain neutral as to the truth and meaning of the discursive·systems it 
studies, is not another theory about the relation of words and things’.  Foucault considers his 
approach as ‘about discourse’ and that it is ‘orthogonal to all disciplines with their accepted 
concepts, legitimized subjects, taken-for-granted objects, and preferred strategies, which 
yield justified truth claims’ (1982: xxiv).  
Foucault defines the subject of archaeological analysis – a discourse – in terms of discursive 
practices.  Foucault describes how discursive practices ‘must not be confused with the 
expressive operation by which an individual formulates an idea, a desire, an image; nor with 
the “competence” of a speaking subject when he constructs grammatical sentences’ 
(Foucault, 2002: 131).  The notion of discursive practices is of ‘the conditions of operation of 
the enunciative function’ – in other words, the conditions that define what is possible to 
express – discursive practices are ‘a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined 
in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, 
geographical, or linguistic area’ (Foucault, 2002: 131) – that is to say, that what is possible to 
express is a changeable condition of the socio-cultural context, at a given moment in time.  A 
discourse is not a linear progression, but a field. 
Approached not as concepts known in full, but as contingent, the concepts of strategic 
management reviewed in Chapter 2 will undergo an archaeological analysis that traces their 
construction and characterizes the concepts as part of prior conceptual frameworks.  
Relatedly, without reference to strategic management, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982: 224) 
observe how ‘the word strategy is currently employed in three ways’: 
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First, to designate the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of 
rationality functioning to arrive at an objective.  Second, to designate the manner in 
which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks should be the 
action of the others and what he considers the others think to be his own; it is the 
way in which one seeks to have the advantage over others.  Third, to designate the 
procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means 
of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle; it is a question therefore of 
the means destined to obtain victory.  These three meanings come together in 
situations of confrontation – war or games – where the objective is to act upon an 
adversary in such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for him (1982: 224-
225)  
As part of the analysis of strategic management disourse, the three meanings of strategy 
proposed above will also be analysed.  Each in turn will be deconstructed followed by their 
combinatorial meanings.  Firstly, the notion of motion contained in the concept of arriving at 
a destination.  Secondly, how one constructs how another might be thinking and how in turn 
they might consider one to be thinking.  Thirdly, the notion of conflict that is rolled up in the 
concept of strategy.  In this way, the analysis considers the notion of ‘strategy’ itself as found 
outside organisational strategy. 
Genealogy 
Archaeological discourse analysis is acutely interested in the organisation of discourse.  
Organisational strategy is strongly associated with systems of regulations and routines.  
Foucault argues that discursive practices, as regulations, are often treated as ashistoric – or 
atemporal, as he calls it – this is because the practices define the subject of analysis, by 
demarcating the field, but are themselves exempt from analysis.  In other words, the 
conditions of operation of analysis, such as the fuzzy boundary that demarcates a subject 
area, a field of study, are discursive practices that are often exempt from analysis.  For 
something to not be the subject of analysis, according to this approach, is for that something 
to not need analysis, for there is no need to clarify anything about it; it is assumed to be 
known in full.  Foucault argues that there must have been a period in which all things treated 
as known in full, must once have been the subject of analysis.  As such, truths have history, 
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which cannot be separated from a history of debate and power relations, and are not as 
timeless or independent of human activity as they are treated.  Genealogy unfreezes concepts 
from frameworks by showing the history of their contingent construction and selection. 
Foucault (2002: 142-148; 157-173) argues that the history of truths is the history of how one 
analytical perspective became dominant, at the cost of other perspectives, and that this 
process is not free of influence of social systems of power relations – moreover, that these 
power relations are found in the discursive practices, the regulations.  For a concept that is no 
longer analysed, there was once a contest regarding the meaning of that concept, and an 
associated power relation in the Social.  A non-analysed concept is treated as fixed in 
meaning, and therefore the associated power relation is fixed, the dominance of one side is 
institutionalised and uncontested.  Moreover, the fixed meaning is taken as self-evident, as an 
a priori truth, as timeless and without history – Foucault calls this the historical a priori.   
The value of applying historical a priori to review the concept of strategy in organisation 
research, and the notions of change in organisational strategy, is that, in this context, 
Foucault draws on the concept of inertia (2002: 145, 157, 161) in context of his theory of 
power relations.  As will be seen, this concept plays a central role in the systems of thought 
that underlie struturalism and in turn stategic management.  Foucault, howeer, interprets this 
concept differently to the manner of its usage in struturalism, insofar as while he reprodues 
its notion of motion he dispenses with its objective characterization.  Foucault proposes that 
concepts can never be independent of interpretation and history.  On this basis that of their 
resistance to a change in meaning and their tendency to remain the same, Foucault describes 
historical a prioris as inert, from which I interpret his theorisation as describing what might 
be called conceptual inertia.  This is a concept I will draw on and a theme that will be 
referred to throughout the thesis.   
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The way that archaeology can identify conceptual inertia is to question the point at which 
something stops being analysed as a subject, and becomes determined with a priori meaning, 
cut off from historical review and presented as eternal (Foucault, 2002: 212).  For Foucault, 
discursive practices help to identify where the past persists in the present.  It is therefore 
appropriate to apply an archaeological analysis to the core concepts of strategic management 
to facilitate a genealogy.  As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest:  
As a technique, archaeology serves genealogy. As a method of isolating discourse 
objects, it serves to distance and defamiliarize the serious discourse of the human 
sciences. This, in tum, enables Foucault to raise the genealogical questions: How 
are these discourses used?  What role do they play in society? (1983: xxv)  
Genealogical discourse analysis provides a way to conceptualise power relations in 
organisational strategy in terms of discursive practices, as systems of relations that define the 
conditions of possibility for expression among organisational members.  The reason for 
doing so is that ‘if we develop the potential of strategy discourse to connect discursive 
practices to other strategizing practices, we will be able to advance simultaneously the 
understanding of both strategy scholars and practitioners’ (Balogun et al., 2014: 195). 
Critical Analysis  
Foucault (2002: 210) argues that discourse theory can be used to critique the claims of a 
discourse to be scientific: ‘in this archaeological history, what one is trying to uncover are 
discursive practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus of knowledge, in so far as they 
assume the status and role of a science.’  This application of archaeology is pertinent due to 
the emphasis placed in mainstream organisational and management discourse as aspiring to 
be, and being treated as, a science.  Discourse theory ‘enables us to better understand the 
persistence of dominant conceptions and related problems in strategy-making such as the 
overemphasis on technical rationality’ (Laine et al., 2015: 1).  As a critical analysis that tests 
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the appropriateness with which the concepts of strategy are being applied to organisational 
(social) activity. 
This thesis will explore how strategy is directed by the way that it is framed and by the 
individuals who have disproportionate sway on the framing process.  In this context 
Foucault’s notion of bio-power becomes important to organisational strategy and strategic 
management: 
[Foucault] isolates and identifies the pervasive organization of our society as "bio-
technico-power." Bio-power is the increasing ordering in all realms under the guise 
of improving the welfare of the individual and the population. To the genealogist 
this order reveals itself to be a strategy, with no one directing it and everyone 
increasingly enmeshed in it, whose only end is the increase of power and order 
itself. (1983: xxvi) 
The approach described above treats ‘inreasing ordering’ as a rudderless ‘strategy’ framed as 
being for the benefit of the welfare of all: biotechnical power.  The description also lends 
itself well to a case study in which the strategy of the research organisation involves the 
genetic (re)organisation of biological organisms.  The case study focuses on the relationship 
between the politics of organisational strategy making and the how the production of 
genetically modified organisms is framed from conception to manifestation.   
The study reflects on how the construction of meaning in genetic research reflects socio-
cultural-political attitudes of desired and undesired genetic traits in context of scientific 
positivism that fixes these meanings and treats them as objective and non-contextual.  This 
has implications regarding future directions of genetic research and its applications 
particularly regarding eugenics and social Darwinism. 
1.2.2 | Political Discourse Theory: Conceptualising Innovation 
Foucault also discusses innovation in context of his approach – discursive practices define a 
discourse by representing and forming the conditions of acceptance into that discourse.  
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Discursive practices therefore facilitate the reconstitution, the reformation, of the discourse.  
By placing the mechanism of discursive change (of shifts in the field) with discursive 
practices (the boundaries of the field), Foucault’s approach explicitly negates any need for an 
explanation for innovation beyond the influence of discursive practices.  However, an issue 
with this conception is that it reduces innovation to structure, and renders agency somewhat 
impotent in determining itself autonomously.  The literature review in Chapter 2 echoes that 
this issue is shared in the concept of innovation in the discourse of strategic management.  
Therefore, to theorize innovation in a novel way, I move beyond Foucault to engage with the 
Political Discourse Theory developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). 
Political Discourse Theory (PDT) is a form of discourse analysis that focuses on politics and 
society.  More specifically, that focuses on the analytic deconstruction of discourse 
formations, using a theoretical framework that describes the construction of concepts that 
constitute and organise the formation.  With this framework, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
(also: Laclau, 2006, 2012; Mouffe, 1999a, 1999b; and the Essex School of discourse 
analysis) provide a theoretical model of discourse formations and practices, and, by 
articulating them, enable us to address the power relations associated with them. 
As with Foucaultian approaches, PDT does not seek to uncover determinable truths that 
apply to all.  Instead, PDT provides a theoretical framework by which to critique dominant 
narratives and fixed constellations of meanings associated with events and the labels used to 
make sense of them, and to analyse and articulate the contestation of meanings as and when 
they emerge.  I will explain the methodology of discourse theory that is used for this thesis, 
beginning with Foucault, and moving on to Laclau and Mouffe. 
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Laclau and Mouffe (2014 [1985]) follow a similar ontology to Foucault: ‘our analysis rejects 
the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices’ (2014: 93).  They describe a 
material reality that is outside of social construction but that can be experienced differently 
for different people, via the influence of socio-historic context and the personal sensibilities 
of each person: 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense 
that it occurs here and now, independently of my will.  But whether their specificity 
as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the 
wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field (2014: 94). 
The associated epistemology of political discourse theory might say that each various person, 
A, B and C […] – call them Alienor, [to]Bias and Christian – are part of different and 
personal amalgamations of environmental, cultural and historical influences, that these 
differences can lead to different and personal worldviews, and that these different 
worldviews could lead to different and personal interpretations, and different tellings, of the 
apparently identical events. 
Laclau and Mouffe (2014) argue that different individuals will have different interpretations 
of the material world due to having personal socio-historical contexts that have shaped their 
perceptions, and thus have different stances on ontology and epistemology and narratives of 
change.  Moreover, this reveals the limits of epistemology within a PDT perspective, PDT 
accepts that there is a something, that Laclau and Mouffe refer to as the constitutive outside, 
but that the most we can know of it is how that something has been interpreted in various 
ways: ‘what is not denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather 
different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive 
condition of emergence’ (2014: 94).  Via this interpretability, agents may display 
individuality – Laclau and Mouffe call this interpretability the Political, which will be 
discussed in more detail later.  The individual interpretation is tempered by the conditions of 
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expression within the enunciative function operates.  In other words, the Political is reduced 
in its capacity for expression due to discursive practices. 
Moreover, as discursive practices construct the conditions through which they are 
reconstructed, any instance of the Political that is marginalised or incongruent with the 
discursive practices arguably has less influence on the reconstitution of the discursive 
practices, and their marginalisation is institutionalised – the discursive practices and 
conditions of expression become ahistorical and no longer the subject of reflection and 
analysis.  As all social members are individuals inducted into organisations, when 
individuality is revealed, it is hard to clarify how much relates to pre-social induction and 
how much to post-social induction, even if this is possible.   
The PDT methodology is therefore dubious about claims of certainty, such as those abound 
in mainstream strategy research, based on the perspective that reality is not independent from 
the observer and objective truth cannot be demonstrated as fully known – that knowing is at 
some level subjective, from individuals to groups (this school of thought varies in the extent 
to which truth is constructed, but is in agreement that truths about the organisation, world and 
universe are subjective).   
However, the conceptual framework of PDT is highly abstract, and it does not have an 
associated methodology for practitioners.  For mainstream organisational theorists and 
practitioners the methodological issues of uncritically applying positivism to the social is not 
so much of an issue – nothing more than a philosophical complication that holds little utility, 
a complaint that obscures and casts doubt on the validity of strategic design without offering 
any viable alternatives.  The positivist response to post-structuralism is typically that the 
post-structuralist perspective, whether accurate or not, does not have much impact on the 
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running of organisations.  Why this should be the case is arguably due to the popularity of 
scientific method and positivism in organisational strategy.  However, this thesis argues that 
a methodology of post-structuralism has much to offer organisational strategy.    
PDT provides a framework that is appropriate for analysing the tensions between 
standardisation and innovation within organisations.  The theory is also highly suited for 
analysing the political nature of organisational competition and its relationship with strategy.  
Considered simultaneously, these two applications of political discourse theory offer a 
consideration of the way meanings are contested both within and between organisations, and 
provides a link between organisational strategy and the construction of acceptable practice 
and shared values.  In addition, by associating the concept of innovation with PDT, the 
theoretical framework can offer novel insights regarding the power relations and tensions 
between organisational strategy and organisational members, and the capability for 
innovation.  In doing so, the ethico-political dimensions of PDT approaches might be related 
to the interests of the mainstream approaches to strategy, and the pragmatic concerns of 
organisational managers and practitioners. 
A PDT approach, if applied to strategic management, might offer insights for theorists and 
practitioners.  The approach enables theory to be linked to context, to address crucial 
questions about the appropriateness of turning to past theories to deal with present and future 
situations; and how standardization could severely limit the capability for adaption and 
innovation within an organisation. 
1.2.3 | Terminology 
As discussed earlier, PDT is highly abstract, and for this reason not all of the terms used by 
Laclau and Mouffe are clear when using them in an empirical sense (Howarth, 2000).  It has 
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also been suggested that ‘scholars in this area each adapt discourse theory to address their 
research questions (Howarth, 2000; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002)’ (Walton, 2008: 98).  I 
will, therefore, take this opportunity to describe the terminology as it will be used hereafter.   
Foucault’s interpretation of inertia was disussed earlier.  To desribe the terminology of PDT I 
feel that it is worth starting by plaing it in ontet of the terminology of structural philosophy.  
This is because I interpret both Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe as deliberately drawing from 
terminiology found at the centre of structural philosophy.  That this selection is strategic.  
This strategic selection is intended to facilitate – in keeping with their philosophical position 
– the unfixing and reartiulation of the concepts that underpin much of structural philosophy 
(this idea is reflected on at more length at the end of the thesis).  In the case of Foucault, one 
central concept is inertia (among others).  As described by Foucault in context of statements, 
and here by Rabinow and Dreyfus, the concept of elements is central to structrualism: 
There are two kinds of structuralism: atomistic structuralism, in which the elements 
are completely specified apart from their role in some larger whole […] and holistic 
or diachronic structuralism, in which what counts as a possible element is defined 
apart from the system of elements but what counts as an actual element is a 
function of the whole system of differences of which the given element is a part 
(1983: xx)  
In the case of Laclau and Mouffe, their conceptual framework directly engages with the 
minutiae of structrualist terminology: beginning with elements and relations.  For Laclau and 
Mouffe (2014: 82), a ‘systematic set of relations is what we call discourse.’  Articulation 
establishes a relation between elements ‘such that their identity is modified as a result’.  
Articulation is like a rung between two points.  Discourse refers to the ‘structured totality 
resulting from the articulatory practice’, a framework of elements related by their 
articulation.  Articulatory practices are comparable with discursive practices, regarding their 
role as demarcating the parameters of discourse and providing the conditions of expression.  
When elements are part of an articulatory framework, they are referred to as moments, such 
    33 
that an element refers to the unarticulated (2014: 91).  This context provides the basis for the 
more nuanced terminology that follows. 
Laclau and Mouffe (2014) base their conception of political hegemony on a theory of signs 
(Saussure; Lacan).  Arguably building on Derrida’s theory of differance, Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that every sign is empty – that every sign has no predetermined meaning and that 
meaning is developed in relation to other signs.  Laclau and Mouffe call empty signifiers 
elements, and argue that, a bit like a piece of Lego™, each element is attachable to and also 
detachable from a wider framework.  By association with and within the articulatory 
framework, the element gains a relative conceptual meaning, becoming a signifier of 
associated meaning.    When an element becomes part of a framework, they describe it as a 
moment.  An element has undefined meaning; a moment has fixed meaning as part of a 
constellation of other moments. 
The fixing of meaning of moments is referred to as sedimentation.  A sedimented signifier is 
not open to alternative meanings – is not open to a process of rearticulation.  A framework of 
articulation that is not open to rearticulation is a political hegemony.  A political hegemony is 
comparable to a framework of inert concepts, to inert discursive practices.  All moments that 
constitute the framework are in a relationship of mutual definition, as such, by dominating 
the conditions for expression, for articulation of relations between elements, the hegemony is 
self-reinforcing. 
Hegemony exists by domination, not totalisation, for this is impossible, due to the primacy of 
the Political (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014: 130).  Laclau and Mouffe differentiate the Political 
and Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005: 9; Laclau, 2006: 112; see also Mouffe 
2000: 101). They define the Political as the inevitable difference of perspectives in social 
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relations, and Politics as a set of institutions and practices that create an order, that organise 
the field of differences.  Moreover, they argue that ‘there is no singly underlying principle 
fixing – and hence constituting – the whole field of differences’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014: 
97).  Therefore institutions are unable to create a system of order (politics) that applies to the 
entire social.  However, with political hegemonies, systems of order (politics) are created that 
dominate the social.  The Political is the precondition for hegemony – hegemonised systems 
of Politics deny the possibility of the Social (contradictory perspectives) from rearticulating 
the fixed signifiers that constitute the hegemonic formation.  As the Social (contradictory 
perspectives) is in direct opposition to the fixed meaning, hegemony is, by definition, 
antisocial.  Hegemonised Politics is the means by which different interpretations of the 
constitutive outside – instances of the Political – are aligned.  The concept of the Constitutive 
Outside refers to ‘[the exteriority that exists] between subject positions located within certain 
discursive formation and ‘elements’ which have no precise discursive articulation’ (2014: 
121). 
Again, a bit like Lego™, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) a fixed signifier can become 
destabilized and even dislocated from the hegemonic formation: a dislocated signifier.  This 
dislocation, leaving a vacuum of relative meaning, then reveals the Political, as the 
possibility for alternative meanings arises – the signifier becomes amenable to rearticulation.  
Individuals can act and construct meanings and identities particularly around a dislocatory 
event (Laclau, 1999) – this is known as political subjectivities – whereby individuals display 
agency.  Dislocated signifiers can lead to the contestation of meaning.   
Contested and empty signifiers are often treated as interchangeable terms, however, for this 
methodology, empty signifiers and contested signifiers are differentiated.  Laclau and Mouffe 
describe a state of signification that is neither ‘void’ nor ‘fixed.’  This state of a sign is 
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described as ‘contested,’ or ‘floating.’  Therefore, empty signifiers are undefined and void of 
meaning, while contested signifiers are undefined and contested in meaning, while fixed 
signifiers are defined and fixed in meaning.  The meaning of a contested signifier is 
articulated in different ways by different people.  Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe argue, a 
contested signifier reveals the Political.  
Laclau and Mouffe approach the emergence of contested signifiers in two ways: one, in 
which a previously fixed signifier becomes ‘dislocated’ from the hegemonic formation; two, 
in which a new signifier emerges that has no previous meaning.  Novel signifiers represent a 
slightly different development of a contested signifier, in that they have not been attached to 
a hegemonic formation, from which they are now emancipated, as in dislocated signifiers.  
For a signifier to be novel, it would have to be so in context of what is old, or normalized.  
Therefore, hegemony is still very much part of the concept of a novel signifier.  The 
Derridean difference in this case is that between new/old, or new/normal.  What is new 
cannot be what is old, therefore what is new, innovative, cannot be what is normal.  In each 
case, the two signifiers only have meaning in relation to each other. Superficially, hegemony 
might apply to the ‘old’ or ‘normalized’ side of the differance.  Whereby, arguably, 
hegemony, in precluding alternative meanings to the signifiers that constitute its formation, 
in doing so, precludes radical innovation from emerging.   
Gramsci describes a historical bloc as a ‘social and political space’ that is ‘relatively 
unified’.  Laclau and Mouffe draw on Gramsci’s concept of a historical bloc for their concept 
of nodal points, insofar as in their approach, nodes share a similarly significant role in the 
structure of discursive formations.  However, Laclau and Mouffe theorise the hegemonic 
bloc slightly differently to Gramsci: for them, the bloc consists of an array of ‘nodal points’, 
wherein the nodal points present salient events, and the array of articulatory practices – the 
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lattice of relations between the nodes, that bring mutual association and combinatorial 
meanings – is designed in accordance to a predisposed perspective, that is to say, is 
unavoidably biased, and often deliberately so (2014: 122). 
Laclau and Mouffe describe ‘contingent social logics’ that ‘will always be limited by other – 
frequently contradictory – logics’.  The contingency of concepts means that the ‘structuring 
of political spaces’ requires consideration from both ‘the points of view of the opposed 
logics’, which they describe as ‘the opposed logics of equivalence and difference’ (2014: 
116, emphasis added).  When the subjective perceptions (logics) of social actors are mutually 
discerned as equivalent, the social actors might form a group based upon this shared 
perception.  As such, they form an organisational intersubjective position.  In other words, 
group logic is formed due to a mutual sense of equivalence between individuals.  
Simultaneously, the logic of equivalence carries with it the logic of difference, which is 
associated with subjects considered to not satisfy the conditions of equivalence:  that is to 
say, the Other (2014: 116).  In this way, what combines, also separates. 
When logics of equivalence and difference lead to the formation of opposed groups, a 
frontier emerges between them.  The primacy of the Political means that ‘the distance 
between the two communities is something immediately given and acquired from the 
beginning, and it does not suppose any articulatory construction’ (2014: 122). 
Laclau and Mouffe move away from an economic-base theory of dialectics.  Instead, they 
propose multiple dialectics and multiple frontiers arising from logics of equivalence and 
difference over any number of political issues, and contested signifiers.  New dialectics can 
emerge, and current dialectics can dissolve, regarding any political subject.  When they 
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persist, arguably they are hegemonic as ‘without equivalence and without frontiers, it is 
impossible to speak strictly of hegemony’ (2014: 122) or a hegemonic formation. 
Logics of equivalence lead to hegemonic formations.  Hegemonic formations are not the 
same as social formations, and this distinction is the basis of the concept of Antagonism.  For 
Laclau and Mouffe, a social formation is ‘an ensemble of empirically given agents’ and a 
hegemonic formation is ‘an ensemble of discursive moments’.  If there is a sense of a 
formation that combines both, it is not possible: in the notion of such a formation the agential 
formation and the moments formation are discernibly separated: ‘through that totality it is 
possible to distinguish them with regard to something external to the latter’.  In other words, 
like a partial eclipse, a hegemonic formation does not entirely encompass the agential 
formation, and therefore 'it is on the basis of its own limits that a formation is shaped as a 
totality’ (2014: 129), for a formation that is a totality cannot encompass the social formation, 
the social and the homogenous are contradictory notions.  Therefore ‘strictly speaking, 
antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or rather, they constitute the limits of 
society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself’ (2014: 125) 
Instead of antagonism, Mouffe proposes an approach that embraces contradiction rather than 
seeking to eliminate it: her theory of Agonism is ‘one of the most prominent alternative 
approaches in recent democratic theory […] (Mouffe and Laclau, 1985; Mouffe 1993, 2000, 
2005)’ (Kerppinen et al., 2008: 6).  An agonistic approach to opposed logics would not 
attempt to block the identity of the opposition, or attempt to totalise the identity of the self.  
As such, an agonistic approach would treat the perspective of the opposition as legitimate.  
Mouffe (1999a) argues that there may be common ground to be found between opposed 
logics, within the underlying premises that constitute the level at which Political opposition is 
revealed.  
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1.2.4 | Summary 
At the heart of this thesis is an analysis of the strategy discourse in organisation studies.  
How ideas interact in organisations and how the pratice of organisational strategy influences 
this interaction.  The orthodox approach to strategy that is favoured by practitioners and 
mainstream research is founded on the construction of shared values.  This thesis analyses 
the legitimacy of the concepts upon which strategy is founded and their links to 
structuralism. 
The taken approach draws on the archaeological and genealogical approaches of Foucault for 
tracing the knowledge of strategic management in terms of its concepts.  Concepts are treated 
as composed of a form/signifier that is imbued with a meaning.  The literature review in 
Chapter 2 forms part of the archaeology and identifies core concepts before tracing them in 
the history of knowledge.  In order to understand the ways in which the core concepts 
reproduce and dominate ideas of strategy, we need to further probe their origins within the 
history of knowledge. The archaeology facilitates a genealogical analysis of conceptual 
inertia: when the meaning becomes fixed in a framework of relations with other fixed 
concepts.   
The approach turns to Political Discourse Theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) for analysing 
innovation in context of power relations that relate to the core concepts and conceptual 
inertia.  The genealogical approach draws on the concept of the Political – that an event has 
a blurred ontology and limited epistemology, and may be interpreted personally – and 
Politics – a system of organisation for managing disputes emerging from the Political.  With 
this theoretical framework, strategic management is analysed as an organisational system, 
(Politics), for managing incongruent perspectives (the Political) regarding the design and 
    39 
implementation of strategy.  This approach represents an orthogonal alternative to the 
struturalism found in orthodox approaches to strategy.   
With the philosophal position outlined above, the thesis analyses the politics of innovation 
with regard to the strategy of constructing shared values.  Emergences of the Political are 
here studied as emergences of ideational innovation juxtaposed with organisational norms 
and strategies of normalization that are based on structuralism and positivism.  This is done 
by srutinizing the legitimacy of the power relations involved in discerning what ideas and 
practices represent innovation and what do not.   
Therefore, with discourse theory, the thesis a) reviews strategic management knowledge and 
traces the core concepts in the history of knowledge, b) uses political discourse theory to 
consider the power relations in, and the legitimacy of, the strategic management of 
knowledge in an organisation, and c) complements the theoretical work with a case study of 
GM biotechnology, so as to ground the theoretical framework within an analysis of the 
strategy discourse and practices of an organisation, in this case with innovation of politically 
controversial products at the centre of its strategy. 
The intentions of this research can be focused as the following three questions:  
 What are the core concepts of strategic management discourse, and how do they 
combine in the field of discourse? 
 What connections are there between the history of the core concepts of strategy 
discourse and power relations at play in the design and performance of organisational 
strategy? 
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 How does innovation emerge in context of power relations in the design and 
performance of strategy discourse?  
The thesis will conclude with a discussion of, these questions, and reflection on the 
conceptual framework, bringing the findings of the case study back to the theoretical 
implications for strategic management raised by the conceptual framework.  Not least, 
regarding the legitimacy of power relations in organisational strategies that might be revealed 
during emergences of the Political.   
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2 | Strategic Management Literature Review 
The mainstream strategic management literature is reviewed in terms of its sub-themes: 
population ecology; strategy as process; strategy as practice (S-A-P); dynamic resource based 
view (RBV).  This literature review argues that there are three core concepts that underpin 
the mainstream strategic management discourse.  These are inertia, friction and adaptation. 
The review of these concepts is organised primarily by conceptual faultlines, and then by 
schools of research where possible.  Nonetheless, the concepts do interweave, therefore the 
distinction according to faultiness is often simply an analytic construction, for the purpose of 
the review, i.e., it is not intended to suggest that the concepts should be treated as entirely 
differentiated from one another, if anything, quite the opposite is suggested.  During the 
course of this thesis, the scientific approach to time and space, of military strategy, and of 
evolutionary adaptation are all considered in context of these themes of strategic 
management. 
This literature review is not the first review of the strategy literature.  A review of preceding 
reviews, at its most stripped down, suggests that the ‘master concept’ of mainstream 
organisation research is the field of strategy (Carter, 2013: 1047); and the main focus of 
strategy research is change.  There is a recurring theme that ‘implicitly common […] is the 
notion of change, both organizational and environmental, and the magnitude of that change’ 
(Hopkins et al, 2013: 77); that ‘the management of change has attracted considerable 
attention in the management literature’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 322).  Arguably the 
prevalence of research on ‘change’ in the strategy literature is because the concept of strategy 
itself is closely related to the concept of change – insofar as the concept of strategy 
influences the concept of organisational change, and vice-versa, such that the notion of 
change influences the concept of strategy.  However, the symbiotic co-construction of these 
    42 
concepts is an area of research that is under developed: for instance, ‘we have not 
acknowledged that strategy itself is implicated in the very conditions it tries to change’ (Huff, 
2001: 129).   
In this way, the concept of change provides a starting focus for an archaeological literature 
review of organisational strategy, out of which the research questions might be engaged with.  
This chapter will review the academic literature that studies organisational change in context 
of strategy.  Arguably, in its most general sense, change is defined as difference, while non-
change is define as no difference.  If the non-change state is not known, then the context of 
difference is less clear.  The review will begin with non change, or inertia, so that the review 
of change as contextualised.   
2.1 | Inertia: Non-Change and Resistance to Change 
As suggested above, the main focus of organisational strategy is change which, by extension, 
we could argue also includes non-change, otherwise known as inertia, by binary opposition.  
Hannan and Freeman (1984) propose a concept of strategic inertia, in relation to their 
approach of organizational ecology.  In the literature of organisational strategy, the general 
definition of strategic inertia is when there is a large disparity between the rate of change of 
the organisation and the environment, in which organisational change is far slower (Hopkins 
et al., 2013: 77).  Strategic inertia is typically problematised as resistance to organisational 
change: strategic inertia loosely means the tendency for organisations to show commitment 
to a status quo strategy (Huff et al., 1992), and the resistance to strategic renewal (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003; Mallette and Hopkins, 2013), for instance, resistance to the adoption of a 
new technology that partially or entirely replaces an incumbent system (Polites and 
Karahanna, 2012). 
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A typology delineating strategic inertia, leads to different problematisations of the concept in 
research.  The first can be considered as structural inertia, ‘when organisations rarely change 
their structure (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Schaefer, 1998; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002), 
which can present an obstacle to organisational change.  Sources of structural inertia have 
been associated with numerous internal and external factors (Huff, 2001: 125) and 
organisational size (Miller and Chen, 1994).  Internal factors of structural inertia include ‘the 
dynamics of political coalitions, and the tendency for precedents to become normative 
standards’; external factors include ‘legal and other barriers to entry and exit from realms of 
activity’ and ‘exchange relations with other organizations’ (Hannan and Freeman 1984: 149). 
Another is practice and task based inertia (Delfgaauw and Swank, 2015), a procedural 
obstacle to organisational change when organisations become fixed in their ways and 
routines are rarely reviewed.  For the rest of this thesis, practice and tasked based inertia will 
be referred to as practical inertia.  A third problematisation of strategic inertia is cognitive 
inertia (e.g., Huff et al., 1992).  Cognitive inertia describes a reluctance to review familiar 
assumptions and beliefs (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Raff, 2000; Durand, 2006), with 
‘routinization’ perceived as a way to prevent a firm’s satisfactory operations from being 
reconsidered at each use’ (Durand, 2006: 84).  Sometimes labelled ‘deliberate inertia’, 
cognitive inertia is generally associated with management (Tushman et al., 2011), when key 
decision makers endorse strategic inertia, then ‘defend and legitimize this choice’ (Schwarz, 
2012: 547).  In an organisation that favours strategic inertia for its survival value, 
management can deliberately implement strategic inertia (Fenton-O’Creevy, 2000; Hopkins 
et al., 2013) 
Arguably, strategic inertia – the concept and the issues pertaining to it – is prevalent in 
mainstream approaches to strategy research, sometimes explicitly, sometimes not.  Strategy 
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as process approaches conceptualise organizational structure in a more specific way than 
organizational ecology approaches. 
Process approaches treat organizational structures as a more ephemeral phenomenon 
(Ciborra, 2002; Hernes and Weik, 2007), structures do not stand firm amidst a changing 
environment, like a lighthouse against the tall waves of stormy seas, but are reconstituted as 
part of a changing environment such that the distinction is more blurred.  For process 
approaches, structures are ‘observably’ formed in context of a ‘flow’ (Pettigrew, 1997), that 
is interconnected with environmental flows, like the shifting shape of a candle flame.  
Therefore, as the name suggests, strategy as process approaches treat organizational strategy 
as an emergent process (Moncrieff, 1999).  As such, a central approach of process research is 
the search for ‘patterns’ in the flow of organisational processes (Hendry and Pettigrew, 
1992), to try to identify both change and regularities in organizational behaviour that might 
represent an ephemeral structure, which in turn could be attributed to the implementation of a 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1979; Dahlmann and Brammer, 2011). 
In this way, strategic inertia is thus treated in relation to a routinised flow, a regular pattern, 
in terms of a linear sequence of events (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2010).  
This can be related to the concept of strategic inertia.  Structural inertia can apply to an 
unchanging process that repeats through a linear conception of time, as in the description 
given by Hannan and Freeman.  Mintzberg (1987: 31) argues that ‘strategies are to 
organizations what blinders are to horses: they keep them going in a straight line, but impede 
the use of peripheral vision.’  This can be related to the concept of strategic inertia in 
organisational ecology.  However, it might be argued that the aspect of cognitive inertia is 
not sufficiently theorized in the process approaches. 
    45 
Differentiating itself from strategy as process, the claim for contribution in strategy as 
practice (S-A-P) literature is that strategy is embedded in the routines (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), activities (Porter, 1985), rules (Davis et al., 2009), and their interconnected dynamics 
(Mella and Colombo, 2014) of an organisation.  The concept of practical inertia can be 
related to strategy as practice approaches, as both share a focus on the observable routines 
and practices of organizations.  Routine is connects structure to performance, such that 
routine is articulated in the strategic design, and performance is the manifestation of ‘specific 
actions, by specific people, at specific time and places, that bring the routine to life' (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003: 94).   S-A-P argues that change is a product of routines, that the central 
distinction between plan and performance (Thomas and Hardy, 2011), facilitates the 
opportunity for change within organizations (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), such that 
practices enable (or impede) strategic foresight in organizations (Sarpong et al., 2013).   
Drawing on quantitative methods, Polites and Karahanna (2012) discuss cognitive inertia and 
practical inertia in relation to the notion of ‘habit’, as ‘habit is often confused with inertia in 
the literature’ (2012: 25).  Their description of the habitual use of an incumbent system 
associates similar internal factors to strategic inertia as defined by Hannan and Freeman, with 
extra emphasis on the psychological aspects of rationalization, normative pressures and 
commitment in encouraging the onset of inertia.  Polites and Karahanna (2012) call or more 
psychological approaches to problematising inertia in S-A-P, and propose a psychological 
distinction between habit and inertia, with habit associated with unconscious processes and 
drives, while inertia also contains a conscious element   Cognitive inertia is nonetheless 
under theorized, as S-A-P lacks a concept of agency.  In S-A-P, the mainstream conception 
of inertia at an individual level is that of consistent consumer preferences over time (Bawa 
1990; Greenfield 2005; McMullan, 2005).  S-A-P subsume agency to structure and as such, 
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while it is applicable to practical and structural inertia, the approach is unable to consider 
cognitive inertia. 
The resource based view (RBV) of strategy, sometimes known as dynamic capabilities, 
reflects the shift of strategic management towards a greater emphasis on internal resources 
and capabilities, than on environmental factors (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011: 1501).  RBV 
is considered to be a more strategically flexible approach that facilitates organisational 
adaptation to environmental changes (Teece, 2007, 2010; Teece et al., 1990, 1997).  One 
factor for this has been proposed to be ‘network responsiveness’ (Kleinbaum and Stuart, 
2014), i.e. how long networks of organisational members take to align with changes in 
formal structures (Teece, 2012: 1395).  Arguably this approach connects dynamic 
capabilities to structural inertia: put simply, Kleinaum and Stuart describe inertia in RBV as 
how long it takes networks of performances (organisational members) to align with 
routinised logics (organisational structures). 
The network approach to RBV has similarities with S-A-P and the gap between strategic 
intention (structure) and implementation (practice/performance).  This is similar to the 
definition of strategic inertia in ecological approaches, only here applied internally to the 
organisation, such that it is the rate of change of the network compared with the rate of 
change of the structure – a sudden change in structure is a fast rate of change, therefore the 
responsiveness of the network is compared to a rate of change, even if the rate isn’t 
necessarily described as a process.   
A slightly more psychological approach is found in RBV than in practice and process 
approaches.  RBV research focuses on cognitive and behavioural processes (e.g., Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Winter, 2000; Alvarez and 
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Busenitz, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Gavetti, 2005; Lane et al., 
2006; Helfat et al., 2007; Kaplan, 2008).  As such, RBV combines a practice approach with 
knowledge approach, and is interested in how logics need to be performed, or ‘enacted,’ to 
become part of practice (Lindberg, 2014), and favours learning and intellectual property 
rights as ‘retention mechanisms’ (Grant, 1996a; Durand, 2006: 84).  This association relates 
cognitive inertia to practical inertia, as here logics are positioned in the same relation to 
strategy as routines are in S-A-P.  i.e., RBV associates routines with logics. 
In RBV approaches, strategic inertia within structures and routines might be argued to be 
related to outmoded information and knowledge, to a ‘rigidity’ of knowledge in organisations 
(Zhou and Li, 2012).  There is research that identifies the onset of inertia with knowledge 
management.  The connection is made due to institutional-based barriers (Zhu et al., 2012; 
Chadee and Roxas, 2013; Smith and Thomas, 2015), such as knowledge bases (Zhou and Li, 
2012), that obstruct individuals from rendering their capabilities fully and from 
communication explicitly with others (Teece et al., 1997).  In this way, RBV problematises 
cognitive inertia in terms of institutional learning which, as with any knowledge, is 
susceptible to dogma, and a desire to ‘preserve the collective practices’ (Nag et al., 2007: 
821).  Nonetheless, while there is engagement with cognitive inertia, it is not theorised in 
detail.  RBV has been critiqued for ‘lacking a dimension of psychology’ (Bloodgood, 2014), 
such that the problematisation of knowledge is theoretically and philosophically naïve.  
Arguably, the RBV approach to knowledge in organisations is not sufficient for theorising 
cognitive inertia. 
The concept of inertia is perfomed in strategy research, generally sub-divided into the three 
forms of structural, practical and cognititve inertia.  While structural and practical inertia are 
prevalent themes of the various approaches to strategy research, the review suggests that the 
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concept of cognitive inertia appears to be undertheorised relative to the structural and 
practical forms.  Moreover, critique of the concept of inertia in strategic management has 
come for instance from Kelly and Amburgey (1991: 591), who ‘suggest a revised 
formulation of the concept of inertia’ on the basis of evidence that its current 
problematisation is ‘misleading’.  This critique provides a foundation for the reconception of 
the concept of inertia in strategy research, a reconception that is at the heart of this thesis. 
Generally speaking, the alternative to resisting change is to change, to adapt.  Therefore, 
having briefly reviewed inertia, how strategic change is theorised in the literature is a natural 
step to take next, this is because it provides further context of the concept of inertia in being 
the definitional opposite of inertia.  In doing so, any relations between the concept of 
strategic inertia and the concept of strategic renewal and adaptation should become clearer. 
2.2 | Adaptation: Innovation is Competitive Advantage 
As will be argued, in the literature, adaptation is closely related to innovation, to competitive 
advantage, and to profit.  In mainstream strategic management, ‘the hypothesis of 
competitive advantage dominates’ (Powell, 2001: 875) strategy ‘as a body of knowledge and 
practice’ (Durand and Vaara, 2005: 14) in both academic and practitioner articles (Perren, 
2013: 235).  Porter’s theories on competitive advantage (1987, 1990, 2008, 2014) have been 
of singular influence on the mainstream conception of strategy (Ryal, 2013), and innovation 
is closely related to competitive advantage as the means by which to gain it, as a source of 
relative profit (Huff, 2001).  For example, see Porter’s (1990) work The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations, a titular homage to Adam Smith’s (1776) The Wealth of Nations.  
Therefore, how innovation is conceptualized in economic theory is worth looking at in 
tandem with the different approaches to strategic management.  
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Generally speaking, in economics, the study of competitive advantage contains the concept 
of perfect competition, which treats all agents as identical (different firms and individuals 
that are identical to one another).  Perfect competitive conditions are an idealised model.  A 
corollary of this concept, the principles of self interest and bounded rationality become 
central to the mainstream economic approach to competitive advantage, and as the basis for 
individual and organisational motivation (Brickson, 2007).  In S-A-P, the mainstream 
conception of inertia at an individual level is that of consistent consumer preferences over 
time (Bawa 1990; Greenfield 2005; McMullan, 2005).  This arguably narrow conception of 
psychology is due to the use of Rational Choice Theory (RCT), an approach that is derived 
from normative psychology and defines what constitutes rational behaviour.  In RCT, self 
interest and competitive advantage are the primary motivations for a ‘rational’ strategy.   By 
definition, the defining characteristics ascribed to rational boundaries treats alternative 
behaviour as ‘irrational’, as ‘absurd.’  Economic theory evaluates innovation in terms of 
profit potential (Davila et al., 2012), which becomes the measure of utility used to both 
design and judge innovations (Van Praag and Versloot, 2007; Parker and Van Praag, 2010). 
In an economic context, innovation without profit is considered to be folly, irrational.  The 
RCT approach to psychology is prevalent in mainstream economic theory (Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2011) and strategic management has long sought to develop rational models (Ansoff, 
1965; Hofer and Schendel, 1978).  However, there are calls for a richer approach than the 
reductive and normative approach to ‘rationality’ based on traditional economic analysis 
(e.g., Bromiley and Papenhausen, 2003). Related approaches critique and propose revisions 
and alternatives to the central position of self-interest in economic theory (Etzioni, 1988; 
Bowie, 1991; Chen et al., 1999; Mintzberg et al., 2002; Stormer, 2003; Ghoshal, 2005), that 
consider whether self-interest is immoral, and the affect that this might have on policy 
making (Bowles, 2008; Bowles and Hwang, 2008); other approaches work towards 
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expanding the concept of ‘rational choice’ in strategic management by combining 
sociological theory with economic theory (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982; Baum and Dobbin, 
2000), these approaches typically draw on a positivistic methodology (for instance, Thietart, 
2005) that is not as far from normative psychology as many of the critiques have called for.   
The RBV approach is the favoured strategy for attaining competitive advantage (Bower, 
1970; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991, 1997; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; 
Barney, et al., 2001; Powell, 2001; Insead and Chatain, 2008; Schilke, 2014) and therefore, 
perhaps it is not surprising that the mainstream conception of innovation problematises it in 
terms of RBV (Barrales-Molina et al., 2010; Martin-de Castro, 2015).  RBV is interested in 
explaining how organisations maintain positions of competitive advantage by changing, 
through strategic renewal.  RBV considers the capability for organisational adaptation to be 
the source of competitive advantage, with organisational learning and knowledge 
management key to this capability (Drucker, 1985; Huff, 2001), and is arguably comparable 
to RCT as they share a focus on knowledge in strategic decision making – with RCT defining 
innovation for profit for competitive advantage, and RBV defining knowledge for innovation 
for competitive advantage, in combination, innovation of knowledge is a rational strategy for 
being profitable due to competitive advantage.   
Arguably, RBV relates adaptation to overcoming cognitive inertia (Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000).  RBV is more capable of considering cognitive adaptation than either the ecological, 
process and practice approaches.  Researchers associate some forms of innovation with skills 
and knowledge of individuals rather than routines (Teece, 2012) or processes.  For RBV 
approaches, high adaptability and innovation can lead to a competitive advantage, while 
persistent innovation is a means of sustaining a position of relative dominance (Bierly and 
Hämäläinen, 1995; Martinez-Ros and Labeaga, 2009; Clausen et al., 2011; Antonelli et al., 
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2012; Teece, 2012; Antonelli et al., 2013; Le Bas and Scellato, 2014; Lhuillery, 2014; Haned 
et al., 2014).  In context of innovation, there is literature that connects persistent innovation 
to knowledge management (Lu et al., 2008; Tsai et al., 2015), including learning-based 
approaches (Westerlund and Rajala, 2010), that argue that collaborative learning can lead to 
innovation (Reeves, et al., 2004), which, by the logic of the strategy, would in turn lead to 
competitive advantage.   
In S-A-P, the concept of innovation can be set in context of practical inertia – normalized 
practices and routines.  However, there appears to be some ambivalence in the S-A-P 
research regarding whether routinization is of benefit to innovation (Wright et al., 2012; 
Mella and Colombo, 2014), by enabling the successful implementation of new practices 
(Hoff, 2014), or a hindrance as ‘the opposite of routinization is invention’ (Huff, 2001: 126).  
Other research links competitive advantage through innovation to the strategy as process 
approaches (Akkermans and van Aken, 1992), which tend to emphasise the unplanned nature 
of adaptation and innovation (De Rond, 2014).  These approaches make a link between 
serendipity and innovation, thus connecting innovation with uncertain conditions, with the 
flux and noise of processes and their environs.  Process approaches also see innovation as a 
way to ‘overcome inertia’, with inertia referring to ‘leaving legacy structures untouched’ 
(Moore, 2003: 91) to the detriment of strategic renewal.  Innovation as process might refer to 
a shift in organizational patterns, in ephemeral structure that reveals it ephemeral state, i.e., a 
shape-shifting organization.  There are relatively few process approaches that relate to the 
study of cognitive renewal, which is undertheorised (Barr et al., 1992).  In organisational 
ecology, innovation is a means of survival in a competitive and changing environment and as 
a means of strategic renewal (Grant, 1996b; Quinn et al., 1997; Huff, 2001; Huang et al., 
2013).  Ecological approaches have an ambivalent view of innovation, in that sometimes 
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inertia is argued to be the best strategy for survival, in which case the relation between 
innovation and competitive advantage is less clear cut (Andersson and Ford, 2015). 
The review suggests that, in strategic management, the source of innovation is generally 
considered within the same lens as economic theory.  Economics studies innovation in terms 
of growth theory.  In growth theory, the causes of innovation are considered to be 
endogenous and/or exogenous, i.e., from without or within an organisation or system, and 
there are different theories and calculations associated with different explanations.  Growth is 
the objective of business strategies, as this means greater relative profit, which implies larger 
market share, larger dominion with the finite carrying capacity of the market domain. 
Exogenous innovation is conceptualized as the rate of technological progress.  Solow growth 
hypotheses that, regarding a Cobb-Douglas production function, used to calculate GDP, any 
discrepancy between the outcome value and the input values is the result of innovation – that 
the process of production has been innovated in some way so as to be more efficient, thus 
explaining the so-called Solow residual (McCombie, 2000).  The Solow residual is how 
innovation is measured in macro-economics.  Mechanistic, processual, innovation is framed 
in context of efficiency.  Innovation in strategic management is typically measured 
quantitatively, according to the process efficiency of inputs-outputs: an increase in efficiency 
indicates technological innovation (the same principle as the Solow residual).  While the 
standard interpretation of a Solow residual is an understandable assumption, this approach to 
innovation remains a monumental assumption. 
Of the mainstream approaches to strategy, organisational ecology most explicitly engages 
with exogenous change and draws on ‘panel data, population analyses, and survival analyses’ 
to calculate the ‘probability of the emergence of organizational forms’ (Durand, 2006: 84).  
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Therefore, it could be argued that the favoured methodology of research into exogenous 
innovation and adaptation does not include the more sociological nuances of motivation, 
psychology and politics.  Relating to exogenous factors, organisational change/renewal is 
considered a significant risk (Jacobs et al., 2013).  Causes of inertia are theorized in the 
literature to be due to the association of innovation with risk in economic theory (Morse, 
2005; Banu Goktan and Miles, 2011; Paulino, 2014), in context of environmental shocks, for 
example the perceived increased risk following the 2008 financial crisis (Archibugi et al., 
2013a, 2013b; Matras-Bolibok, 2013). 
Endogenous approaches propose macroeconomic models based on microeconomic principles 
to account for innovation.  These approaches associate innovation with internal forces.  The 
endogenous approach to innovation is typically derived from econometric approaches to 
strategy, such as game theory (Drahos and Maher, 2004; Webster, 2004; Muller et al., 2005, 
2012; Voepel et al., 2005; Loewe and Dominiquini, 2006; Giesen et al., 2007, 2010; Loewe 
and Chen, 2007; Jimenez-Jimenez and Sanz-Valle, 2008a, 2008b; Zhang et al., 2009; 
Dervitsiotis, 2011; Clausen and Pohjola, 2013).  In endogenous approaches, innovation is 
treated as product related or associated with strategic practical renewal, and typically 
conceptualized as quantifiable.  Innovation seems to be perceived differently in 
contemporary business as opposed to the past, for instance in the 1960s (Corson, 1962; 
Schon, 1963): ‘in our culture today […] “Inventor” is very nearly a dirty word’ (Schon, 
1963: 77).  There is a feeling in some of the literature that the concept of the ‘innovator’ has 
been lost (Frick, 2014), regarded as a fiction by those who seek to find ways to systemise 
innovation (Hargadon and Sutton, 2000).  The perspective of the innovator and of innovation 
is more frequently seen as of something of a top-down (Pearson, 2002) systemisable process 
(Drucker, 1985; Gottfredson and Aspinall, 2005; Reichstein and Salter, 2006; Selden and 
MacMillan, 2006) that can be quantifiably measured to gauge the performance (Anthony et 
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al. 2006) of organisations and individuals.  Endogenous approaches thus associate innovation 
with organizational routines (Mella and Colombo, 2014) and organizational logics (Waldorff, 
2013; Hoon and Jacobs, 2014).   
The wider strategic management literature typically sees innovation as the remit of 
management (Hollen et al., 2013), this trend is arguably still seen in RBV approaches that see 
the improvisation of management as the source of innovation (e.g., Teece, 2012: 1395).  
RBV approaches consider barriers to radical innovation (Sosa, 2013; Story, 2014) that might 
be found within the formation of strategy, significantly reducing the conditions for 
innovation (Thietart, 2005).  These are therefore endogenous barriers.  Critiques of the RBV 
approach argue that it does not provide many satisfactory explanations for the ‘the origins of 
an organization’s uniqueness’ (Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Durand, 2006: 73), which can 
arguably interpreted as suggesting that RBV is unable to include exogenous context in its 
concept of innovation. 
In S-A-P, sources of innovation are assumed to emerge from outside the organisation (Huff, 
2001) but the practice approach rarely engages with the external, albeit occasionally through 
the lens of the organisation only (Walton, 2008), while ignoring exogenous socio-political 
influences: for this reason, along with the favoured mechanistic approach that subsumes 
agency to structure, the S-A-P approach has been critiqued for a lack of sociological nous 
(e.g., Carter et al., 2008a, 2008b).  However, alternative approaches (Fiol and Romanelli, 
2012) – that are based on the work of social theorists such as Foucault, Latour, De Certeau 
and Giddens – are also critiqued within the literature, for reducing their use of these theorists 
to a strategy perspective only (e.g., Carter et al., 2008a, 2008b).  S-A-P is critiqued for being 
based on ‘cold information processing logic’ that subsumes agency, and innovation, into 
structure (Hodgkinson, and Healey, 2011: 1512).   
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What might be considered an attempt to avoid over emphasizing either endogenous or 
exogenous factors, is the concept of ‘open innovation’ (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rufat-Latre 
et al., 2010; Muzamil Naqshbandi and Kaur, 2014), which argues that the boundary between 
an organisation and its environment is more permeable than is it is treated in mainstream 
approaches.  Something of a middle path sees strategy as providing a guide to orientate ‘a 
creative decision-making process’ (Hacklin and Wallnofer, 2012: 166).  For instance, Ovans 
(2015) argues that in strategic management there is a split between conceptions of innovation 
as associated with people or process.  She decides both and argues that strategy is a double 
edged sword regarding innovation: ‘talented people can be hobbled by poor processes; 
hesitant people can be uplifted by smart processes’ (2015, final page).  As such, strategy can 
be a barrier to innovation, as well as beneficial.  This interpretation can be supported by 
approaches that argue that renewal and innovation are driven by ‘the subtle relation between 
rule-following and rule-breaking’ (Geiger and Schröder, 2014: 170), that associate 
innovation with subversion (Bureau and Zander, 2014), with ‘disruptive talent’ (Christensen, 
1997; Hart and Christensen, 2002).  While the system based approach appears to be favoured 
in both endogenous and exogenous approaches, these approaches suggest that there is a 
return to consider the individual as an ‘innovator’ going against conformity. 
In strategy research, the core concept of adaptation is formulated in terms of innovation, in 
turn, innovation is considered to be a source of competitive advantage.  Innovation is 
generally associated with organisational systems, or the environment outside an 
organisational system, such that in either case innovation is not generally considered in 
relation to the individual participants of an organisation. 
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These perspectives of innovation introduce questions of agency-structure and power relations 
into how innovation is conceptualised and treated in strategic management literature.  How 
power relations relate to innovation and inertia is reviewed in context of the core concept of 
friction/resistance. 
2.3 | Resistance, Friction and Dissent 
There is an alternative conception of resistance to change in strategic management literature, 
one that is not based on strategic inertia.  Lewin (1951) proposes a problematisation of the 
forces that hinder strategic change, although his model is transferrable to other forms of 
organisational performance.  The approach conceptualises two opposed forces, one 
consisting of propulsive forces, such as operations and strategic goals that will take the 
organisation forward, the other consisting of perceived forces opposing and hindering 
organisational progress.  This has been a method consistently used by management and 
strategy practitioners since conception (Bargal et al., 1992; Adelman, 1993; Argyris, 1997; 
Burnes, 2004a, 2004b; Burnes and Cooke, 2013; Swanson and Creed, 2014).  The dominant 
view of resistance in both strategic management practice and theory is negative and ‘a sign of 
failure’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 323), a ‘problem’ (Dent and Goldberg, 1999) to be 
‘eliminated’ (Giangreco and Peccei, 2005: 1816) or overcome (e.g., Zander, 1950; 
Cummings and Worley, 1997; French and Bell, 1990). 
S-A-P approaches study ‘hindrance factors’ during strategic change that could be 
conceptually compared with that of resistance as friction, for instance in implementing a 
‘mass-production-to-mass-customization transition’, i.e., an initiative of strategic renewal 
(Rungtusanatham and Salvador, 2008: 385).  Some S-A-P research focuses on the problem of 
strategic intention (Chia and Holt, 2006; Weber et al., 2001), and/or unintended outcomes 
during organisational performance (Balogun and Johnson, 2005).  The intention of strategy is 
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related to the routines that are implemented, and associated with employees and apparatus 
rather than the environment. 
In RBV approaches, hindrances are related to information and knowledge – barriers to 
innovation – the approaches are more related to the concept of cognitive inertia than to 
friction and could be said to lack the political dimension between the organisation and its 
surroundings.  Strategy as process research focuses on patterns within organisational flows to 
identify inertia and change.  As part of this approach, process strategies study uncertainty due 
to the dynamic environment (e.g., Kaplan, 2008), and therefore arguably engage with 
hindrances relating to friction. 
Process approaches acknowledge that ‘noise’ becomes mixed in with the ‘pattern’ leading to 
a flux of processes, including environmental, and this noise interferes with the 
implementation of strategy, leading to a gap between intention and outcome (e.g., Gray, 
2001; Moyer, 2004; Eriksson, 2008).  According to Huff (2001: 125), that strategic design 
may falter during implementation is ‘easy to observe.’  In terms of daily organizational 
activity, ‘orchestrating activities in different parts of the organization and its larger 
environment takes time and leads to obligations that are not easily abandoned.’  The 
definition of noise varies from sonic meanings such as ‘senseless shouting’, and musical 
dissonance, to mechanistic and functional definitions of ‘signal disturbance’, and ‘irrelevant 
or meaningless data’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary).  This has several implications.  Not 
least, that it is a functionalist interpretation of discord: friction is invariably negative, a force 
of drag, a problem.  Secondly, by extension, process approaches, while focusing on fluid 
phenomena that seem morphologically different to mechanistic approaches, arguably remain 
functionalist nonetheless.   
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For Lewin, resistance is a systems phenomenon, not psychological (Scheuer, 2015), and 
therefore shares the mechanistic approaches and functional logic that are favoured in 
strategic management (Hodgkinson and Clarke (2007).  Adopters of the S-A-P approach 
argue that ‘this “practice-turn” involves a radical reformulation of the intractable problem of 
agency and structure that enables us to bypass the ‘micro/macro’ distinction so intimately 
tied to the social sciences in general and to strategy research in particular’  (Chia and 
MacKay, 2007).  They call this a ‘post-processual’ approach.  Therefore, arguably S-A-P 
shares the mechanistic and functional approach to the conception of the organisation: ‘the 
mutual constitution of structure and agency, generally subscribed by practice theorists, 
rejects their manifestation as distinct entities’ (Herapath, 2014: 858).  Practice research has 
been criticized, even by some within the canon, for not considering agency in context of 
broader social practices (Denis et al., 2007; Moisander and Stenfors, 2009; Golsorkhi et al., 
2010; Sillince et al., 2012; Vaara and Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2012).   This critique 
of S-A-P chimes with ongoing questions of agency and organisational moral responsibility in 
other areas of strategy literature (e.g., Carney, 1987; and Powell, 2014).  There is literature 
that engages with the issue of power relations, which argues that S-A-P places too much 
emphasis on (or trust in) systems of power to implement strategic practice, as well as deny 
the presence of subjectivity (McCabe, 2009; Orlikowski, 2010; Herapath, 2014).  Elsewhere, 
there are arguments that S-A-P would benefit from a ‘stronger emphasis’ on the ‘contextual 
and hidden characteristics of strategy-making’ (Rasche and Chia, 2009: 713), and that in S-
A-P ‘far more attention needs to be paid to the politics of practice’ (Carter et al. 2008a: 111).  
Therefore, politics and power relations are undertheorized in S-A-P. 
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In process approaches the interplay of a variety of ‘often conflicting agendas’ can lead to the 
loss of strategic clarity.  For these reasons, process approaches provide further insight into 
‘how organizational realities temper grand strategic ideas’ (Huff, 2001: 125).  As such, 
process approaches concede that contingency plans, no matter how elaborate, will not fully 
describe how events unfold.  Therefore, much process research focuses on the idea of 
emergent strategy with this flux in mind.  For example, Quinn’s (1978) influential work 
describes strategy as a logically incremental process, that responds to opportunities as they 
emerge.  Similar approaches focus on strategic flexibility, as opposed to ‘fixed’ strategic 
plans, in the face of uncertain environments (e.g., Isenberg, 1987; Sull, 2005; Moyer, 2008).  
These approaches generally treat the concepts of ‘efficiency’ and ‘flexibility’ of operations as 
opposite approaches to strategy, as dichotomous.  An interesting process study on efficiency 
versus flexibility by Ebben and Johnson (2005) argues that an organisation that 
simultaneously follows both approaches – efficiency and flexibility – will not perform as 
well as an organisation that follows only one.  Furthermore, the authors propose a 
quantitative method of comparison – based on their interpretation of the performance data, 
and conclude that there is little difference between the efficiency and flexibility approaches 
to strategy.  Taken at face value, the conclusion is that a flexible approach to strategy is as 
effective as an efficiency approach, such that what processes may be considered ‘noise’ 
becomes more complicated. 
RBV does not generally explicitly emphasise resistance as a political phenomenon, but the 
same sort of idea is found in the wider strategy literature that concerns psychological 
resistance and dissenting perspectives – on the ‘rules of engagement’ between authority and 
‘dissent’ (Argyres and Mui, 2007).   
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Functionalist approaches subsume agency to structure and therefore, arguably, dissenting 
perspectives can be dismissed as inefficient with regard to the functioning of the organisation 
as a whole.  In the mainstream strategic management literature, there are studies that 
associate resistance with psychology, but only with the psychological shortcomings and self-
interest of individuals and personnel (Lawrence, 1954; Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979; Piderit, 
2000; van Dam et al., 2008).  ‘It is commonly held that successful change requires the 
cooperation of employees, since any resistance on their part can hamper the change initiative 
(Piderit, 2000)’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 323).  A critique of these approaches is that ‘other 
arguments are dismissed only at a cost’ (Hirst, 1999: 8).  There is also more balanced 
research on how logics relate to organisational change (Ford and Ford, 1994), ‘how inductive 
and deductive logics can lead to tensions in strategy formation’ (Montgomery et al., 1989), 
how ‘multiple institutional logics may lead to internal conflict’ (Besharov and Smith, 2014), 
and on the power struggle for control of organisation during organisational change (Freeland, 
2001), such as in the case of Ford and his strategy for low-cost cars (see introduction).   
The concept of friction is performed across the different approaches to strategy research, and 
is formulated as a negative force that holds an organisation back from reaching its goals.  
There is also a suggestion that friction can include the notion of tensions within 
organisations, which can, in many cases, arise from differing logics and perspectives 
regarding the processes and aims of an organisation – many of which might be described as 
falling under the umbrella concept of organisational strategy, and differences regarding the 
purpose and methods of a strategy. 
From the review of the literature, the relevance of power relations and differing perspectives 
has emerged as an area of study that is less visible in the mainstream approaches.  A review 
of power relations in strategic management literature could be improved by looking at the 
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discursive approaches, which are not in the mainstream approaches to organisational strategy 
of researchers or practitioners. 
2.4 | Discursive Approaches 
To problematise the formation of strategy through a lens of discourse theory is not a 
mainstream approach for practitioners, but is one that has been gaining traction in academic 
research over the last 25 years (e.g., Knights and Morgan, 1991; Alvesson, 1998; Ezzamel 
and Willmott, 2008; Siltaoja, 2009; Aggerholm et al., 2012; Kupers et al., 2013).  In strategic 
management research, ‘discursive perspectives […] were initially seen as a threat and a 
challenge’ that cast doubt on the attainability of the ‘goal of understanding organizational 
decisions essential to a firm’s long-term survival and success’  (Balogun et al., 2014: 195).   
Discursive approaches are interested in the concept of strategy (Paroutis and Heracleous, 
2013). In more discursive approaches to strategy research, it is acknowledged that an 
unfamiliar term becomes ‘anchored’ by repeated associations with familiar terms 
(Moscovici, 1984, 2000; Duveen, 2000; Perren, 2013: 236), such that the meaning of terms 
develop ‘some stability’, while also retaining ‘a certain amount of fluidity’ (Gergen, 1997; 
Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Perren, 2013: 236).  Paroutis and Heracleous (2013: 941) study 
organisational and business strategy ‘as a contingent concept’ that does not have a 
predetermined meaning.  Some of the (relatively fringe) discourse based research in strategic 
management follows a more meta approach, in which the discourse of strategy research itself 
is studied, to analyse the construction of ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ (e.g., Shrivastava, 1985; Hardy 
et al., 2000; Mir and Watson, 2000; Rhodes, 2000; Weick et al., 2005; Laine and Vaara, 
2007; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013; Brown et al., 2014). 
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There are discursive approaches to S-A-P (e.g., Sminia, 2005; Fenton and Langley, 2011; 
Vazquez et al., 2013) yet there are calls for S-A-P to engage more with both discourse theory 
(Balogun et al., 2014) and with politics (Carter et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2013).  There is 
literature that focuses on how the construction of meaning is an interplay between various 
levels of organisations (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2008; Perren, 2013), that 
describes strategy as a ‘masterful wordgame’ (Bauerschimdt 1996: 667), that makes links 
between rhetoric and strategy (Boje et al., 2005; Mantere and Sillince, 2007; Mantere and 
Vaara, 2008), and studies discourse as a strategic resource (Hardy et al, 2000) and as a 
symbolic resource (Van Dijk, 2001; Greckhammer, 2010).  Elsewhere it is suggested that 
organisational systems of meaning influence agential identification (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989; Scott and Lane, 2000).  Together these approaches could be interpreted as a focus on 
the strategy of persuasion.  This is the premise for many discursive approaches, which focus 
on how power relations are involved in the strategy discourse in organisations, which argue 
that members in more influential positions, such as those found in hierarchical structures, 
have more relative power to control the organisational discourse – the articulatory practices – 
and thus shape the minds and actions of others (Van Dijk, 2001; Samra-Fredericks, 2005; 
Willmott, 2005; Brickson, 2007; Greckhammer, 2010; Vaara et al., 2010).  If organisational 
identity is a form of multi level ‘coherence’ between agents (Ashforth et al., 2011), the 
strategic construction of shared values in organisations relates to discourse theory.  There is a 
common theme that in some cases organisational strategy is used as a means of standardizing 
(of normalizing) perspectives and practices of personnel. 
There is research that suggests that ‘striking differences’ in perceptions can exist between 
different departments of an organisation, and also between the perceptions of different 
organisations (Brickson, 2007: 881; Tlili, 2008; Boulu-Reshef, 2015).  Tensions between 
alternative perspectives relate strategy to politics and ethics.  When treating strategy as a 
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process of giving meaning to issues, there is a legitimisation process that selects some 
meanings while rejecting others (Pettigrew, 1977).  In this way, tensions that are analysable 
in discursive approaches can be related to the conception of resistance in strategic 
management and discursive contest regarding organisational change (Ybema, 2014).  
According to the discursive literature, from the view of management, resistance by 
employees is often viewed as a ‘pathology’ that represents an obstacle to organisational 
change (Dent and Goldberg, 1999).   Resistance could be the result of bad management 
(Greiner, 1992; Reichers et al., 1997; Spreitzer and Quinn, 1996), but it is the act of 
resistance that is the problem (Dent and Goldberg, 1999).  Presented as such, the problem lies 
with staff, who either misunderstood the change or are just intolerant of change (Furst and 
Cable, 2008; Kotter and Sclesinger, 1979; Reichers et al., 1997; van Dam et al., 2008; 
Thomas and Hardy, 2011).  Nonetheless, discursive approaches argue that ‘individuals are 
not pawns in this social representation game’, employees ‘have their own agency and wish to 
construct meanings’ (Voelklein and Howarth, 2005; Perren, 2013: 236).  As they have their 
own agency, individuals can and do ‘call upon terms to make sense of their world and to 
legitimize actions (de Rond and Theitart, 2007; Giddens, 1986; Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 
2007; Jarzabkowski, et al., 2007)’ (Perren, 2013: 236).  For this reason, discourse theory is 
seen as an apt approach for problematising power relations, politics and ethics in strategic 
management research. 
Power relations are generally legitimized by the structure of the organisation. There are 
studies that focus on the connections between structures in an organisation and its strategy 
(see, for instance, Mitushashi and Greve, 2004).  These investigate whether the strategic 
objective influences the form that power relations take within an organisation – as 
competitive advantage is the dominant objective, this could be interpreted to be studying how 
the concept of competitive advantage is connected to power structures.  By extension, this 
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relation applies to innovation: how the dominant structure (and hence the dominant objective, 
competitive advantage) influences the concept of legitimacy regarding innovation and 
resistance, through the dynamics of power between participants of the social representation 
game. 
There are calls for ‘theories of paradox’ to be included in strategy research so as to enrich the 
study of tensions in organisations (e.g., Smith and Lewis, 2011; Jarzabkowksi et al., 2013).  
In this vein, there are studies that apply PDT to the study of organisations (e.g., Martin, 2005; 
Bowman, 2007; Schaap, 2007; Karppinen et al., 2008; McManus, 2008; Howarth, 2008; 
Owen, 2008; Stavrakakis, 2012).  It was noted in the introduction that PDT does not have a 
specific approach for empirical research; there are papers that focus on developing methods 
of operationalising PDT (Van Dijk, 2007; Howarth and Glynos, 2007; Howarth, 2010; and 
Glynos et. al., 2009), some with a focus in critical management (Hillier, 2003; Ploger, 2004; 
Gunder, 2005; Willmott, 2005; Bridgman and Willmott, 2006; Spicer and Bohm, 2007; 
Purcell, 2009; Backlund and Mantysalo, 2010; McClymont, 2011; Kenny and Scriver, 2012; 
Rhodes and Harvey, 2012; Burchell and Cook, 2013; Contu, 2014), but none that follow the 
theoretical framework as developed by this thesis.  Regarding the choice of case study, that 
of GM biotechnology, there are studies that draw on PDT specifically for analysing a 
polarized political debate, for instance, the pro/anti abortion debate (Goi, 2005). 
The discursive literature indicates that strategies of persuasion are also applied externally.  
There is research on how organisations seek to gain competitive advantage by strategically 
‘shaping key audiences’ perceptions so as to manipulate beliefs (King and Walker, 2014), 
and that ‘there are many ways in which firms can influence beliefs to their advantage’ (Foss, 
2007: 255).  Strategies of this kind, to discursive approaches, might appear to be an attempt 
to establish greater market shares by developing public favour toward the organisation and its 
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products, and/or disfavour towards the rival or target organisations.  In this way, the beliefs 
of the ‘key audience’ become a site of contest – hearts and minds – both consumers and 
organisational members – everyone.  ‘As organizations seek to influence public perception 
over emotive issues such as climate change, conflict at the ideational level can give rise to 
information warfare campaigns’ (MacKay and Munro, 2012: 1507), which blur the 
endogenous and exogenous approaches to strategy.  Competitive advantage, as the dominant 
objective, can then be examined regarding its influence on innovation, through the dynamic 
of power relations between staff, and also between the organisation and its environment. 
Research studies how competitive strategies relate to alliances between organisations 
(Fiegenbaum et al., 1988; Bowersox, 1990; Gomes-Casseras, 1994, 2003; Koza and Lewin. 
1998; Yoffie and Kwak, 2006; Trapido 2013; Van Fenema and Loebbeck, 2014) 
Organisations of alliances are sometimes described as ‘alliance constellations’ (Das and 
Teng, 2002), they are ‘strategic alliances formed by multiple partner firms’ to “compete 
against other such groups and against traditional single firms” (Gomes-Casseras, 1996: 3)’ 
(Das and Teng, 2002: 445).   These approaches arguably form a connection between the 
strategic objective of an organisation and the basis of identity formation in an alliance, in 
relation to rival organisations.  In so doing, like discourse theory, the study of strategic 
alliances is also able to blur the endogenous and exogenous approaches.  There is a recurring 
note that discourse theory and the study of strategic alliances are a good fit (de Rond and 
Bouchikhi, 2004).  While strategic alliances are a favoured strategy in the contemporary 
literature and in practice, they might be considered a form of ‘network and clusters’, which 
research suggests is susceptible to inertia (Sydow, 2014: 89).  A discursive approach could 
then explore how inertia can be a consequence of competitive strategies, strategies that are 
generally designed to encourage innovation and renewal. 
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Some research argues that interpretations of events and situations are based on preconceived 
beliefs from one central lens (Stigter and Cooper, 2015), this includes academic cliques, e.g., 
S-A-P (Carter et al., 2008: 109), and ‘meaningful strategies cannot be developed within a 
‘one lense’ paradigm only’ (Stigter and Cooper, 2015: 20).  With the consideration of status 
quo bias in organisational strategy (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), the focus on power 
relations makes ‘discourse a major domain for institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy and 
Maguire, 2008)’ (Greckhammer, 2010: 844).  Discourse theory is interested in the legitimacy 
of alternative perspectives.  According to Morris, discourse in strategy can be seen ‘as set of 
assumptions that guide thought and action’, that ‘have a dynamic quality’ and are ‘subject to 
changing interpretation’ (2013: 57).   
The literature suggests that, while not a mainstream approach in strategy research, discourse 
theory has a presence, yet there are recurring calls for a further engagement with discursive 
approaches for problematising power relations in strategy research.  That there is space for a 
closer engagement with discourse theory in strategy research is perhaps explainable as being 
because discourse theory represents an approach that does not aim to attain certainty, and 
therefore has been considered incommensurate with the positivistic goals of mainstream 
strategy scholarship.  Discourse offers a way to problematise strategy and change in a 
manner that is an alternative to the functionalist approaches favoured in the mainstream.  
Discourse theory is acknowledged as having the potential for theorizing the aspects of power 
relations that are not captured in the less sociologically sophisticated methods of research 
favoured in the strategy canon.   
A discursive approach is well equipped for considering the ethical and political aspects of 
strategic management, in context of inertia, innovation and friction.  Greckhammer (2010: 
841) argues that ‘critical analyses of strategy discourses hold substantial potential for 
    67 
organization studies and strategic management’.  For instance, ‘stability versus change is one 
of the central tensions in organizational strategy’ (Mitushashi and Greve, 2004: 107), in this 
way, we could relate discourse and the construction of concepts to cognitive inertia and 
renewal, with friction associated with tensions between differing perspectives. 
2.5 | Summary 
This chapter has been a brief tour of the core concepts that are argued to be the foundations 
of strategic management literature: inertia, adaptation/innovation, and friction. As well as 
recognising the key role these concepts often have in the formulation of strategy, the review 
also reveals calls for a reconceptualisation of each of these concepts in some way.  In its 
current conception in strategic management research, inertia has been critiqued for being 
applied to social phenomena without due consideration of sociological theory and research.  
Moreover, cognitive inertia is largely undertheorized with regard to power relations and 
ethics.  A recurring critique of strategic management is that the favoured mechanistic 
approaches subsume agency to structure, and then apply a positivist and instrumentalist 
approach to measuring performance regarding innovation.  Commensurate with the favoured 
methodology, technological innovation appears to be the main concept of innovation in 
economic theory, and also in strategic management approaches that draw on economic 
theory.  However, quantitative approaches do not explain much regarding innovation beyond 
process efficiency relating to the selected variables of study.  As seen above, ecological 
approaches have been critiqued specifically for this.  While there are approaches that 
consider power relations in the construction of shared values, the mainstream approaches 
generally do not include a consideration of uncertainty, paradoxical data or dissenting views 
within strategic design and implementation, nor confront cognitive bias (Hodgkinson, et al., 
2011), as much they might do.  In this way, the mainstream approaches do not consider how 
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the determination of values, and subsequent construction of shared values based on these 
determinations, are the result of power relations in the social – of historical a priori, and of 
conceptual inertia. 
In short, the concept of inertia in strategy research has been critiqued for being too narrow, 
friction has been critiqued for lacking power relations, and adaptation has been critiqued for 
being too narrow and positivistic.  Discourse theory, on the outskirts of strategy literature, 
has been drawn on to articulate and engage with these problems, and offers some alternative 
approaches that might contribute to expanding the notions of inertia, adaptation/innovation 
and friction/resistance in strategic management.  The next stage of the thesis is to analyse 
these concepts in more detail, the next chapter details the genealogy of the concepts raised by 
the review.  The genealogy includes the development of the theoretical framework that will 
be used to analyse the case study.  The theoretical framework aims to include discourse in 
strategy research, but without subsuming it into a strategy only lens. 
There is no claim made here that these concepts exhaust the number of core concepts in 
strategic management.  The concepts reviewed are an inevitable consequence of the chosen 
lens through which the review was motivated, namely a consideration of how strategy is 
formed and implemented, and how power relations and innovation are related.  Other 
approaches to reviewing the literature could potentially lead to the highlighting of alternative 
concepts, then treated as being core to the concept of strategy in organisation research.  In 
short, different modus operandi will arguably lead to different core concepts.  Therefore, the 
concepts emphasised by this review, and thesis, are entangled with the design of the research.  
This admission does not impair the validity of the study, and, if anything, is partly evidence 
in itself, that different perspectives to analysis can generate different results. 
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3 | Strategic Management Genealogy 
The literature review suggests that there are three core concepts that underpin mainstream 
strategic management discourse.  These are inertia, friction and adaptation.  This chapter 
provides a genealogical archaeology of strategic management knowledge, and retraces the 
core concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation to Newtonian physics, Clausewitzian military 
theory and Darwinian evolutionary theory respectively.  In this chapter, I approach the core 
concepts of strategy discourse as being contingent, with other discourses intersecting within 
them.  I propose that the articulatory practices of strategy discourse draw relations between 
the core concepts.  Moreover, within each of the core concepts, articulatory practices draw 
relations between ‘synonymous’ concepts in other discourses. 
The previous chapter suggests that the core concepts contain several fields of academic 
research.  For this reason, an archaeological analysis is appropriate.  Foucault explains that 
an analysis of the discourses that intersect within concepts is one of the applications for his 
archaeological method: that archaeology ‘is not intended to reduce the diversity of discourses 
[…] but is intended to divide up their diversity into different figures.  Archaeological 
comparison does not have a unifying, but a diversifying, effect’ (Foucault, 2002: 177).  The 
genealogy follows this approach, and is in part a comparative analysis that will focus on the 
various discourses that intersect within the core concepts of organisational strategy, 
contributing to the formation of the core concepts.    
An aspect of Foucault’s method is that a concept that is shared by different discourses, that 
appears to share the same meaning ‘does not, as we know, mean that they are absolutely 
identical’ (2002: 159).  Similarly, Mutch argues that ‘metaphors carry with them a weight of 
association, symbolism and imagery that, if not scrutinized, have the potential to lead our 
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inquiries astray or render them rather less productive than we would like’ (2006: 751), which 
could be said to apply to concepts as well, in the sense that their meaning may differ in the 
different discourses that intersect within the meaning of the concept in a particular discourse.  
For instance, within the concept of resistance in strategic management, are other discourses 
that include the concept of resistance, but in different discourses the meaning might vary.  If 
they do, then the meaning of resistance as it is constructed in the strategic management 
discourse might contain different, even paradoxical, meanings.  This could lead to 
misunderstandings that are not acknowledged or recognised.  Therefore, the core concepts 
are scrutinized, on the basis that their current usage might lead strategic design astray and 
render organisations both less productive and less ethical than they could be.  In keeping with 
Foucault’s approach, in this chapter, the justification for the discursive intersections within 
the core concepts is scrutinized. 
This genealogy – and any associated critique – of the core concepts is conducted in the spirit 
of rigour, not of undermining established conceptions or antagonising those who hold them.  
The mistrust of discourse theory by mainstream strategic management was suggested in the 
literature review.  However, a genealogical approach is not as far removed in intention as the 
mathematical approaches that are so prevalent in the mainstream approaches to strategy.  In 
mathematics, it is commonplace for one to go back through one’s workings, to double check 
each stage of the process.  A genealogy is much the same, it is to go back through process of 
construction by which principles and fixed concepts came to be, how common sense 
meanings were arrived at.  As with mathematics, the process is methodical.  Nonetheless, 
without a lengthy treatise on the philosophy of pure mathematics and the symbolic in 
language, we can say that discourse theory is the checking of the workings within with 
concepts are constructed in the social – in organisations – and is therefore a more abstract 
process than applied maths.  This chapter is an attempt to analyse the construction of the 
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concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation, within the discourse of strategic management, 
just to double check that all is well, and to see how power relations may have skewed the 
construction of the core concepts.  This approach sits alongside precedent genealogical 
approaches (e.g., Rasche and Chia, 2009; Vaara and Lumberg, 2015), that might ‘increase 
our understanding of the evolution and transformation of strategic discourses and their power 
effects’ (Vaara and Lumberg, 2015: 1). 
3.1 | Newton 
Mallette and Hopkins (2013: 104) review the causes attributed to strategic inertia in the 
literature.  From their review – as well as mine – it appears that there is little to no literature 
that analyses the concept of inertia.  This section will be a genealogy of the concept of inertia 
in strategic management discourse. 
3.1.1 | Inertia, Simultaneity and Positivism 
Inertia is a term introduced in the discourse of physics by Kepler (1621) and is derived from 
the Latin iners, which means idle, or lazy.  Newton (1846) developed the concept of inertia 
as the foundation of his model of the universe: inertia is the first law of motion.  Inertia refers 
not only to an object if it is motionless, but also if it is moving at constant speed in a constant 
direction.  Inertia therefore refers to a motion that is neither accelerating nor decelerating, put 
simply, inertia refers to what is not changing.  The concept of inertia in strategic management 
takes this Newtonian meaning, as exemplified by Polites and Karahanna (2012: 23-24): 
‘inertia denotes “remaining at rest or in uniform motion in the same straight line unless acted 
upon by some external force” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary)’.   
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Inertia also refers to the resistance of something to a change in its state of motion.  As such, 
Newton’s first law of motion, the law of inertia, also states that inertia is the tendency of an 
object to resist a change in motion.  The use of the term inertia in strategic management has 
been used to describe a ‘force’ at work against organisational change (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984: 149; Huff, 2001: 125; Mallette and Hopkins, 2013: 104).  This meaning of inertia does 
not seem especially differentiated from the concept of friction.  This will be explored later in 
context of Clausewitzian military theory. 
When film-maker Howard Hughes wanted to create a film about fighter planes, he soon 
realised that the footage of dogfighting planes he had accumulated did not seem to convey 
just how fast the planes were flying.  Hughes realised that this was due to flying scenes 
having been filmed on cloudless days.  He decided that the flying scenes should all be 
refilmed, this time, only on cloudy days.  The logistics of predicting cloudy weather, or 
responding to the appearance of clouds, contributed to his reputation as a difficult and 
eccentric film maker (Porter, 2005: 530).  However, Hughes had noticed something that had 
been of interest to physicists for some time: that the motion of something can only be 
described in relation to something else, be that other objects such as clouds, subjective 
observers and bystanders, or even a set of coordinates.  In the discourse of physics, these 
reference points, that give meaning to motion, are called frames of reference and they are 
closely related to the concept of inertia.  If motion can only be gauged in relation to 
something else, motion can only have meaning in context of frames of reference.  Moreover 
this then implies that change (or stasis) can only be gauged in relation to something else: a 
comparison of the present with the past.   
In Newton’s concept of change, each passing moment is represented by a page of a 
‘flipbook’.  Like a photograph, each moment is a snapshot, a frozen image of a constellation: 
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the ‘edges’ of the page are the horizons of observation, the edges of the photograph.  Within 
each universal moment is contained the distribution (clusters and dispersions) of matter and 
energy throughout the universe at that moment.  As moments pass, the flipbook flicks 
forwards and changes to the scene might be seen corresponding to changes in the 
distribution.  Similarly, inertia might also be seen via areas of distribution that do not move.  
Newton’s model of the universe uses a Cartesian approach – which is to say an approach that 
applies a grid of coordinates across a frame of reference.  In a Cartesian approach, the 
clusters and dispersions of matter and energy can be described in relation to the grid of 
coordinates imposed upon the scene.  That is to say, by position within the momentary ‘page’ 
of the flipbook.  In this way, the changes or non-changes can be measured via a comparison 
between the distributions at different moments. 
Of importance to this genealogy is that Newton’s work suggests that simultaneity exists. The 
concept of simultaneity is a logical progression of the concepts of absolute space and 
absolute time.  According to the view of absolute space and absolute time ‘everyone’s freeze-
frame picture of the universe at a given moment contains exactly the same events’ (Greene, 
2004: 133).   This means that everybody observes the same thing, at the same time, 
regardless of where they are, that an event is the same for all observers.  For Newton, we 
would all unanimously agree on what is happening on each page as we step shoulder-to-
shoulder through linear time. 
Organisational change is problematised such that each moment in time (in a longitudinal 
sense) is distinct from the previous and the next, allowing for a measurement of change 
(Mead, 1932; Capek, 1962; Joas, 1997) that is ‘episodic’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 329).    
Structural inertia can apply to an unchanging process that repeats through a linear conception 
of time, as in the description given by Hannan and Freeman.  Therefore the Newtonian 
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notion of inertia and change might be argued to be present in the notion of change in strategy 
as process approaches.  This relates structural inertia to routines within processes, to the 
routines of organisations that are generally the focus of study.  Like the process approaches, 
S-A-P research also problematises organisational change and adaptation (MacKechnie, 1978; 
Lewin et al., 1999; Selsky et al., 2007; Whittington, 2007; Regner, 2008; Vesa and Vaara, 
2014), and as such includes an implicit notion of time.  The mainstream conception of the 
business model in S-A-P is that it provides ‘an analytical tool with a clear sequence of steps’ 
(Hacklin and Wallnofer, 2012: 166).  This, then, might be argued to be a Newtonian concept 
of time.  RBV studies ‘influential event lineages’ (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Van de Ven and 
Grazman, 1999; Durand, 2006: 84). 
In simultaneity, ‘if someone or something is on your now-list for a given moment, then it is 
necessarily also on my now-list for that moment (Greene, 2004: 133), which is much the 
same as the aim (and assumption) of synchronization in strategic management.  Strategic 
purposes generally foster synchronization, as a means of facilitating the scheduling of events 
and time allocation, while strategic directions rely on synchronization and view time as linear 
(e Cunha, 2004: 271).  We could argue that, in synchronization, simultaneity is a central 
aspect of mainstream approaches to strategic management, that we all share the same 
experience of the passing of time: each ‘organisational moment’ is considered to be absolute.  
In other words, the strategic aim of synchronization is to construct simultaneity across an 
organisation As such, everyone can agree on an organisational history and the state of an 
organisation at a given moment.  Regarding synchronization in organisations, the 
construction of a shared value of space and time is often considered of paramount 
importance.   
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Simultaneity is also the foundation of Path dependence, which draws on a Newtonian linear 
perspective of time to problematise how ‘paths’ become fixed, how motion can become 
dependent on a particular route or trajectory – in path dependence, history influences the 
present distribution of matter and energy, as a multitude of constitutive parts following 
historically influenced agential paths across the plane of the absolute frame of reference.  
Path dependence is the synchronization of the now with the past and the future, that the path 
is a coherent path, a casual chain, independently demonstrated. 
There is an outcrop of research in which path dependence has been applied to decision 
making and appropriated for strategic theory (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011).  For instance, 
network forms of organisation are typically considered strategically flexible, but path 
dependence can be a cause of falling into ruts, of strategic inertia, in networks (Sydow, 
2014).  The association of inertia with path dependence is interesting.  However, in this area 
of strategy research, the notion of path dependence itself would seem to be taken as a given.   
The ontology and epistemology of strategic management, has long drawn on scientific 
method (e.g., Taylor, 1911; Gomory, 1989; Roy, 2007; Hodgkinson, et al., 2011; Kemp, 
2013; Ryall, 2013), which contains philosophy of science derived now as much from 
Popper’s (1935) principle of empirical falsification as Hume’s (1748) independent 
demonstration (Seth and Zinkhan, 1991; Kay et al., 2006).   
Hume’s (2007 [1748]) empirical concept of independent demonstration is related to 
Newton’s concept of simultaneity, and has an association of verifiable practicality, reliability, 
and neutrality in socio-political bias.  Arguably, business theorists and practitioners refer to 
simultaneity when designing, implementing and evaluating organisational strategies.  
Independent demonstration is about proof.  Hume considers what can be regarded as a fact or 
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knowledge – as a causal relationship – in context of rationalism and empiricism.  Rationalism 
argues that knowledge is gained through abstract thought.  Empiricism argues that 
knowledge is gained through experience through sense perception.  In independent 
demonstration, one side of a binary proposition is shown and proven to be false via the 
observation of events, of external reality that is independent of human influence, while the 
other proposition is not necessarily true, but has not been proven false, and this much we can 
know by testing it out again and again.  In reponse to ‘Hume’s fork’ some Rationalists such 
as Leibniz argue that abstract thought and reasoning is a consequence of experience.  This 
principle has become associated with positivism: that information gained from sensory 
experience, then interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source of all 
knowledge.   
In Newton’s combination of simultaneity with Cartesian grids of coordinates, there is an 
absolute frame of reference constructed, that has been set as an independent benchmark.   
The absolute grid forms the conceptual basis of the standardisation of measurement, which in 
turn is the basis for the measurement of change in strategic management, and also for 
organisational performance.  We could argue that the assumption of positivism in strategic 
management is found in the credence given to measuring change and performance with 
methods derived from Newton’s methods for describing motion.  There is a drive in strategy 
literature to develop ever more precise approaches to measuring performance (e.g., 
Montgomery et al., 1989). The popularity of positivism in organisation and business strategy 
is arguably derived from the ability of Newtonian mechanics to predict the motions of planets 
and stars, as well as how objects around us interact, which scientific approaches to 
management are inspired to replicate. 
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S-A-P research often measures organisational behaviour from a performative perspective 
(Samra-Fredericks, 2003, 2005; Lowe and Jones, 2004; Whittington, 2006, 2015; Rouleau 
and Balogun, 2011; Balogun et al., 2014; Garicano and Wu, 2012).  There is an emphasis on 
‘capability trajectories’ (Durand, 2006: 84) and path dependence thinking in the RBV 
approaches, and in some cases it is argued that path dependence in network approaches can 
lead to inertia (Sydow, 2014).  There are some mixed approaches, but these are less common, 
they also retain an assumption of simultaneity: ‘an integrative framework of organizational 
decline on the firm-level is proposed that relies on a process perspective, combining insights 
from organizational ecology, path dependence and the resource-based view’ (Heine and 
Rindfleisch, 2013: 8). 
In economics and management, the positivist approach is favoured by the majority (Durand 
and Vaara, 2005).  However, the positivist perspective is not methodologically unproblematic 
(Wiggins and Rueffli, 2001), mainly due to the complexity of the causal changes that the 
empirical methods used aim to clarify (Cockburn et al., 2000; Meier and O’Toole, 2013).  
There is literature that supports the assertion that approaches that employ quantitative models 
are methodologically unsuitable (or incomplete) for studying change due to innovation.  The 
mechanistic approach in S-A-P has been criticized for its ‘cold information processing logic’ 
(Hodgkinson, et al 2011: 1512), that ‘strategic thought that mainly seeks hard, fact-based, 
and logical information may have been sufficient in the past but not anymore (Stitger and 
Cooper, 2014: 7).  To some extent engaging with these critiques, Jarzabkowski et al. (2007) 
discuss the challenges of reliable measures in conducting research in the practice approach.  
MacClean et al. (2015) argue that that novelty is central to change and RBV fails to 
sufficiently include novelty, which is where its explanatory power ends.  As RBV follows a 
rational and normative conception of behaviour and change, an approach that, at the level of 
its design, is opposed to difference, the framework is not equipped to describe the emergence 
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of novelty.  A similar critique is made by Farjoun (2007).  There are approaches that could be 
said to describe reference frames in organisational strategy (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; 
Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), generally through an economic lens of buyers’ and sellers’ 
reference points in valuation judgments (Diaz and Hansz, 2001; Paraschiv and Chenavaz, 
2011).  Again, as these approaches have an economic slant, they focus on how preferences 
are dependent on reference points (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) – in doing so, they engage with 
the economic discourse of RTC and bounded rationality, explicitly or not. 
Basing organisational strategy on principles of precision is the mainstream approach.  In this 
way, the process of elimination relates to practical inertia.  This is because if it were possible 
to reach total precision in organisational processes, such that no further refinement is 
possible, further innovation in organisational processes is no longer possible, and practical 
inertia is the outcome.  This would further relate applications of scientific method to 
organisational strategy as a possible cause of inertia.  If an organisation cannot become any 
more efficient, according to its own measurement systems, then inertia has set in.  However, 
there is the caveat that it is only efficient according to its own principles of measurement, i.e., 
practical inertia is related to cognitive inertia, such that the familiar scientific rationales are 
no longer reviewed regarding their appropriateness for strategic design and implementation. 
In the fringes of organisation theory, ‘more subjective approaches to time tend to see past, 
present and future as all rolled in together, with each imminent in the others (Schotter, 2006)’ 
(Hernes et al., 2013).  Other approaches argue that ‘temporal continuity then, is expressed in 
the ongoing flow of present actions that draw simultaneously on pasts and futures as 
epistemic resources, which themselves are subject to endless reconstruction (Simpson, 2009)’ 
(Hernes et al., 2013: 3).  Some literature proposes a dialectic approach of time in organisation 
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theory (Pina e Cunha: 2004), but, these approaches could be considered unorthodox for the 
mainstream strategy literature. 
To critique core concepts of strategy discourse is justified if we are of the opinion that 
‘strategy discourses are engulfed by their own “truth” effects that make the socially 
constructed realities seem inevitable and taken for granted (Grandy and Mills, 2004; Knights 
and Morgan, 1991)’ (Greckhammer, 2010: 844). 
I argue from the archaeological findings that the basis of the core concept of strategic inertia 
is rooted in Newtonian mechanics.  For this reason, the concept of strategic inertia is argued 
to be closely derived from the Newtonian concept of inertia, and by extension Newtonian 
concepts of change and linear time.  Each ‘organisational moment’ is considered to be both 
absolute and independently demonstrated.  For this reason, for a perspective of positivism 
that is assoiated with determinism, any alternative perspectives and accounts of hange and 
otion are, by definition, absurd.  The implications will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.  As such, the concept of simultaneity is a core assumption of mainstream approaches 
to strategic management, which is used as a foundation for positivist empirical approaches to 
oneptualising organisational performance and change, and for legitimising the design of 
synchronistic, and the evaluation of incongruent perspectives within an organisation or team. 
 
3.2 | Darwin 
Strategic inertia is set in relation to its opposite, strategic renewal, which refers to a change in 
inert structures, practices or thinking.  Both of the approaches to strategy are set in context of 
a changing and often unpredictable environment.  If organisations adapt to environmental 
changes, they display strategic renewal, if they remain the same, they display strategic 
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inertia (Hopkins et al., 2013).  This environment is perceived as cause for a natural 
competition for survival, with competitive advantage the goal of strategy.  One way or 
another, strategic management has been heavily influenced by Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species (Abatecola et al., 2016).  This section will be a genealogy of the concept of 
adaptation in strategic management discourse. 
3.2.1 | Adaptation, Competitive Advantage, Innovation 
Strategy research borrows and interprets evolutionary theory for strategic purposes (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Sammut-Bonnici and Wensley, 2002; Moore, 
2004; Lo, 2006).  Evolution is used as a basis for framing organisational strategies in terms 
of fighting for survival and competitive advantage within a changing environment (Mallette 
and Hopkins, 2013). The theory of evolution acts as a bridge between the different 
perspectives of business strategy and organisational ecology (Hodgson, 2013).    
In the management of change, a regular theme found in common assumptions and 
‘neologisms’ is Darwin’s (1859) principle, that survival is the outcome of adaptation 
(Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 322) – in strategic management discourse, adaptation is referred 
to as strategic renewal (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000).  Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984) 
make the same observation about the interpretation of Darwinism, but argue that the theory 
of evolution does not actually suggest that survival is associated with adaptation.  They argue 
that structural inertia is a consequence of a selection process within a competitive 
environment; a product of evolutionary selection pressures that leave organisations that 
survive with inertial structures.  Hannan and Freeman reason that as the inertial structures are 
the outcome of pressures, they are the source of survival – that they withstood the pressures 
and in so doing have been honed and strengthened (Burgelman, 1991).  Proponents argue that 
inertia represents a better choice during a crisis than making structural changes (Sawant et 
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al., 2015).  This may be because institutionalization is perceived to enable organisational 
structures to withstand environmental selection pressures (Durand, 2006: 65), while radical 
structural change represents a threat to the legitimacy of the institutions related to the 
changes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), a possible reason for why change initiatives often fail 
(Beer and Nohria, 2000).  In short, proponents of inertia argue that in stormy seas a firm hand 
is needed on the tiller to keep the boat on a steady course.  Hopkins et al. (2013) observe that 
the utility of strategic inertia for organisational survival has been, and continues to be, a 
focus of study (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Wei et al., 2014). 
In contradiction to proponents of inertia, there are approaches that consider strategic renewal 
as part of ‘an evolutionary process’ (Floyd and Lane, 2000: 155).  These approaches argue 
that strategic flexibility is needed to survive in ‘increasingly turbulent environments’ 
(Sydow, 2014: 89) and that strategic inertia might ‘prove fatal’ in a changing environment 
that facilitates the sudden emergence or radical change of competitors (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Romanelli and Tushman, 
1994; Durand, 2006: 65).  Beyond business competitors, the importance of establishing better 
adaptability (Reeves et al., 2011) is emphasized at a time when environmental (including 
economic and technological) shocks of global reach are both various and numerous (Mella 
and Colombo, 2014: 194).  Organisations are currently in a situation in which they are being 
forced to react (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 323), for if they do 
not, they risk their futures (Hopkins et al., 2013).  These approaches can be considered to be 
in opposition with Hannan and Freeman’s logic that the strategies and structures that 
survived past pressures will be suitable for surviving present and future pressures.  
Proponents of renewal argue that in stormy seas it is best for the tiller to react and adapt to 
the direction of the waves and to alter the course accordingly.  Recent research argues that 
many organisations ‘desire to achieve’ strategic renewal in response to changes in the 
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competitive environment (Ahmandian et al., 2011; Rusetski and Lim, 2011; Yokota and 
Mitsuhashi, 2008), most notably in organisations with an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ (Kuratko 
et al., 2005).   
Due to these different interpretations of what evolution means for organisational strategy, 
approaches that emphasize deliberate inertia and limit individual forms of adaptation are 
often considered to be Darwinian, while proponents of adaptability and deliberate renewal 
are considered Lamarckian (Hodgson, 2013: 973).  There are also approaches that try to steer 
a middle path between inertia and renewal.   While inertia can give the organisation focus 
and direction, when there is a radical shock in the finite ‘carrying capacity’ of the 
environment, structural inflexibility can result in the loss of entire markets (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1994; Durand, 2006).  The argument being that while inertia can give the 
organisation the focus and direction required for survival, excessive inertia impairs the 
adaptability of organisations in response to shocks and variable selection pressures (Rumelt, 
1995).  In other words, the argument for a middle path is that the more inert an organisation 
becomes, the harder it is to get moving again, to change from the inert course, to shift to a 
state of strategic renewal (Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Hopkins et al., 2013: 77).  Almost as if 
the more inert the organisation, the heavier it becomes, the more resistant to a change in 
motion.  This is a situation in which organisational inertia is not deliberate and is seen as a 
problem, it is sometimes referred to as the Demon of Inertia (e.g., Moore, 2004; Huang et al., 
2013; Hopkins et al., 2013).  Proponents of a middle path argue that there is a threshold of 
inertia, beyond which its survival value falls sharply, moreover, that this threshold differs 
with regard to the organisational population in question (Durand, 2006: 65). 
In orthodox strategic approaches, it is important to gather information with which to assist 
decision making.  Strategic management has the purpose of gaining a more precise 
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understanding of causal chains (Porter, 1980) that relate to sustaining a high level of 
competitive performance (Teece et al., 1997).  For instance, D’Aveni (2007) maps 
competitive position within a wider market environment with quantitative variables.  The 
practice of applying quantitative approaches to competitive advantage, again, derives from 
scientific method.  Arguably drawing on simultaneity, the flipbook concept of time and space 
is intrinsic to the evaluation of organisational performance in context of a competitive and 
changing environment.  Game theory, typical of strategy research in economic theory (Huff, 
2001: 124), makes predictions about outcomes based on the concept of competitive 
advantage and assumptions regarding rational decision making (e.g., Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1997; Witteloostuijn et al., 2003). 
Competitive advantage is a dominant concept in strategic management discourse, a concept 
that is arguably a conceptual synthesis of simultaneity, instrumentalism and evolution: ‘under 
any leading strategy theory, sustained superior performance exists, it has specifiable causes, 
and these causes are tied to the concept of competitive advantage’ (Powell, 2001: 875).  The 
review suggests that in the mainstream discourse, competitive advantage is associated with 
innovation, such that innovation is the best means of gaining a relative advantage.  It follows 
then, that change and renewal (adaptation) is typically approached as a question of 
innovation such that adaptation is anchored to strategic renewal which is in turn anchored to 
innovation of practices or products.  Promoting innovation as a means of strategic renewal 
has become of vital importance to organisations seeking adaptability (Floyd and Lane: 2000).   
As the review suggests, innovation, adaptation and renewal are problematised in different 
ways by the orthodox approaches, some focusing more on endogenous factors, others more 
on exogenous.  Organisational ecology places organisational change in context of the 
Outside.   Process approaches view change as flux between environment and structural flow.  
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S-A-P subsumes agential innovation to structure.  RBV approaches are interested in how 
social organisations might evolve, how they adapt to environmental selection pressures, and 
which organisational capabilities and resources are related to surviving within dynamic 
competition (Abatecola et al., 2016: 1).  Farjoun (2007: 207) argues that while RBV is an 
approach that can study how competitive advantages shift, it is better suited to ‘endogenous 
change’ than ‘industry evolution’.  That RBV is not suited to describing changes that occur 
exogenously to the organisation.  This is the same critique as that levied against process and 
practice approaches.  It should be noted that how effective a strategy of renewal is for 
gaining competitive advantage is debated in RBV research (Nedzinskas et al., 2013), such as 
its appropriateness in different contexts (Wilhelm et al., 2015).  For instance, there is also an 
association between competitive advantage and inertial routines that are the most profitable 
for having been refined through history and experience (Teece and Pisano, 1994: 553).   
As organisational performance is treated as measurable in mainstream strategy discourse, 
innovation is also treated as measurable.  A critique of instrumentalism in the concept of 
innovation is that the concept of linear time and path dependence creates an emphasis on 
linear process innovation, which can ‘hinder the innovation process’, due to institutional 
pressures to ‘demonstrate progress’ (Swan et al, 2016: 1).  Moreover, analysing knowledge in 
terms of the efficiency of operating routine (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Powell and 
dent-Micallef, 1997; Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Wilhelm et al., 2015) subsumes the concept of 
knowledge to the positivistic methods of scientific management (Powell, 2001; Farjoun, 
2007).  This association indicates the view of linear time and path dependent evolution.  
Moreover, combining evolution with the internal analysis and processes of scientific 
management subsumes the linear notion of evolution into the ‘administrative efficiency of 
the organization’ (Durand, 2006: 71).  Innovation is typically problematised in context of 
process and performativity and is therefore subsumed to process efficiency, and tied to the 
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concept of competitive advantage in terms of organisational performance.  Similarly, 
evolutionary economists draw on ‘mathematical models, computer simulations and, 
sometimes, empirical tests’ to calculate ‘innovation rates, profit profiles, and industry 
dimensions such as concentration and the nature of competition’ (Durand, 2006: 84).  By 
drawing on process measurement as a means of studying conditions for innovation, these 
approaches fail to facilitate considerations of conditions that are related to mind, the 
conditions of thought 
Elsewhere, there has been research on the philosophy of strategy research and competitive 
advantage (Schendel, 1994; Spender, 1996; Nonaka, 1998; Mir and Watson, 2000; Kwan and 
Tsang, 2001; Powell, 2001; Durand, 2002; Arend, 2003; Durand and Vaara, 2006), but not 
many engage with the Political.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1965) argues that 
analytic statements are a more reliable foundation for constructing knowledge than 
positivism via independent demonstration.  He defines an analytic proposition as a 
proposition, or statement, that is true in and of itself (Hospers, 1956; Russell, 1961; Heil, 
1995; Powell, 2001).  Analytic statements can be known as true without independent 
demonstration, simply because they do not describe relations between things – such as cause 
and effect – but are self contained, such that the meaning of a statement is implied in its 
predicate.  ‘The bachelor is unmarried’ is a classic example (Powell, 2001).  The proposed 
relation between the statement (the bachelor) and the predicate (unmarried) needs no 
independent demonstration, it can be known as true because the predicate adds no new 
information, no new associated meaning, to the statement.  To contradict an analytic 
statement is not simply an empirical error, it is to be self-contradictory, to be absurd, to be 
irrational.   
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Generally speaking, the focus of economic rationality and self-interest makes assumptions 
that participants follow strategies to win the competition: to ‘win the game’, or at least ‘not to 
lose’ (Davila et al., 2012).  Nash equilibrium, in the favoured game theory approach to 
studying economic competition, describes situations in which self-interest is combined in 
strategy with group-interest for the optimal outcome with minimal risk.  A similar trend in 
game theory combines cooperation with competition – called ‘coopetition’ (e.g., Bonel and 
Rocco, 2007; Dagnino, 2007; Mariani, 2007; Padula and Dagnino, 2007; Garaffo and Rocco, 
2009.), others more specifically on the meaning of competition and cooperation (Huemer et 
al., 2004), and in the evolution of cooperative strategies (Hemphill, 2003: 100).  As such self-
interest becomes the same as competitive advantage, an analytic relation, even in cooperative 
approaches, monopoly is considered to be more profitable than competition (Chen and 
Schwartz, 2013).  
Reydon and Scholz (2009, 2014) have critiqued strategic management for its use of 
evolutionary theory, arguing that Darwinian principles are not at all applicable.  Further 
critique of organisational ecology has come from studies that empirically test Hannan and 
Freeman’s theory.  For instance, Kelly and Amburgey argue that there is no relation between 
organisational change and an ‘organization’s chances of survival’ (1991: 591) –  if this is the 
case, then renewal would have little impact either, suggesting that exogenous changes are the 
only factor and strategies have no influence whatsoever.   
There is also the issue of the influence that presuppositions about time and space have on the 
concept of evolution.  Organisation research focuses on strategy; strategy research focuses on 
change and inertia (Newton), in context of competitive advantage and evolution (Darwin).  
Darwin’s theory of evolution was conceived in a cultural environment in which Newtonian 
mechanics and absolute time were dominant.  Therefore, evolution is typically 
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conceptualised in a linear and path dependent way: as a proess of refinement within and as 
part of a calculably finite carrying capacity 
 
3.3 | Clausewitz 
I have described how the core concepts of inertia and adaptation can be traced to Newtonian 
physics and Darwinian evolution.  That the combination of these underlying discourses, 
brought together in the relation between the core concepts in their forming of the foundation 
of strategic management discourse, combines competitive advantage with instrumentalism, in 
context of a linear and simultaneous concept of evolution.  The contingent discourses in the 
core concept of friction are analysed next.  This section will be a genealogy of the concept of 
friction in strategic management discourse. 
3.3.1 | Friction 
The literature review suggests that the work of Porter (e.g., 1980, 1985, 1987, 1990, 2008, 
2014), on competitive advantage, has been significantly influential on the mainstream 
conception of strategy (Ryal, 2013).  Krause (1995) observes the prevalent use of Sun Tzu’s 
Art of War in Porter’s work.  As does Huff (2001: 124), who states that ‘Porter (1980, 1990) 
used surprisingly similar ideas [to Sun Tzu] to help strategists think about their position with 
respect to suppliers and buyers, as well as competitors’.  Due to the influence of Porter, the 
premises that underlie ‘competition’ in strategy arguably relate to military theory.  Due to the 
dominance of the concept of competitive advantage in strategic management, a ‘legacy from 
military strategy’ (Huff, 2001: 124) is readily found in the literature of theorists and 
practitioners (Drucker, 1967; Frohman, 1982; Ries and Trout, 1986, 2001; Dunford and 
Palmer, 1996; Hannagan, 1998; Santamaria and Clemons, 2002; Bryce and Dyer, 2007; 
    88 
Adner and Snow, 2010).  These influences range from models and analogies to metaphors, 
transposed from military theory to organisational strategy (Mutch, 2006: 751-752), and as far 
as organisational strategy is based on military strategy, it is arguably related to the theories of 
Clausewitz (Kornberger, 2013). 
For Clausewitz, the basis of strategy is to ‘predict and incorporate’ the reactions of ‘the 
enemy’ to our strategy, into our strategic plan (Holmes (2007: 129).  The strategic approach 
that is devised in relation to a competitor’s strategy has been part of organisation theory for 
some time (see Sweetman 1996; Tsai et al., 2011; Deshpandé et al., 2012); ‘strategy has been 
practiced whenever an advantage was gained by planning the sequence and timing of the 
deployment of resources while simultaneously taking into account the probable capabilities 
and behaviour of competition’ (Henderson, 1981: 3), this concept of strategy connects the 
central tenet of Clausewitzian theory (taking the actions of the enemy into account within the 
design of strategy), and the central tenet of Newtonian change, by which inertia is identified 
(simultaneity in the synchronization of strategic design). 
Clausewitz (2007: 68) turns to the concept of friction to describe obstacles and interferences 
to the smooth operation of organisations: ‘friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that 
makes the apparently easy so difficult’.  Friction is considered to be counterproductive and 
dysfunctional, and represents a problem to be overcome as best as possible.  The use of the 
concept of friction brings us back to Newton.  In the Newtonian laws of motion, friction is 
generally defined as a direction of force that is opposite to the motion of the body.  Following 
the principle of inertia, his first law of motion, Newton extrapolated a second law: the 
resultant force acting on an object is equal to the product of the inertial mass of that object 
and its rate of acceleration.  Denoted as: 
F = ma 
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F denotes the outcome (direction and speed) of forces acting on an object, that is to say, the 
net force acting on the object, and represents a vector (a trajectory through space over time) 
that is a net vector, of the various forces exerting an influence on the object.  Only the net 
force has this relation to the acceleration of an object, and the net force can only be known if 
all the forces acting on an object are known.   m denotes the mass of the object; and a denotes 
the acceleration of the object and also represents a vector.  The direction of the net force is 
the same as that of the acceleration.  If the forces are balanced then the object is in a state of 
inertia.  When the forces become unbalanced, the object undergoes a change in state of 
motion: speed and/or direction.  The greater the force, the faster the change; the more 
massive the object, the greater the force required to unbalance its inertial state.  This equation 
provides the units of measurement for forces, 1 Newton (the unit of force) is the force 
required to impart an acceleration of 1 metre per second to an object of 1kg mass.  In the 
laws of motion, friction is generally defined as a direction of force that is opposite to the net 
vector F.    
Friction is a concept that has to some extent been applied to strategic management discourse.   
This conception of motion – Newton’s second law – is arguably the inspiration for Lewin’s 
(1951)  ‘force field analysis’ technique for decision making in organisations.   The approach 
conceptualises two opposed forces, one consisting of operations and strategic goals that will 
take the organisation forward, the other consisting of ‘opposing forces’ that resist 
organisational operations and progress.  Like Lewin, Clausewitz makes the point that the 
strategic objective, and performance levels need to be realistic, buffered against the 
inevitable influence of ‘friction’, and there are examples in the strategic management 
discourse of how ‘friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan’ 
(Holmes, 2007: 129).  Unlike approaches inspired by Lewin, Clausewitz emphasizes that 
friction is ‘exceedingly hard to gauge’ (2007: 63) and ‘brings about effects that cannot be 
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measured, just because they are largely due to chance’ (2007, 66).  Friction distinguishes the 
plan on paper from the unfolding of the events; in practice, ‘every fault and exaggeration of 
the theory is instantly exposed’ (2007: 66) – this is the same approach taken by S-A-P 
research.  However, for Clausewitz, friction emerges both internally, in the array of 
interactions that constitute the organisation and externally, in the changing and unpredictable 
competitive environment. 
3.3.2 | Friction as Risk 
 
External Friction 
Simultaneity arguably is present in Clausewitz’s suggestion that the past has a limited 
applicability to the present, and events unfold in an unpredictable manner.  That ‘every war is 
rich in unique episodes (2007: 67)’ describes an episodic, flipbook, notion of time.  
Clausewitz famously draws on a metaphor of the unpredictability of weather to describe 
sources of friction related to the changing environment.  He argues that the fog of war 
disturbs the smooth running of a strategic plan, clouds vision, interferes with communication 
and disrupts synchronization.  For Clausewitz, ‘action in war is like movement in a resistant 
element’ (2007: 66-67).  A resistant element presents a source of drag on an object, an 
organisation, or army.  Like wading through waist-deep water, a resistant element presents a 
source of drag – this conception of friction is of external resistance opposing the 
organisational direction.  Strategic management considers external friction, for example 
associated with environment shocks (Waldman, 2010). 
For Clausewitz, the influence of chance and unpredictability creates ‘tremendous friction’ on 
the implementation of strategic plans, at every layer of military (organisational) activity 
(2007: 66-67).   While some research focuses on the disruption of strategy due to unplanned 
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events, such as the concept of noise in the strategy as process approaches, there is also a 
substantial literature that argues that the uncertainty of organisational structures should not 
only be acknowledged, but in some cases, the unavoidable influence of chance should 
sometimes become part of the organisational strategy (Knudssen and Lemmergaard, 2014; 
Wilner et al., 2014).   While relatively modern, these papers nonetheless echo Clausewitz’s 
original sentiment, that chance and uncertainty are unavoidable, and should be accepted, 
even embraced.  Nonetheless, in strategic management discourse, instrumentalism is applied 
to friction, for instance, ‘the concept of risk is central to strategy research and practice’ and is 
typically measured ‘as a series of accounting-based returns’ (Henkel, 2008: 287).  The 
instrumentalist approach to risk and negative performance is then not taken from 
Clausewitzian military theory.  This would suggest that, by relation to the core concepts of 
adaptation and inertia, the concept of friction in strategic management discourse is that it is 
measurable. 
Internal Friction 
In addition to the friction associated with a dynamic environment, Clausewitz also identifies 
another source of friction to be the individual adaptation. 
Clausewitz argues that ‘the military machine – the army and everything related to it – is 
basically very simple and therefore seems easy to manage’: in theory, the commanding 
officer’s duty is to carry out their orders, they are in a position of command due to a tested 
capacity for leadership, and ‘discipline welds the battalion together’ and enable the orders to 
be performed in testing circumstances ‘with the minimum of friction’ (2007: 66). 
The link between organisational strategy and structure has been long made (Chandler, 1962).  
The traditional argument is that military theory in organisational strategy arguably leads to a 
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structure that has characteristics of a military organisation, ‘the classic organisational 
pyramid’ (Mutch, 2006: 752).  Terms like ‘line and staff’, or ‘rank and file’ indicate the 
influence of militaristic approaches to structure in strategic management (Mutch, 2006: 751-
752).  The intention is that directions are set by those at the top and are then communicated 
clearly through a rigid chain of command and carried out by those lower down in the 
structure ‘without any license for adaptation’ (Mutch, 2006: 760). 
That an organisation can be conceptualised in a manner analogous to a machine, or an 
organic system, and that consequently scientific method is applicable to organisations, is 
associated with a functional structuralist perspective of organisations – that each constituent 
aspect of the society, or organization, has a specific function to be carried out that contributes 
to the function of the whole.  The law of the conservation of energy – that energy can neither 
be created nor destroyed, only changed in form – states that friction does not destroy energy, 
however friction is associated with energy that is lost to the productive potential of a system.  
In friction, energy that could contribute to momentum is lost as thermal energy, which 
dissipates in random directions and therefore does not contribute to the sum vector.  For 
example, a rolling snooker ball slows to a stop as friction converts its momentum (kinetic 
energy) into heat.  This conception of friction, as associated with the energy lost to a 
productive system is an example of the second law of thermodynamics, that some energy is 
always lost in the process of production, and total efficiency in the conversion of energy is 
not possible.  This then relates efficiency to friction, with friction being against efficiency, 
the opposite of efficiency.  As such, efficiency is comparable to the vector sum, the net force 
that denotes the resultant direction and momentum of an object.  In the case of functional 
structuralism in strategic management, the resultant momentum is the remit of strategy, the 
strategy designates a future destination for the organisation (in context of competitive 
advantage) and this becomes the benchmark by which efficiency is measured.  In short, 
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scientific concepts in strategic management discourse associate efficiency of process with 
maximum momentum. 
Clausewitz states that ‘a battalion is made up of individuals […] whom may chance to delay 
things or somehow make them go wrong’ (2007: 66); the organisational machine is not one 
piece, neither are its ‘components’ each one piece, but ‘each part is composed of individuals, 
every one of whom retains his potential of friction’ (2007: 66).  This conception could be 
considered a functional structuralist view that is reflective of a top down hierarchal structure, 
in which the subordinates are an issue, similar in sentiment to scientific management.  
Moreover, through a lens of functional structuralism, internal friction is located in the 
practice of organisational members that oppose the strategic directions.  For the sake of the 
functional organisational self, in the name of organisational performance in context of an 
uncertain and changing environment riddled with survival pressures, individuals are expected 
to do as instructed.  For these reasons, cognitive inertia is not an issue of concern for 
functional structuralists.  Any long held assumptions have been forged in the fires of the 
evolutionary process, have proven their mettle, and to question them is a waste of time, a 
waste of energy that could be put to more productive use.  Individuality in organisational 
practices, deemed as friction, is deemed as productivity lost to the organisation.  In this 
conception, resistance is always negative.  Resistance could be the result of bad management 
(Greiner, 1992; Spreitzer and Quinn, 1996; Reichers et al., 1997), but it is the act of 
resistance that is the problem (Dent and Goldberg, 1999).   Presented as such, the problem is 
always associated with the rank and file, who either misunderstood the strategy, or have 
some form of intolerance or pathology that represents an obstacle to strategic function 
(Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979; Reichers et al., 1997; Dent and Goldberg, 1999; Furst and 
Cable, 2008; van Dam et al., 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011).   
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As well as direct resistance, for Clausewitz (2007), and organisational strategy, friction is 
also associated with what could be called individual adaptation that differs/deviates from the 
organisational strategy (Holmes, 2007).  We might say that this concept of friction would 
include the Political.  In frictional practices of individual adaptation, energy that was 
potentially available to the productive practices of the organisation has been wasted, and 
contributes to slowing the organisation down from reaching its goals.  Adaptation other than 
by the leader is friction, resistance and dissent.  Clausewitz argues that in unforeseen 
conditions, military genius might reveal itself (2007: 67) – this is the ability, among others, to 
respond, improvise and adapt.  Military theory, with its use of a clear hierarchical chain of 
command, places responsibility for innovative practice with the leader.  There are studies that 
draw on Clausewitz’s concept of military genius explicitly (Holmes 2007: 129); this 
approach to adaptation is grounded in hierarchical organisational structure.  Arguably due to 
military principles of organisational structure, innovation is far more legitimate at the 
management levels of organisational structure.  
The denial of the inventor is arguably a feature of functionalist approaches.  Nonetheless, a 
more recent trend in strategic management emphasises the value of ‘disruptive innovation’ 
with ‘disruptive talent’ (e.g., Christensen, 1997).  Interestingly, the choice of the word 
‘disruptive’ is indicative of the functional structuralist perspective to organisational strategy.  
Disruptive innovation approaches include a consideration of ‘barriers to innovation’, and 
how these can be circumvented or disrupted (Davenport et al., 2003; Oke, 2004; Reynolds 
and Hristov, 2009; Leavy and Sterling, 2010; Nijstad et al., 2014; Orstavik, 2014).   
3.4 | Summary 
In this chapter I have traced the genealogy of the core concept of Inertia, which has been 
traced to the Newtonian Laws of Motion.  The influence in the knowledge of strategic 
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management is the associated meaning of inertia as resistance to change; inertia as 
consistency; simultaneity; instrumentalism; synchronization; (and to Darwinian Evolution 
Theory: inertia as a strategy for gaining/retaining competitive advantage).  In Newtonian 
physics, inertia describes a state of motion that is either at complete rest or at constant speed 
in a fixed direction.  Newton argues that when a force acts upon an inertial object, there is 
some threshold that the force needs to reach before the inert object is compelled to change its 
state in motion.  Therefore, for Newton, inertia is also a resistance to change.    Strategic 
inertia borrows this characteristic of inertia, of resistance to change (to the current state of 
motion), from the Newtonian model.   
Motion, including inertial motion, requires a benchmark, a frame of reference.  Simultaneity, 
as a universal frame of reference, defines that everyone will agree on what is happening at 
given moment.  Simultaneity is based on the concepts of absolute space and absolute time.  
The concept of strategic inertia is based on the concept of simultaneity.  This matters if the 
concept of strategic inertia is more than a superficial namesake, if the concepts of absolute 
space and absolute time are also present in the concept of strategic inertia, and thus in the 
definition, problematisation, assessment and proposed solutions to strategic inertia.  
The core concept of Friction has been traced to Clausewitzian military theory.  The influence 
in the knowledge of strategic management is the associated structure of hierarchy and 
inflexible chain of command; the concept of dissent as friction; the role of risk, chance and 
uncertainty (and also to the Newtonian laws of motion: friction as negative and oppositional 
force/ energy/ motion).  Friction is therefore closely linked to power relations within (and 
between) organisations.   
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The core concept of Adaptation has been traced to Darwinian evolution theory.  The 
influence in the knowledge of strategic management is the associated meaning of evolution 
as conflict; adaptation and innovation as a means for gaining/retaining competitive advantage 
(and also to Clausewitzian military theory: business competitors and a ‘dog-eat-dog’ dogma).  
The judgement of change, like motion, requires a benchmark, a frame of reference.  
Simultaneity and instrumentalism are applied to organisational change as a result, such that 
what is new is considered to be simultaneous and measurable by extension.  The competitive 
element is related to Darwinian evolution, and a path dependence conception of evolution 
that is based on Newtonian notion of linear time.   Whether inertia or adaptation is a suitable 
strategy for survival or not is typically a question of relative profit.  Therefore, change is 
measured in terms of profit, which is relative and competitive.  The influence of economic 
theory introduces Rational Choice Theory to the problematisation of innovation, thus more 
radical innovation begins as part of the (RCT defined) realm of the ‘irrational’, a position 
from where innovation must prove its rationality via the economic dictum of profitability.   
In the strategic management discourse, the three concepts discussed here are combined in a 
system of relational meaning.  The genealogy suggests that, in organisational strategy, the 
Newtonian principle of simultaneity is prevalent, and forms the dominant basis of the notion 
of time and change.  The scientific (physics and biology), military, and economic discourses 
that significantly contribute to the mainstream conception of strategy in the literature are all 
derived from positivist premises.  Arguably, simultaneity is such an implicit assumption that 
is not the subject of analysis in organisational strategy literature.  This insight provides the 
foundation for the next chapter, which brings PDT to bear against the core concepts, 
exploring the implications raised by the genealogy performed in this chapter. 
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Hannan and Freeman describe how there are inertial pressure on the structure of an 
organisation, that are both internal, ‘for example, internal politics’, and environmental ‘for 
example, public legitimation of organizational activity’.  They argue that ’to claim otherwise 
is to ignore the most obvious feature of organizational life’ (1977: 957).  This conception 
arguably combines the concept of selection pressures from evolution, and melds it with the 
concept of inertia, from physics, to describe internal and external sources of what can be 
compared with Clausewitz’s concept of friction.  Both of their examples are political.  The 
political parameters/criteria that govern which adaptations are considered to be innovation 
and not friction, and vice-versa, and why, are at the heart of this critique. 
Gabriel et al. (2014) argue that ‘the world is an unpredictable and uncontrollable entity, one 
that favours ingenuity, improvisation and imagination rather than faith in scientific dogma 
and the dictates of instrumental rationality’ (2014: 335).  A central implication of this 
genealogy is that the concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation are contingent – and, by 
extension, the same applies for the strategic concepts of resistance, innovation and 
competitive advantage.  This chapter has reviewed the constituent discourses in the concepts 
and examined the articulatory practices that connect them.  The next chapter turns to the 
legitimacy of the articulatory practices that form the foundation of strategic management 
discourse, and considers the associated ethico-political implications.  As the core concepts 
are connected in the strategy discourse, other discourses that intersect within the core 
concepts are brought into relation with one another.  The implications of this further 
intersection of discourses are also considered, regarding combinatorial meanings that are not 
necessarily nodes of the strategy discourse. 
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4 | Political Discourse Theory: A Critique of SM 
In order to understand the ways in which the concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation 
reproduce and hegemonise dominant ideas of strategic management, we need to further 
critique their origins with the history of knowledge in context of PDT.  In this chapter, I 
examine how fixed meanings hegemonise the core concepts identified by the genealogy; how 
articulatory practices relate the core concepts; and, therefore, how fixed meanings of the core 
concepts hegemonise the discursive field of strategic management knowledge.   
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is test the legitimacy of the reproduction of the fixed 
meanings of the core concepts of strategic management discourse, with a related examination 
of the power relations that are legitimated by the fixed meanings.  In this way, the legitimacy 
of power relations in organisations can be tested by scrutinizing their foundation in the 
articulatory practices of the strategy discourse.  By extension, the legitimacy of accepting or 
dismissing proposed innovations can be analysed through a frame of PDT, rather than 
principles of scientific management which are often used in orthodox approaches to strategic 
management by practitioners and researchers. 
In the preceding chapter, I explored how strategic management discourse can be traced into 
different discourses that intersect within the core concepts.  The genealogy suggests that the 
core concepts are not as synonymous across discursive fields as they appear to be treated in 
the mainstream strategy discourse.  Therefore, this chapter will look in more detail at the 
articulatory practices that relate the different core concepts together.  In other words, as other 
discourses arguably intersect within the core concepts of strategic management discourse, 
these other discourses are to some degree brought together, in combinatorial meanings 
associated with the core concepts intersecting within the strategy discourse.  The implications 
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of these combinatorial meanings, transferred into the discourse by association, are explored 
in this chapter. 
4.1 | Time and Power: The Construction of the Moment 
A conception of time (and space) is fundamental to a consideration of change.  This section 
focuses on the related concepts of strategic inertia and strategic renewal (organisational 
change) in context of Foucault’s conception of diachronous time and discursive inertia.  By 
extension, a conceptual framework emerges in which the concept of strategic inertia is 
relatable to discursive inertia.    
4.1.1 | The Relative Absolute Event: Relative Simultaneity  
The archeaology suggests that the concept of simultaneity is present in the core concept of 
inertia in strategic management.  This section is a genealogical examination of the legitimacy 
of the concept and its application and use the discourse of strategic management. 
The last chapter disussed how strategic management developed a positivist approach to 
knowledge.  This section explores the legitimacy of positivism for ascertaining knowledge of 
strategic management as well as exploring alternative approaches to conceptualising the 
production of knowledge and how this relates to strategic management.   
In response to Hume’s Fork, Kant argues that empirical knowledge begins with experience, 
but knowledge comes not only from experience.  Knowledge comes from sense and 
understanding as well.  Alonside sensory experience there are also pure intuitions that in 
some way form the framework of experience, the conditions of possibility of experience, 
namely space and time in their a priori form. This section will explore the notions of space 
and time and relate the implications to strategic management. 
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‘Until 1905, it was thought that everyone experiences the passage of time identically’, in 
other words, ‘that everyone agrees on what events occur at a given moment of time’, and that 
‘everyone would concur on what belongs on a given page’ of the linear flipbook.  However, 
‘when Einstein realized that two observers in relative motion have clocks that tick off time 
differently, this all changed’ (Greene, 2004: 55).  In 1905, Einstein proposed the theory of 
special relativity in the paper ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’.  In special 
relativity, Einstein uses reference frames as a way to specify the relationship between 
different people moving past each other at different speeds and in different directions.  
Newton’s principle of simultaneity means there is only one frame of reference, the universal 
frame of reference.  Einstein demonstrates that this is not the case.  Two frames of reference 
in relative motion to one another will not have the same perspective or chronology of events: 
‘observers in relative motion do not agree on simultaneity – they do not agree on what things 
happen at the same time’ (Greene, 2004: 57.  Italics reproduced from original text).  In other 
words, each moment is relative to our motion and associated frame of reference, different 
reference frames in relative motion will have different photographs that they ascribe to the 
same moment, such that we would not all agree on what is happening at each moment: 
‘observers moving relative to each other have different conceptions of what exists at a given 
moment, and hence they have different conceptions of reality’ (Greene, 2004: 133-134).  For 
Einstein, a moment is relative, not absolute.  In short, simultaneity ‘is not how the world 
works’ (Greene, 2004: 58), there is no absolute frame of reference. 
Einstein reconciles this revelation with the predictive success of Newton’s laws of motion, 
and demonstrates that Newton’s laws of motion only work when the assumption is made of 
being in an inertial frame of reference.  For Einstein, frames of reference are not universal, 
but the illusion of simultaneity is retained in the notion of relative simultaneity: that the 
universe can then be treated as inertial, as special relativity is not felt at the scales of relative 
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speed and motion in which we have been evolving and at which we experience life on Earth.  
For all mechanical and engineering intents and purposes, Newton’s equations more than 
suffice for matters taking place within the relatively small scale region of spacetime local to 
us on Earth.  i.e., we agree on the moment within the planetary frame of reference, and 
therefore the foundation of instrumentalism – the standardisation of measurement – is 
preserved.   
Special relativity is more accurate in predicting motion than Newtonian simultaneity, yet 
‘most people’s intuition is still bound up with this [Newtonian] way of thinking’ (Greene, 
2004: 133).  As discussed, the principle of simultaneity, that there is an absolute reference 
frame, is the basis of independent demonstration.  However, in special relativity, frames of 
reference are relative, with none privileged over any other.  Yet, in the socio-cultural level, 
there are privileges in place associated with reference frames.  Firstly, the Earth-centric 
perspective, in which our experience of time is coordinated by the motion of the solar 
system, centred round the Sun (heliocentric), and the relative position of Earth within the 
system.  After this, the history of calendar systems suggests that any shared experience of 
time is as much socio-cultural construction as independent demonstration – as discussed in 
the introduction. For this reason, there is the potential for a critique of organisational 
knowledge on the basis that, in the strategic management of knowledge, the concept of 
simultaneity, of a universal inertial frame, persists, and forms part of the discursive practices 
that govern the strategy discourse.  For instance, no simultaneity means that ‘different nows 
mean different now-lists’ (Greene, 2004: 132), which is the opposite of synchronisation.   
Due to articulatory practices, other concepts in strategic management discourse become 
associated with simultaneity.  When applied to organisational strategy, the positivistic 
principle of refinement could lead to an approach that considers routinised practices to be 
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routines because they have been independently demonstrated to represent pinnacle 
efficiency.  In the design of organisational strategy, alternative approaches could then be 
dismissed as illegitimate for being in contradiction to simultaneity, with the assumption that 
alternative approaches are unscientific, or inefficient: absurd.  Arguably, it is in relation to 
simultaneity that discourse theory is left in the fringes of strategic management discourse, for 
representing an alternative ontology and epistemology.  Due to the predominance of 
positivism, discursive approaches to organisational strategy are generally considered 
unscientific: at best impractical and at worst absurd.  Nonetheless, discourse theory is 
suitable for critiquing the reproduction of the concept of simultaneity in strategic 
management.  Moreover, discourse theory arguably contains a direct critique of the notion of 
simultaneity.  Why this should have any use for strategic management will be discussed in 
due course, as will the implications for power relations and ethics.   
4.1.2 | The Discursive Event: Historical Conditions of Knowledge 
Production 
 
Popper (1935) wondered why it had taken so long for Newton’s work to be revised and 
concludes it is due to the reverence bestowed upon Newton’s work by wider society.  Popper 
uses this as a basis for returning to Hume to argue for corroboration and falsifiability and to 
propose the principle of empirical falsification.  With its emphasis on corroboration and 
falsifiability, instrumentalism is partly credited to Popper.   
I have established that simultaneity is a construction, and also a basis for positivism in 
organisational strategy.  That the concept is an approximation does not matter for 
instrumentalism.  However, the concepts of absolute time and absolute space arguably also 
dominate, even though they are demonstrably untrue.  In other words, while Newton’s laws 
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of motion work in an inertial reference frame, they do not describe motion in a non-inertial 
reference frame.  Nor does Newton’s model allow for different reference frames to describe 
motion differently.  In short, positivism appears to work only because of the relative 
simultaneity of motion for us on Earthly scales.  Arguably due to its association with 
simultaneity (traceable back to Hume), positivism retains the notion of simultaneity in 
strategic management.   In doing so, positivist discourse can dismiss alternative reference 
frames as absurd, as incongruent to science.  However, this argument is not true, simultaneity 
does not exist, and therefore to apply simultaneity to social phenomena is not based on solid 
foundations.  Arguably, the concept of simultaneity is comparable with the logic of 
equivalence, insofar as ‘the logic of equivalence is the logic of the simplification of political 
space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2014: 117). 
While special relativity might not be relevant to organisational activity on Earthly scales, it 
does identify a gap in the positivist framework, and facilitates a consideration of social 
theory.  It might be argued that discourse theory engages with this gap, and by extension is 
relevant to strategic management.  Discourse theory provides a theoretical explanation for a 
local, or micro, relativity: a social relativity; socio-historical frames of reference. 
To explain how, let us consider a thought experiment: two people, Adam and Bea, seeing an 
event of some kind.  In the discourse of physics, if Adam and Bea are separated in spacetime 
by a distance negligible to special relativity, then special relativity tells us that the event, 
which Adam and Bea participate in constructing by being there, is essentially identical to 
both.  For all intents and purposes in calculations, Adam and Bea are treated as sharing the 
same frame of reference.  This may be true for instrumentalist calculations, but with the 
caveat that simultaneity does not exist, the question is: how far do we go when considering 
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this identical experience, and how far do we then go when applying it to wider phenomena, 
such as the construction of shared values in organisations, the evaluation of dissent and 
innovation, and strategic decision-making? 
Different people would experience and describe an event differently, due to each being part 
of different personal socio-cultural and historic contexts that influence their responses.  
Moreover, these discursive conditions of enunciation influence their interpretation of their 
own responses, and the interpretation each has of the response of the other.  Discourse theory 
suggests that there is no reason to assume that any of these descriptions should necessarily 
align with one another.  There is no universal interpretation of an event.   
Einstein says nothing on how in the same space-time frame of reference, a different person 
might be a different frame of reference.  Arguably this is because Einstein, following 
Newton, was dealing with motion. There is little evidence to suggest that either felt that the 
same principles applied to thought.  However, positivism and instrumentalism reduce the 
social level of different reference frames to the laws of motion, and arguably maintain the 
notion of a universal interpretation.  Foucault does engage with different frame of reference 
at the social level, in context of power relations. 
For Foucault (2002), the event is discursive.  He describes a statement as an event, but not as 
Newton and Einstein would describe it.  The statement ‘must not be treated as an event that 
occurred in a particular time and place’ consigned to history and recollection only.  A 
statement/event is ‘more than the place and date of its appearance’ (2002: 117).  He explicitly 
differentiates the statement from the event, but, in so doing, explicitly associates the 
statement with the consideration of the event.  This is a point of discursive intersection.  For 
Foucault, the statement, as an event, is something to be witnessed, or experienced, or 
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participated in, and should not be treated as purely material, nor purely ideational.  The 
constituent material aspects of an event are mapped into abstract constellations of related 
meaning: at each moment, ‘energy’ and ‘matter’ are given meaning, according to perceived 
‘distributions’ within a ‘boundary’, akin to gestalt psychology.  For Foucault, the event is a 
concept, and the concept of the event is discursive.  Foucault (2002: 131) defines a discourse 
as a formation of statements 'for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined’.  If 
events are discursive there are conditions of expression, discursive practices, which govern 
how events are interpreted.   
In short, simultaneity does not exist, and arguably is unsuitable for making sense of, and 
problematising, matters pertaining to the Social world, in this case in organisational strategy.   
It is in this reconception of inertia that discourse theory, with its ontology and epistemology 
that differs from the positivism and determinism derived from simultaneity, can be shown to 
hold significant explanatory value for thinking about organisational strategy, and for 
considering the power relations involved in the construction of shared values and their 
legitimacy. 
Diachronous Time and Conceptual Inertia  
To describe statements in context of events, Foucault draws on the concept of diachronous 
time.  Diachronous is a term that in the discourse of geology denotes a layer, or slice, of 
sedimentary rock that appears to be uniform in age, but is actually a marbling of rock from 
different ages within the same layer.  If a page of the flipbook can be considered a diachronic 
layer, this conception arguably conceives the ‘event’, the moment, as not being distinct in a 
linear and teleological progression of time.   Which is to say that the history of knowledge 
does not take steps forward along a linear grid, arriving in new epochs of thought, leaving the 
thoughts of the old epoch behind, but rather each layer in the history of knowledge and ideas, 
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while appearing uniform in age, is diachronous, such that it consists of past ideas, continuing 
in the present, and influencing the future, in a historical ‘marbling’ effect.    Moreover, many 
of the ideas that persist do so at the expense of alternatives, that the history of knowledge is 
rife with examples of repression.  In this way, events are interpreted in context of past 
meanings, and also influence imaginings of the future, which can in turn also influence 
present meaning.   
Interestingly for its pertinence, while detailing his archaeological method of genealogy, 
Foucault draws on the concept of inertia (2002: 145, 157, 161) to describe knowledge that is 
taken for granted.  In so doing, he relates the concept of inertia with the concept of power 
relations in social theory.  This association might be considered an articulatory practice 
within the discourse of discourse theory.  For a concept that is no longer analysed, Foucault 
argues, there was once a dynamic power relation in the social, a contest regarding the 
meaning of that concept.  A non-analysed concept is fixed in meaning, and therefore the 
associated power relation is no longer dynamic, but fixed, institutionalised.  Moreover, the 
fixed dominant meaning is treated as self-evident, as an a priori truth, as an analytic 
proposition.  Foucault calls concepts that are no longer analysed the historical a priori, and 
argues that they are misleading: historical a prioris are not really a priori in the Humeian 
sense, and the contest/debate that was once active in the formation and reformation of a 
concept has been suspended and forgotten.  Historical a prioris are presented as without 
history, without a process of non-impartial selection, yet, Foucault argues, independent they 
are not and history they must have.  On this basis of this reasoning, Foucault describes 
historical a prioris as a form of inertia, that we could consider conceptual inertia.   
Simultaneity is such an implicit assumption that is not the subject of analysis in 
organisational strategy literature.  This is a clear hallmark of a historical a priori.  With 
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diachronous time, Foucault rejects simultaneity.  Any sense of a flipbook, for Foucault, is a 
teleology that does not acknowledge power relations in knowledge.  Foucault draws on the 
concept of inertia to suggest that power relations create the illusion of simultaneity of 
knowledge; that knowledge does not progress in a linear direction of improvement, of linear 
evolution.  For Foucault, the ‘great mythical book of history’ does not contain ‘lines of 
words’ that ‘translate […] thoughts that were formed in some other time or place’.  Instead, 
‘systems of statements’ establish statements as events or things: events ‘with their own 
conditions and domain’, and things ‘with their own possibility and field of use’.  These 
systems of systems, the ‘density of discursive practices’, are the archive (2002: 145).  
Foucault proposes the concept of the archive as a complex domain that (re)constitutes 
discourse: the archive is divided by different and distinct discursive formations that emerge, 
persist and dissolve in accordance with ‘specific rules and practices’ (Foucault, 2002: 145).  
Archaeology of the archive ‘reveals the rules of a practice that enables statements to survive 
and to undergo regular modification.  It is the general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements’ (2002: 147).  Discursive practices in the archive do not 
transcend all the different formations, and therefore are unable to specify the domain as a 
whole (Foucault, 2002: 145).  Therefore, it is not possible that, through a ‘polymorphous 
vocabulary’, we can construct, through discourse analysis, ‘a sort of great discourse that one 
could travel over in any direction’ (Foucault, 2002: 165).  This could be considered a critique 
of applied mathematics: the archive is a non-geometric form, a form without a 
circumference, a set without a shared boundary. 
Unsurprisingly, Foucault rejects simultaneity as a goal of discourse theory, the analysis of 
discursive formations is not an ‘attempt at totalitarian periodization’, in which at a ‘certain 
moment […] everyone would think in the same way […] in spite of surface differences’ 
(Foucault, 2002: 145).  This description could be interpreted to critique both simultaneity and 
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relative simultaneity.  In addition to critiquing simultaneity, Foucault’s work can also be 
brought into contrast with Einstein’s theory of time.  ‘The feeling that time flows is deeply 
ingrained in our experience and thoroughly pervades our thinking and language’ (Greene, 
2004: 142).  However, counter to our intuition, reality ‘embraces past, present, and future 
equally’ (Greene, 2004: 132).  Einstein’s theories suggest that the passing of time is an 
illusion: ‘moments just are the raw material of time, they don’t change’ (Greene, 2004: 141).  
‘Under close scrutiny, the flowing river of time more closely resembles a giant block of ice 
with every moment forever frozen into place’ (Greene, 2004: 141), which suggests that that 
moments are frozen and always exist.  Foucault’s approach to moments takes the opposite 
approach: ‘archaeology does not try to freeze time and to substitute for its flux of events 
correlations that outline a motionless figure’ (2002: 186), does not try to construct ‘a 
definitive place in an unmoving constellation’ (2002: 228-229), because [the field of 
statements] is a domain that is active throughout’ (2002: 161).  To question the point at 
which something stops being analysed as a subject, and becomes determined with a priori 
meaning, cut off from historical review and presented as eternal – is to analyse the historical 
conditions of knowledge production (2002: 212). 
For these reasons, ‘instead of following the thread of an original calendar, in relation to 
which one would establish the chronology of successive or simultaneous events, that of short 
or lasting processes, that of momentary or permanent phenomena’ (2002: 186-187), 
Foucault’s analytical approach does not try to identify new moments as they replace old 
moments, and focuses on the conditions by which the property of being new is defined.  In 
this way, archaeology and Foucault’s discursive method are not suitable for analysing 
innovation in the manner of its conception in strategic management.  Archaeology is 
interested in the conditions in the strategic management discourse that define what is 
innovation.  PDT can be used to enhance the theorisation of these discursive conditions. 
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4.1.3 | The Political Event 
The experience of passing moments is how we think of change.   Change needs a benchmark, 
a point of reference.  This raises a pertinent question, if time (and space) is not simultaneous, 
what is the benchmark for describing change?   
As discussed, the articulatory practices of discourse theory associate power relations within 
the history of knowledge to the term inertia.  Following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe (2014 
[1985]) theorize the moment in considerable detail.  Whether they deliberately use the term 
‘moment’ for its relation to the discourse of time debatable, however, as part of the 
genealogical approach, the association is brought to bear against the concept in physics of the 
event as a moment.  In their theory of political hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe, perhaps 
nodding to the geological meaning within diachronous time, describe the sedimentation of 
meaning associated with concepts.  The sedimentation of meaning occurs when an element 
becomes attached to the framework of fixed meanings.  Once attached, the element is no 
longer available to a process of rearticulation.  Laclau and Mouffe describe a sedimented 
element as a moment.  A moment, then, is comparable to Foucault’s concept of an inert 
concept.   Laclau and Mouffe describe political hegemony as a framework of moments, a 
hegemonic constellation is a distribution (clusters and dispersions) of moments within the 
articulatory framework, within the horizons of intelligibility (2014: 92).  The horizons of 
intelligibility relate to Foucault’s concept of discursive practices, as rules and regulations that 
define what may be inside the discourse – a perimeter defined by parameters.  Discursive and 
articulatory practices define the parameters of acceptance, and are arguably akin to a frame 
of reference.  From a Laclau and Mouffe perspective, then, a frame might be argued to refer 
to the discursive practices that demarcate the conditions of possibility, and to the clusters and 
dispersions of the moments (inert concepts) that occupy the discursive field.   
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In relativity, a moment is relative to a frame of reference.  The moment encompasses 
everything within it – all the spatial positions of all particles within the frame of reference – a 
frozen constellation.  In PDT, if moments are inert, then the articulatory practices that relate 
them together are inert as well, what we might consider to be a conceptually inert framework; 
a network, or organisation, of inert concepts; fixed, frozen, hegemonic.  Analogous to the 
formation of a snowflake, hegemonic frameworks develop outwards from a fixed centre, by 
freezing some of the floating discursive elements that are outside of its structure, in doing so, 
the floating elements become fixed, integrated as part of the hegemonic structure, and the 
hegemony expands its frozen territory.  Frameworks (constellations) of moments constitute 
an inertial frame.   
For Laclau and Mouffe (2014: 98-99) ‘any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate 
the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre.’  We might 
argue then, that the construction of a hegemonic centre is exactly what the selection of an 
inertial frame of reference involves.  A hegemonic framework constructs itself as an 
independently demonstrated inertial frame of reference – as a universal benchmark, which 
enables the hegemonic frame to direct others.   Thus the flow of differences, of change, of 
time, is discernible only in relation to a moment, an inert meaning attached to an element, a 
hegemonic frame of reference. 
A hegemonic framework of articulatory practices governs the conditions in which existence 
can be defined.  If the conditions are fixed, then alterative meanings are denied association 
with the moments of the hegemonic framework.  Laclau and Mouffe argue that hegemonic 
frameworks reproduce their dominant positions by repressing or appropriating alternative 
perspectives.  It is here argued that the reproduction of simultaneity in strategic management 
represses or appropriates alternative conceptions of time and space in organisational strategy.  
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For instance, strategic management based on simultaneity imposes an ‘internal pacing upon 
the environment’ (Pina e Cunha, 2004: 271) and upon organisational members too.  Applying 
the discursive critique, the construction of simultaneity has been extended to shared values in 
organisational strategy, which is more than simply a best attempt at capitalising on the 
potential for profit in organisations, it is a political strategy that places a set of perspectives at 
the centre of a system of relational meaning, and treats these perspectives as unquestionable, 
arguably on the basis of their links to scientific discourse. 
Arguably, hegemony, a network (or organisation) of inert concepts with inert associations, 
influences us first into seeing the same constellations (patterns and relations) from the 
dispersed and clustered collection of elements (the gestalt image); then secondly into 
interpreting constellations the same way, drawing the same meaning from the same patterns, 
forming and reproducing a constellation of moments outs of dispersals and clusters of 
elements.  By controlling the interpretation of elements and moments, dominant narratives of 
events and change can be established, and a sense of simultaneity is constructed.  Therefore, 
in PDT, the benchmark for describing change can be hegemonic.   
This theorisation combines the concept of an inertial frame of organisational reference with 
the concept of strategic inertia as ‘the tendency for organizations to remain with the status 
quo and their resistance to strategic renewal outside the frame of their current strategy’ (Huff, 
et al., 1992: 55; Hopkins et al., 2013: 77).  The dominant narrative associated with a 
hegemonic reference frame can influence the interpretation of the present, and the 
imagination of the future.  With reference to Gunder and Hillier (2009), Stavrakakis (2012: 
318) argues that ‘exactly like the political act, “planning is ultimately about what will, or 
might be, the future” (2009: 5)’.  In this way, the dominant narrative can be self-fulfilling and 
reproduce its position as a centre of discourse.  Dominant narratives have been linked to 
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organisational inertia (Naslund and Pemer, 2012) and a ‘resistance to strategic renewal 
outside the frame of current strategy’ (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Mallette and Hopkins, 
2013: 104).  We have then a theorization of strategic inertia that arises from conceptual 
inertia due to the hegemonised articulation of moments that reinforce an inertial frame of 
reference. 
The approach suggests that reference frames are Political, and inertial reference frames can 
be hegemonic in organisations.  This relates power relations to frames of reference in 
organisations, wherein core concepts of the organisational strategy form a hegemonic 
framework, to which organisational members are subject. 
For Foucault, the statement/event, can be used for repressive power, and can also be 
contested in meaning.  Laclau and Mouffe argue that contested signifiers reveal the 
‘openness of the social’ that is the precondition for hegemony (2014: 128).  This necessary 
incompleteness is for Laclau and Mouffe, the primacy of the Political, that indicates that 
‘“society” is not a valid object of discourse’ (2014: 97) when conceived as a totality: ‘the 
incomplete character of the totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of analysis, 
the premise of “society” as a sutured and self-defined totality’ (2014: 97).   
In this context of social logics, Laclau and Mouffe like Foucault, arguably reject 
simultaneity, on the basis that ‘there is no singly underlying principle fixing – and hence 
constituting – the whole field of differences’ (2014: 97).   This is a similar characteristic to 
that of the archive, of which no discursive practices encompass the entire field of discourses: 
‘no hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and constitute its centre’ (2014: 
128).  If political hegemony is a totality of the social, then this would suggest ‘a new suture 
would have been produced’, meaning all social difference has been homogenised under a 
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unified logic.  However, hegemony depends upon an outside that can be dominated, therefore 
a totalised system would mean ‘the very concept of hegemony would have eliminated itself’ 
(2014: 128).  Laclau and Mouffe (2014: 120) describe how ‘there is no place whatsoever for 
a hegemonic practice’ if ‘the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed.’  Hegemony 
cannot be ‘a closed system of relational identities.’   A political order of this type forecloses 
the openness of the social, and denies hegemony the power relation that defines it.  In short, 
simultaneity, or an absolute inertial frame of reference, as a basis for a socially unified logic, 
is an unattainable premise, insofar as totality of meaning (absolute meaning) is not possible.  
This has been accepted in the discourse of physics for some time, but arguably is not as 
implicitly acknowledged in strategic management discourse.  Discourse theory illustrates 
how the construction of simultaneity can become a political strategy of cultural domination.   
Laclau and Mouffe reason that ‘the impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning’ does not 
mean that fixed meanings do not occur, ‘there have to be partial fixations’, ‘otherwise, the 
very flow of differences would be impossible’.  Change can only be judged in relation to a 
benchmark: change is change, regarding motion or meaning – ‘even in order to differ, to 
subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning’ (2014: 98-99).  Referring here to hegemony as a 
‘partial fixation’, they ‘call the privileged discursive points […] nodal points.’  Nodal points 
are moments that are differentiated for having a more influential, privileged, position within 
the framework of meaning.  As a framework, the nodal points ‘partially fix the meaning of 
the social in an organised system of differences’ (2014: 121).  Nodal points could be 
considered to be core concepts.  The implication of this is that the dominant meanings 
associated with core concepts in strategic discourse are presented as timeless, yet are open to 
the possibility of rearticulation, of renewal in meaning.  Indeed, it is this natural ambiguity in 
meaning that ‘makes possible articulation as a practice instituting nodal points’ in the first 
place (2014: 121)    
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Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, unlike the principle of independent demonstration, does not 
attempt to solve contradictory logics into an absolute concept.  This is because a theory of the 
social cannot be based on ‘absolutizing’ any of those contradictory logics, because ‘none of 
them has absolute validity, in the sense of defining a space or structural moment which could 
not in its turn be subverted’ (2014: 129).  In other words, because there is no absolute 
benchmark for an event in time and space, true validity in the meaning of a moment cannot 
be independently demonstrated.  The concept of simultaneity of values constructs an absolute 
frame that precludes the legitimacy of subjective perspectives.   
In mainstream political theory, framing refers to the rhetorical strategy of manufacturing 
contextual meaning, such that the meaning of the discourse can be manipulated.  This often 
done with the intention of associating particular characteristics and meanings to a discourse 
by segregating the discourse from other meanings, thus specifying a narrow range of possible 
meaning, a narrow range that serves the purposes of the manipulator.  I argue that the PDT 
critique of inertial frames of reference provides a more textured description of political 
frames than is usually found in the strategy literature. 
In context of conceptual inertial, strategic inertia can be linked to fixed discursive practices.  
An inertial frame of reference defines the parameters of observation, and influences the 
observation.  A frozen formation is an inert frame of reference.  The hegemonic constellation 
gives the impression of an absolute inertial frame of reference.  However, there is only a 
hegemonic frame of reference.  Moreover, hegemonic moments, while appearing fixed, 
might actually be presented as fixed due to hegemonic power relations, not due to an 
independent demonstration: moments are presented as frozen, but are not.    Therefore they 
might be better thought of as dormant.   
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Standardisation is normalization; it is the bracketing of possible practice for the purpose of 
efficiency.  Therefore, difference, might be definitionally associated with inefficiency of 
process, for being in binary opposition with standardized, normalized, functional practice.  
How this relates to innovation, such that the frame imposes its perspective on all activity that 
passes though the frame (also to barriers to innovation), will follow.  First, friction. 
4.2 | Clausewitz: Dialectic Friction 
As discussed in the methodology, the theoretical framework of this thesis treats 
organisational strategy as a System of Politics.  The fallacy of simultaneity means that the 
concept of inertia as it used in strategic management is open to critique, moreover, a 
reconception of strategic inertia means that any combinatorial meanings and relationships 
established between the core concepts in strategy discourse are called in question by 
extension.  Without simultaneity, it is worth exploring whether the construction of shared 
values is legitimate, particularly in how simultaneity is performed within an asymmetric 
organisational structure.  When considering the power relations involved in the construction 
of shared values, and their legitimacy, I return to Clausewtizian theory, to explore how power 
relations are performed, and the logic with which the concept of friction applied to strategy.  
More specifically, in this section I analyse whether the assumptions of friction, as being 
negative and associated only with subordinates, is legitimate.  I suggest that, with the 
construction of shared values, strategy acts as a system of Politics, meaning that the 
reproduction of simultaneity is the reproduction of a system of hegemony, not the 
reproduction of common sense and functional wisdom.   
Clausewitz (2007: 20) appears to hold a similar opinion to Laclau and Mouffe regarding the 
potential for personal interpretation – ‘the same political object can elicit differing reactions 
from different peoples, and even from the same people at different times’ – and also with the 
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focus on conditions of articulation as the influence on what is considered to be standard – 
‘we can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it 
can exert upon the forces it is meant to move’.  Clausewitz argues that ‘nature of those forces 
therefore calls for study’.  If differing reactions are associated with the Political, then 
arguably PDT enables a consideration of the ‘political forces’. 
‘Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower the 
general level of the performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal’ 
(Clausewitz, 2007; 66).  ‘Clausewitz’s fundamental critique leads him to the conclusion that 
a normative theory of strategy is impossible’ (Kornberger, 2013: 1058).  This is a similar 
conclusion as that made about political systems by Laclau and Mouffe: a totality is 
impossible.  As Clausewitz is in context of strategy, this assertion, in context of Laclau and 
Mouffe, could be interpreted as a conceding that a normative strategic plan – the basis of 
routinisation and scientific management – is impossible, deluded.  Instead, ‘he suggests 
understanding strategy as a socio-political (rhetorical) mechanism through which people can 
be convinced in deliberations about a specific course of actions’  (Kornberger, 2013: 1058). 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that in the contestation of meaning of concepts, the Political is 
revealed.  Organisational strategy, when used as a means of standardizing (of normalizing) 
perspectives and practices of personnel, could be considered to be a system of politics that 
manages disputes arising from the Political.   In this way, organisational strategy is 
conceptualized in relation to political difference, other frames of reference, a relation that 
involves tensions.  Tensions and power relations in the implementation of strategy, between 
recursive and adaptive forms, from individual cognition to macro competitive contexts 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004: 529), reveal the system of Politics of organisational strategy to manage 
the Political.   
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4.2.1 | Relative and Discursive Friction 
The genealogy also suggests that the Newtonian conception of time in organisational strategy 
carries with it the assumption of an absolute frame of reference.  The model proposed by 
Newton is the inspiration behind ‘scientific management’.  The conception of friction in 
Newton’s model has been appropriated by functional structuralist approaches to strategic 
management, to conceptualise factors that impede the attainment of strategic goals.  Friction 
is seen as a problem, as dysfunctional.  Arguably, beyond the simultaneity of time and space, 
the terminology of motion is entwined with strategic thinking: for instance, strategy is 
designed to take the organisation forward, not backward.   In the discourse of strategic 
management, friction is typically associated with the slowing of motion, with drag, as with 
Clausewitz’s conception.  The genealogy suggests that the negative concept of friction in 
Clausewitzian military theory is associated with the implicit concept of friction in Lewin’s 
Force Field Analysis, and in subsequent problematisations of resistance and dissent.   
From the absolute frame of reference there is an absolute benchmark for determining what 
constitutes frictional practice, and what does not.   If we take as the inertial frame of 
reference that of the strategic, any practice or perspective that is directly incongruous 
compared to the strategic frame, is by definition frictional within a functionalist perspective 
based on simultaneity.  Therefore, if an organisational frame of reference – implicit in 
strategy – is presented as absolute, then alternative frames of reference are frictional and 
counter-productive.  In this way, the meaning of friction has been dominated by a negative 
conception of alternative practices and perspectives.  Due to the persistence of simultaneity 
based approaches to organisational strategy, what is frictional is assumed to be the same for 
everyone, at the mechanical level, and then, in the concept of functional structuralism, 
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extended to the social level, in strategies such as those encouraging shared value initiatives 
(e.g., Porter and Kramer, 2006; 2011). 
In approaches like Lewin’s, change is desirable and friction represents resistance to change, 
in Clausewitz’s approach, inertia is desirable (no unauthorised/unplanned change), and 
friction represents resistance to inertia.  In overly simplistic terms, Lewin is pro change, and 
Clausewitz is anti change, but both treat friction as an antagonistic force: negative and 
counterproductive.  This suggests that in the strategic management discourse, despite the 
association with functional structuralism, friction is ambiguous, and can apply in two 
opposing directions.  This should not be the case according to Newtonian simultaneity, on 
which functional structuralism in organisational strategy is argued here to be based on.  
Either approach to friction nonetheless might be considered a functional structuralist 
perspective of organisational change, one that borrows from the discourse of Newtonian 
mechanics in the design of strategy. 
Friction is popularly known only for its role in producing inertia.  However, special relativity 
provides a more nuanced understanding of friction.  From a perspective of special relativity, 
in some cases, friction is associated with the acceleration of motion, with propulsion, and the 
transference of energy between bodies.  Inertia is the force that resists change.  Without any 
force acting on it, an object will either be in a state of rest, or move in a straight line at an 
unchanging speed.  Inertia is the resistance of the object to any change in its state of motion: 
this includes slowing down, but also speeding up.  Friction, therefore, by definition as 
oppositional to the trajectory of motion, can accelerate or decelerate the body, can dislodge 
inertia.  Friction can be a positive force for change.  Resistance can be productive (Smith, 
2011; Morris, 2013: 57), and ‘is to be encouraged, even celebrated’ (Dobosz-Bourne and 
Jankowicz, 2006; Ford et al., 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 324-330).   
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Moreover, frames of reference are only inert relative to other reference frames, and therefore 
cannot be independent.  In which case, there is no absolute basis for defining frictional 
motion.  Different frames of reference will produce different interpretations regarding what is 
frictional.  In short, in special relativity, with no privileged reference frames, which direction 
represents forwards is relative, it is not absolute and simultaneous.  Therefore, what 
constitutes a frictional force, as being in opposition to the forward motion, is an indication of 
power relations in the Social. 
Laclau and Mouffe describe how ‘the logic of equivalence is the logic of the simplification of 
political space’, whereas ‘the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing 
complexity’ (2014: 117).  As such, the logic of simultaneity is similar to the logic of 
equivalence.  One refers to space, the other to political space.  Yet the theorisation of 
political space borrows terminology from the discourse of physics.  The comparison suggests 
that the simplification of relativity is the rationale behind maintaining the concept of 
simultaneity.   In special relativity, friction can do positive work when perceived from 
different frames of reference.  In this conception of friction, whether friction represents a 
counterproductive motion is more ambiguous.   
Logics of equivalence and difference describe antagonistic relations, when ‘a maximum 
separation has been reached’, in which elements in the system of equivalence will not enter 
into systems of relation with elements of the different system – the other logic.  Moreover, 
elements in the system of equivalence will only enter into relations of opposition to the other 
system (2014: 116). 
In antagonistic relations ‘the world divides, through a system of paratactical equivalences, 
into two camps’: the first ‘representing the identity of the movement’, and the second 
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‘incarnating evil’.  In this relation, ‘the second is the negative of the first’ (2014: 116).  From 
this position, the alternative perspective is always frictional.  Frictional perspectives are 
opposed to the inertial frame of reference and can be considered to be the negative of the 
inertial frame of reference.  This connection would suggest that, for being the logical 
negative of the inertial frame, friction is viewed as functionally negative. 
In context of PDT, the absolute frame of reference is argued to be a social construction, and 
the basis for power relations.  The judgement of what constitutes frictional practice is thus 
socially constructed, and associated with power relations within social interaction.  What this 
implies is that friction does not apply to either side, but is the relation between them, the 
dialectic frontier, the antagonism.  Which side is displaying friction can only be defined as a 
semantic relation, such that there is no objective truth to associating friction to either.  
Friction may apply to either or both, depending on which side you take, which frames of 
reference you take as your inertial frame.  This becomes a matter of perspective, of politics.   
Friction, in physics, is the force of resistance between two surfaces/bodies in relative motion 
– an interactional force.  In the discourse of physics, bodies can be treated as frames of 
reference, in which case friction arguably arises from the interaction of two relative frames of 
reference.  The application of logics of equivalence and difference to the concept of friction, 
suggests that it is a dynamic between two motions, between two communities: ‘there are not 
one but two societies’ (2014: 116).  Therefore, we might say that friction arises when the 
relative motions of two frames of reference are in opposition to one another, that friction is 
comparable with an active frontier between different systems of articulatory practices. 
This theorization is not in search of a polymorphous vocabulary, it is not to suggest a 
unification of special relativity and discourse theory, the purpose is to clarify the intersection 
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of discourses within the core concepts of strategic management: as strategic management 
draws on the discourse of physics, it is to concepts in physics that the discourse analysis 
turns.  The apparent synonymity of concepts between discourses needs to be articulated 
before it can be deconstructed, and the discourse of discourse theory cannot be excluded 
from the process (synonymity is a term in genetic science referring to synonymous meanings 
ascribed to the functions of codons, such that different codes are assumed to result in the 
same functional outcome – this will be described in more detail in Chapter 5, as it is an 
assumption that has been recently questioned within the field of genetics).  The theoretical 
approach of this thesis is a critique of the articulatory practice that relates friction in military 
theory to friction in organisational strategy, in context of a genealogy that suggests that both 
conceptions of friction share a Newtonian meaning, which is the basis of a negative 
conception of friction in both. 
To compare the concept of friction in these discourses with the concept of the frontier in 
PDT, is to suggest that ‘friction’ is not an absolute phenomenon, but Political; that, as with 
inertia, PDT says more about what would be considered a shared frame of reference in 
special relativity.  As with inertia, discourse theory is able to engage with the social aspects 
of the concept without reducing them to positivism – if the concept of an inertial frame of 
reference is hegemonic, then the Political is frictional by relation. 
A PDT approach suggests that the concept of simultaneity – an absolute inertial reference 
frame – in strategic management means that the organisational moment is considered 
absolute.  When this view is combined with a perspective of functional structuralism, 
alternative perspectives are considered not only absurd, they are also frictional, they are 
absurd resistance to the real world.  Simultaneity reduces personal interpretations to the 
negative concept of friction.  In PDT, each personal interpretation is a personal socio-historic 
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reference frame, and each is valid on its own terms, is not necessarily a negative force of 
individuality to be overcome.  As discussed, hegemonic frames are associated with dominant 
narratives, which can lead to strategic inertia.   
4.2.2 | Change Agents and Nodes of Power: Defining Friction 
The labelling of action as friction requires a reference point by which to judge motion.  The 
discursive critique of simultaneity suggests that an organisation, via its design and 
implementation of strategy, ‘constructs a hegemonic centre’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) 
around an inertial frame of reference.  It is by relation to this constructed inertial frame that 
alternative reference frames are defined as frictional.  In this way, friction is defined by 
whoever constructs the inertial frame of reference.  The reproduction of the dominant 
reference frame reproduces the position of influence.  As such, practice that is labelled as 
resistance, as friction, reveals power relations in organisational strategies. 
A dominant narrative ‘fixes not only the meaning of events, but also the meaning of the 
labels available’ for making sense of events (Naslund and Pemer, 2012: 89).  Discourse 
theory associates events with moments and by extension with elements.  Discursive elements 
can be used to give a narrative power (Gabriel, 1998); that is the ability of a narrative to 
define and therefore control realities (Salzer-Moerling, 1998) by attaching elements into 
frameworks of related meaning, on a moment by moment basis; ‘Foucault argues that power 
is productive.  It produces “reality”, including “domains of objects”, and “rituals of truth” 
and individual subjects (Foucault, 1979: 194)’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 326). 
There are a multitude of narratives produced in organisations simultaneously, called a 
‘polyphone’ (Salzer-Moeling, 1998), which can be related to the Political.  When negotiating 
meaning, such as in the construction of organisational strategy, the narratives that ‘display 
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semantic fit with the dominant story’ are favoured, while those that deviate ‘appear 
oxymoronic’ (Naslund and Pemer, 2012: 89), and can be overridden by a hegemonic 
discourse embodying a universal story of change.  The dominant narrative of strategic 
management discourse is argued to be based on core concepts.  These concepts reproduce 
their position of dominance by reproducing the concept of an inertial reference frame.  In 
other words by justifying the position as real, and then dismissing the alternative perspectives 
as unrealistic.   The core concepts, however, being nodes, are only partially fixed and are 
open to rearticulation even if they appear not to be.   
Foucault (1980) argues that power and resistance are implicated in one other, that ‘there are 
no relations of power without resistance’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 326).  This becomes 
relevant as it can be associated with the core concept of friction, and can be continued into 
Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of nodes.  Laclau and Mouffe argue that ‘power is never 
foundational’, that via the ‘opposed logics of equivalence and difference’, every form of 
power is constructed ‘internally to the social’.  Their theorisation is that power is not 
constructed simply as ‘the dominant sector which constitutes the centre’, i.e., power is not 
concentrated in one place.  Neither is power a ‘total diffusion’ within the social, as this 
proposition would ignore the ‘partial concentrations of power’ (2014: 129).  Power is 
partially concentrated within moments that make up constellations of relational meaning. 
In organisation theory, the Foucauldian approach developed by Thomas and Hardy (2011) to 
theorize power relations in organisation is pertinent to this analysis.  They propose that 
relations of power are exercised in organisations when resistance arises among organisational 
members in discourses of organisational change. Their concept of power relations shares 
some characteristics with Laclau and Mouffe’s approach: ‘power is never complete and 
possibilities for resistance always exist’, a discursive approach suggests that the same applies 
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for nodal points: due to the partial fixity of moments, the possibility of resistance is found 
within each node; ‘power is exercised through multiple points of pressure and so too is 
resistance’, PDT suggests that there is no single centre of power, which is partially dispersed 
within the social, partially concentrated in moments; and ‘power and resistance thus operate 
together in a web of relations’ (2011: 326), which we might describe as a hegemonic 
constellation.  As argued, the concept of friction is set in relation to the inertial reference 
frame, the hegemonic centre, which organisational strategy can sometimes form.  The 
concept of friction can then be seen to be one that, rather than being concentrated in one 
place, is partially diffused among a network of moments.  If power is exercised when 
resistance arises, then power is exercise when instances of the Political are considered to be 
frictional: power is exercised in the Political moment.  As discussed, nodes are the privileged 
moments of the partially fixed framework.   
In organisations, change agents have more influence than others regarding strategic decision 
making.  For instance, while the direction of organisational strategy applies to all personnel, 
relatively few organisational personnel contribute to the direction of the strategy.  In an 
organisation, there are relatively few directors.  Directors decide the strategic direction.  
They decide the organisational structure, typically a hierarchy that retains their position as 
the directors but partially diffuses their endogenous power into roles of authority further 
down.  The concept of the change agent is associated with positions of management (Luscher 
and Lewis, 2008; Wooldridge et al., 2008; Hopkins et al., 2011), and can be found in 
practice, dynamic capabilities and ecological approaches (Sele and Grand, 2016: 1).  There is 
a ‘privileging of change agents’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325), such that we might 
consider change agents as the nodes of the organisational structure, insofar as the structure 
relates to social organisation.   The strategic frame legitimizes change agents to ‘use 
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whatever means necessary to prevent resistance, including the use of power against 
employees (Hardy and Clegg, 2004; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 322).   
Change agents judge change; they embody the benchmark by which change is judged; 
‘power may reside in the act of labelling’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325).  The evaluation of 
the Political by change agents enacts and reproduces an inertial frame of reference that is 
imposed on the Social.  In the Political moment, in which individual instances of the Political 
emerge, change agents might exercise their power, and exercise the power of the 
organisation: ‘individuals are, then, always “in the position of simultaneously undergoing 
and exercising this power” (Foucault, 1980: 98)’ (2011: 326).  With hegemony, power 
relations means that there is a repression in the social.  To label the Political as frictional is 
an act of social power, an act that places oneself at the centre of social relations, in a 
position of dominance over opposing perspectives.  ‘In producing reality’, while ‘some actors 
may be privileged’, as change agents, ‘others may be marginalized’: ‘some subjects may 
“secure their sense of what it is to be worthy and competent human beings” (Knights and 
Morgan, 1991: 269), while others may rebel against the ways in which they are defined, 
categorized and classified (Sawicki, 1991)’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 326).  ‘Resistance 
only exists if change agents label the actions of change recipients as such’ (2011: 324).  The 
judgement of what constitutes frictional practice is thus socially constructed, a consequence 
of the concept of simultaneity, and associated with power relations within social interaction.   
There are studies that focus on resistance to power (Kelly, 2009; Contu, 2013) and ‘counter-
hegemonic’ planning (Purcell, 2009) from the perspective of the resistance.  These 
approaches can be interpreted to suggest that alternative frames of reference label themselves 
as ‘resistant’ forces, i.e., as friction.  In other words, alternative frames view themselves as 
alternative frames, and define themselves within the perspective and articulatory framework 
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of the dominant frame of reference.  Arguably, ‘asymmetrical power relations’ are 
normalized and taken for granted, rather than being scrutinized and analysed (Hardy and 
Clegg, 2004; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325).  Arguably, in strategic management discourse, 
the asymmetric approach to power relations has become a form of conceptual inertia.  In 
other words, the asymmetry is a form of historical a priori, which is possible as ‘the 
negotiation of meaning is shaped by power-resistance relations that are not necessarily 
consciously mobilized, such as when discourses reproduce taken-for-granted meanings’ 
(Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 329). 
In this section, I have argued that the concept of simultaneity leads to an unquestioned 
legitimacy being attached to the negative conception of friction, such that friction in 
organisation and in strategy research is considered to be a problem, and is associated, due to 
the influence of military theory, with subordinates in a hierarchical organisational structure.  
Moreover, that due to simultaneity being illusory, the unquestioned legitimacy of associating 
friction with negative actions of subordinates is equally illusory.  Therefore, to label actions 
as frictional is a power play within the Social, between otherwise equal social participants, 
and nothing more. 
However, while an inertial frame is experienced, it is not absolute.  The articulatory 
framework of the discourse of strategic management, treated as the inertial frame of 
reference, is also treated as absolute, in that it imposes simultaneity on organisational 
members.  The articulatory practices, that connect the core concepts of strategy discourse in 
relational meaning, define the lens through which alternative perspectives of organisational 
strategy are evaluated.  Alternative perspectives arise from the Political, and functional 
structuralism leads to the dismissal of individual views that are judged to be incongruent with 
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the articulatory frame(work).  Therefore, while able to provide benefits of standardisation, in 
functionalism is intentionally myopic and is able to be means of social repression.   
As concepts in organisational strategy can arguably be considered to derive in part from 
military theory, the system of politics in business organisations is one that is relatively 
intolerant of political differences, within and outside the organisation.  However, in strategic 
management discourse, the different approaches to friction indicate that the concept is 
contested.  The organisational structure is defined by the strategy discourse of the 
organisation: the articulatory practices of the strategy discourse legitimize power relations 
that enforce (reproduce) the articulatory practices of the strategy discourse.   
Functional logic is a logic of equivalence, and is generally treated as no longer in need of 
analysis.  Functional logic is conceptually inert if, by the principle of the logic of 
equivalence, logics that differ from the given principles are considered absurd – are, by 
relational definition to an absolute perspective, the opposite of functional.   
The evaluation of what is functional and what is frictional is made by change agents.  Change 
agents enforce the articulatory framework when exercising the power relation that is 
legitimized by their role in the organisational structure.  Turning functionalism back on itself, 
Clausewitzian friction, in terms of individual error, could be applied to change agents in the 
labelling of friction: ‘a tendency to [label resistance] precipitously or unthinkingly may 
hinder the effort’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 324).  In the language of functionalism, we 
could say that in cases of mislabelled friction, the power endogenous to the organisation has 
been used inefficiently, more specifically, that the inefficiency is due to the way that the 
power is distributed within the organisational structure.   
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The articulatory framework of the strategy discourse facilitates and limits the possible 
expressions of organisational strategy.  In this way, the organisational reference frame and 
the possible strategic direction are closely related.   Hegemonic discourse dominates the 
meanings available to change, and therefore the possible choices of direction.  In the 
conceptual framework proposed in this thesis, power is theorized as the power to judge 
‘motion’, to construct the inertial reference frame (framework of articulatory practices) from 
which to judge whether alternative reference frames are considered to be frictional: the 
power to choose.  
4.3 | Darwin: Agonism and Ethical Dissent 
Simultaneity contains a linear and universal notion of time and a conception of evolution 
based on simultaneity constructs a concept of linear and universal evolution.  Even now, ‘a 
hundred years after Einstein’ we still think in terms of simultaneity: ‘almost no one, not even 
professional physicists, feels relativity in their bones’, including biologists and chemists, 
business analysts, economists, and social theorists. Arguably, as ‘everyday experience thus 
fails to reveal how the universe really works’, meaning that special relativity is not felt at the 
speeds and distances we are used to here on Earth, ‘one is hard pressed to find the survival 
advantage offered by a firm grasp of relativity’ (Greene, 2004: 77).   
The implications of the lack of an absolute reference frame are, when empirically measuring 
competitive advantage, researchers assume that they are grounded in the scientific basis of 
independent demonstration, when they are instead looking for relations between empirical 
findings and socially constructed concepts (Durand and Vaara, 2006), such as the idealised 
concept of perfect competition (Powell, 2001).  In organisational terms, the objective that the 
strategy has been formulated to achieve could well influence the ‘performance criteria’ – 
    129 
financial performance, for instance, could be considered a reflection of resource allocation 
(Stinchombe, 2000).   
The last section explored the possibility that the consequence of this dominance might be that 
the notion of what is frictional is defined within a militaristic conception.  This section will 
explore how other concepts associated with military theory discourse might have been 
transferred into the discourse of strategic management along with the concept of friction, in 
context of the core concept of adaptation.  The genealogy suggests that the concept of 
adaptation can be traced to Darwin’s theory of evolution, and various interpretations of its 
meaning. 
4.3.1 | Innovation and Discourse Theory: The Political 
That the inertial frame judges what is frictional is not the full story.  The last section focused 
on how the inertial frame is used as a benchmark for judging what is different, in terms of 
labelling friction.  The frame that is treated as a benchmark is a construct; it is a framework 
of articulatory practices.  What is different can also be determined in context of time, 
difference from one moment to the next is how we tend to conceptualise change.  In a 
temporal lens, change relates to the concept of what is new, by comparison with what is 
unchanged.   
Foucault describes how the discursive practices that constitute the reference frame ‘are not so 
much limitations imposed on the initiative of subjects as the field in which that initiative is 
articulated’ (2002: 230).  Articulatory practices construct the frame through which 
emergences of the Political are interpreted.  Expressions of the Political are obliged to meet 
the requirements of articulatory practices in order to be articulated, to gain entry to the 
discursive field.  Foucault’s conception of change (2002: 230) places the power to change the 
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structure with the structure, such that the structure changes itself.  In this way, Foucault 
facilitates discursive change alongside his theory of discursive inertia.  This connection is an 
articulatory practice that associates two of the core concepts in strategic management 
discourse with core concepts in disourse theory.  For Foucault, change is facilitated and 
limited by discursive practices, and therefore, it is the conditions of articulation that define 
innovation.  Therefore, as with friction, what is innovative is defined by relation to the 
constructed inertial frame.   
In an approach of diachronous time, as opposed to simultaneity, the constructed frame is 
susceptible to historical a prioris and conceptual inertia.  This is because, in diachronous 
time, dominant discursive practices are taken for granted and presented as ahistorical.  As the 
past lingers in the present, we cannot simply separate event/moments into a linear sequence 
of change.  Foucault argues that 'the field of statements is not a group of inert areas broken 
up by fecund moments’ (2002: 161).  Fecund means creatively fertile, such that we might 
take Foucault as dismissing the concept of a linear evolution of knowledge. 
For Foucault, changes in discursive structures are not associated with ‘new ideas, a little 
invention and creativity, a different mentality’ (2002: 230) but with a change in a practice – 
in a rule and governing statement of a discourse – or several practices, in which their 
‘common articulation’ is also changed.  This conception leaves no room for individual 
creativity as source of innovation independent of the social, of the organisation: ‘I have not 
denied – far from it – the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty 
of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it’ (2002: 230).  Foucault dismisses 
the notion of Eureka moments, flashes of inspiration.  Foucault argues that creativity does not 
exist, only the reconstitution of what has been.  Therefore, ‘archaeology is not in search of 
inventions’ (2002: 161), and all we can ascertain is which side of a frictional relation is 
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dominant, and we can do this via an analysis of power relations in the co-construction of 
reality.  This theorisation of creativity would suggest that in our analysis of the core concepts 
of strategic management discourse, with innovation (as a form of strategic adaptation) we 
have reached the self-defined limits of explanation available to us with Foucauldian 
discourse theory.  In diachronous time, there is no room for radical innovation in knowledge 
via individuals.  This is a characteristic that Foucauldian discourse theory shares with 
structure-based theorisations of strategy. 
The theorisation of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) possibly offers a way.  Political hegemony 
depends on difference, more specifically the subjugation of difference, to survive and 
perpetuate.  The dependence of hegemony on the subjugation of difference means that the 
full elimination of difference is counter-productive.  PDT suggests that all difference is 
formed in context of the hegemonic frame: ‘autonomy, far from being incompatible with 
hegemony, is a form of hegemonic construction’ (2014 127); moreover, ‘autonomy is not 
opposed to hegemony, but is an internal moment of a wider hegemonic operation’ (2014: 28). 
What is new is what is different in time, temporally different.  What is new is judged by the 
hegemonic benchmark; hegemony not only dominates difference in the Political moment, but 
is able to construct a dominant narrative by defining what is new.  PDT suggests that all 
creation is created in context of the hegemony.  In other words, due to the power relation, and 
the direction of power in the relation, the creation is produced by the hegemonic frame, as the 
hegemonic frame is defined by what it excludes, and autonomous practices and perspectives 
are autonomous by relation to the hegemonic frame. 
Nonetheless, unlike Foucault’s, Laclau and Mouffe’s theorization arguably affords more 
sovereignty to personal creativity.  Laclau and Mouffe describe the constitutive outside, the 
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interaction between individuals and the ‘material outside’ that is associated with emergences 
of the Political.  The constitutive outside facilitates a personal, individual, socio-historic 
context through which events of the material outside are interpreted.  Establishing this space 
for individual creativity, beyond hegemonic influence, innovation is then interpreted as the 
forms of personal creativity accepted by the hegemony.  The social order, the hegemony, sets 
the parameters, the filters, the limits, of politically accepted manifestations of individual 
creativity.  The form of the creation is changed by the process of socialisation, such that the 
innovation only partially resembles the individual creation in its pure form; the form of the 
creation is needed to fit into the inertial reference frame of the organisational strategy.  In 
other words, individual creativity and ‘innovation’ are here treated as separate concepts.  
‘Innovation’ is a term applied to hegemonically produced (syphoned) individual creativity.    
Political discourse theory suggests that the agent is a bridge between the symbolic framework 
of the Social, and the constitutive outside.  Therefore, in the conceptual framework of this 
thesis, personal creativity will be conceptually linked to personal frames of reference, and the 
capability for innovation is rooted in the creativity of individuals that resides before and 
beyond the power relation with the social order.   
‘We have a history of extraordinary accomplishments achieved by people who somehow 
imagine what had been unimaginable’ (Huff, 2001: 126); yet, curiously, in functional 
psychology, a person that sees alternative or uncommon patterns may be labelled as suffering 
from ‘paradoeilia’, and merged with categories of hallucination.  On what basis certain 
patterns are considered more legitimate than others is here argued to be a purely social-
historic power relation.  Seeing things another way is thus to risk being categorised as ‘mad’, 
and therefore this approach thus follows Foucault’s (1961) critique of the socio-historic 
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phenomenon of madness, with regard to power relations over what is frictional creativity and 
what is not, in context of a hegemonic frame of reference of fixed constellations. 
There is research in strategy discourse that approaches innovation as a concept with different 
meanings (Leitch and Davenport, 2005; Wullweber, 2015), which could be interpreted here 
as an example of innovation being a partially fixed node of strategic management discourse.  
In which case, PDT becomes relevant to a consideration of how the ‘the innovator’ is 
constructed as part of organisational strategy: ‘how can actors change institutions if their 
actions, intentions and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to 
change?’ (Holm, 1995: 398).  The concept of change and innovation can only take place 
within a court of asymmetric power relations.  The meaning of innovation is constructed 
within the conditions that it emerges, within the inertial frame of reference.  An inertial frame 
of reference is definitionally inert, and therefore has a fixed perspective on what constitutes 
an innovation and strategic renewal, and what constitutes friction and a problem to be 
eradicated. 
4.3.2 | Schmitt and the Political: Antagonism 
In the last chapter, I proposed that friction is a core concept of strategic management 
discourse, and that the concept can be traced to Clausewitz and Newton.  This chapter is 
exploring the implications of how the genealogically traced discourses are brought together 
in the framework of strategic management discourse that relates the core concepts.  The 
implication of associating simultaneity with friction in strategic management has been 
suggested to be a functional structuralist frame.  The implications of relating the concept of 
evolution to the simultaneity-friction articulatory framework is explored in this section, in 
context of the discussion of innovation. 
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The concept of the Political is also discussed by Schmitt (2008 [1927]) in The Concept of the 
Political.  Schmitt’s Hobbesian concept of the Political can be related to strategy, and by 
extension to Clausewitzian friction and Darwinian evolution.  For Schmitt, the Political 
denotes the ‘ineradicable dimension of conflictuality’ that lies at the heart of social relations 
in a competitive environment (Mouffe, 1999a: 4).  This definition is comparable with Laclau 
and Mouffe’s concept of the primacy of the Political, that the definition of the Social is 
difference.  In Schmitt’s definition, the concept of the Political includes the context of a 
competitive environment, which relates it to the Darwinian concept of evolution.  Following 
Hobbes (2011 [1651]), who argues that the state of nature is bellum omnium contra omnes – 
‘war of all against all’ – Schmitt argues that the Political ‘is bound by no law: it is prior to 
law’ (Hirst, 1999: 9).    It is arguable that Schmitt considers the Political to be a priori.   
For Schmitt, there are some assertions that can never be proven by independent 
demonstration.  For Schmitt, the Political denotes an ‘irreconcilable’ situation in which 
groups are placed in conditions of opposition, and each considers the other to be an enemy to 
fight against, with the intention of defeating them (Hirst, 1999: 8-9).  Schmitt calls this the 
friend-enemy distinction, which is also of primary importance in military derived strategies.   
The same distinction is also comparable with logics of equivalence and difference in political 
antagonism, insofar as the Political leads to the formation of oppositional groups.  In 
Schmitt’s view, the natural friend-enemy relation leads inevitably to the realisation that if the 
other survives, it will be at the cost of one’s own survival, thus, the other is the enemy.  
Before long, ‘the radicalization of politics’ erupts into ‘the open warfare of Us against Them’ 
(Žižek, in Mouffe, 1999a: 25).  In many ways, framing pretty much all social relations as a 
combat zone is a requisite for justifying the use of military approaches in organisational 
strategy.  This conception is not far removed from the same linear, path dependent notion 
evolution as that held by Hannan and Freeman (1989).   
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Organisational life becomes a war of all against all.  To act strategically becomes to act to 
ensure one’s own survival at the cost of the enemy, while incorporating their responses to 
this strategy within the strategic design.  A discursive approach suggests that the Schmittian 
frame is discernible in the militaristic language of contest and conflict that is often used in 
strategic management discourse (Brunsson, 1986; Rindova et al., 2004; Vaara and Monin, 
2010; MacKay and Munro, 2012), of both business organisations and public and not-for-
profit organisations (Huff, 2001).  The combination of financial economics with evolution 
facilitates a ‘culture of competitiveness’ (Stitger and Cooper, 2015: 10), and ‘relative profit is 
typically the measure of success’ (Huff, 2001: 124).  Within a competitive environment, 
organisations engage with the organisational other (Schwabenland, 2015; Garcia and Hardy, 
2007).  Strategies are designed with regard to a competitive other (Rafii and Kampas, 2002; 
Stalk and Lachenauer, 2004; Stalk, 2006), often to overpower the competitor(s) (Hawkins, 
2014).  The mainstream strategic objective is to dominate an opponent (Huff, 2001: 124), 
with the use of guerrilla warfare by small firms to survive against dominant opponents 
(Fershtman, 1996).  The Schmittian strategy of insurgency – and the blurring of the boundary 
between military and civilian sectors – has become normalised in military discourse (Gumz, 
2009).  Arguably, as strategic management discourse draws on military theory, the concept of 
insurgency carried into the discourse of organisational strategy.  In the militaristic concept of 
competitive advantage, other organisations are defined as enemies, competitors in the 
musical chairs of business survival in a world of diminishing carrying capacity; a world in 
which as the number of chairs decrease, the number of competitors increase.  This is an 
example of how there are ‘ideological implications’ associated with the mainstream concept 
of competitive advantage (Durand and Vaara, 2005: 26).  However, the concept of 
competitive advantage itself should not, as it is in the literature, be assumed as analytic, and 
needs further consideration in strategic management (Powell, 2001). 
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Schmitt considers the Political to be a problem.  Again, this resonates with the Clausewitzian 
frame, this time with the concept of dissent as friction, as a problem to be eradicated.  
Schmitt proposes an approach of decionism for solving the problem of the Political.  For 
Schmitt, assertions that can never be proven by independent demonstration hold little 
practical utility, they represent pointless knowledge, and discussing them only slows us 
down.  Schmitt believes that in the event of Political difference, a decision should be made 
quickly, that will end the discussion (Hirst, 1999: 9), i.e., eradicate the difference in opinion 
that leads to a discussion.  In a hegemonic frame of reference derived from a militaristic 
frame of reference, a ‘one frame for all’ perspective is applied both within an organisation 
and in context of its competitive environment.  In this way, the site of contest could be 
interpreted as being the ‘centre’: the claim to hold the inertial frame of reference, to be the 
benchmark.  Schmitt’s solution to the Political can be seen in this way to be a deliberate 
strategy of constructing historical a prioris: the strategic construction of a fictitious 
simultaneity.  Decisionism enforces simultaneity on the Political.   
Moreover, decisionism enforces simultaneity on the concept of the Political.  In Decisionism, 
the Political (different predicates) has been suspended within the concept of the Political 
itself.  The Political friend-enemy distinction is presented by Schmitt as an analytic 
statement, but is in fact a proposition about relations of things, such that a) the Other is the 
enemy, and b) the Political is the friend-enemy relation.  In this couplet of propositions, the 
predicates are assumed to add no new information, no new associated meanings, to the 
statements.  Put simply, Schmitt treats Other and enemy as synonymous, and from this treats 
the friend-enemy relation as synonymous with the Political.  Schmitt believes that the 
Political and the enemy-friend distinction are both analytic and a priori.   
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As this chapter has suggested, there is no absolute frame of reference.  Discourse theory 
suggests that the agent has no independent sovereignty in creativity and innovation.  PDT 
suggests that the agent is a bridge between the symbolic framework of the Social, and the 
constitutive outside.  Foucault denies the sovereignty of the individual to exclusive and 
instantaneous change in the discourse.  It was earlier suggested that the Political and 
constitutive outside is a hint of personal sovereignty.  Schmitt, meanwhile, argues that 
‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt, 1985: 5).   
In other words, power is the ability to decide on what is the exception to the rule, thus 
defining the rule: the ruler makes the rules by deciding what is exempt from exclusion.  A 
Hegemon is a supreme leader, a dictator, a total sovereign.  Therefore, Schmitt’s approach to 
the Political is to justify a strategy of political hegemony, of constructed simultaneity, 
centred on the perspective of the Hegemon.  This can be related to the concept of innovation: 
the inertial frame – the hegemonic frame – determines what is frictional, and the inertial 
frame is defined by the articulatory framework constructed by the sovereign.  In this way, 
Schmitt’s frame suggest that power relations define what is innovation, much as Clausewitz’s 
suggests that power relations define what is frictional – ‘the mind is the seat of judgement’ 
(Clausewitz, 55).  The exception, then, on which the sovereign decides, might be interpreted 
as friction or innovation: political power is the power to decide, to be judge. 
In Schmitt, we have simultaneity once more.  In the suspension of the Political, associated 
with both the concept of the Political, and the concept of competitive advantage, an 
ahistorical simultaneity is present in organisational strategy.  The argument of this thesis is 
that any suspension of the Political leads to a deep rooted form of conceptual inertia in 
organisations, and that, in a double bind, conceptual inertia can be traced down into the 
suspended concept of the Political: a frozen kernel of a frozen tree.  However, there is 
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another interpretation of the Political, one that does not contradict the a priori status of the 
Political, but does contradict Schmitt’s logic of Decionism and his analytic assertion of the 
enmity relation being synonymous with the Political. 
4.3.3 | Mouffe and the Political: Agonism 
Mouffe’s later work (e.g., 1999) theorises the Political in further detail and engages with the 
work of Schmitt and Heidegger (Howarth, 2008: 177).  Like Schmitt, Mouffe (1999a) argues 
that contest is inevitable because cases will arise in which rational conclusion is not possible 
between two different logics, that contest emerges from the Political.  However, Mouffe 
argues against Schmitt’s strategy of decisionism for a system of Politics for managing the 
Political.   
Mouffe draws on Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction to describe the Political, but emphasizes 
that ‘the main limitation’ of Schmitt’s theorisation is that it ‘does not permit a differential 
treatment of this conflictuality’ (1999a: 4-5).  Mouffe adapts Schmitt’s distinction to propose 
a terminology of agonism, and describes a continuum view of the Political, with antagonism 
at one end and agonism at the other.  Clausewitz describes war as ‘an extension of politics’ 
(ref), and Schmitt approaches the Political from the Hobbesian perspective of war of all 
against all: that of ‘friends and enemies’, which represents one end of the continuum.  Both 
of these militaristic approaches favour a hierarchical and intolerant approach to managing the 
Political, within an organisation and with regard to other organisations.  Powell, via Hobson, 
argues that competitive advantage is morally wrong – that the objective of ‘monopolistic 
power’ is irreconcilable with considerations of human welfare (Hobson, 1893: 401, in 
Powell, 2014: 205).  Meanwhile, Mouffe approaches the Political from the opposite 
perspective, that of friends and adversaries (ref).  Mouffe ‘proposes a relationship between 
conflicting parties that is neither the liberal relationship between economic competitors or 
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rational interlocutors, nor the Schmittian war between irreconcilable enemies, but a relation 
of political adversaries’ (Howarth 2008: 177). 
In Mouffe’s conception of agonism, there is ‘a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, 
although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless 
recognise the legitimacy of their opponents’ (Mouffe, 2005: 20).  Therefore, in distinction 
from antagonism, the basis of agonistic contest is the shared ethico-political principles of 
common respect, the acknowledgement of the Other a Social constituent.  In agonism 
between adversaries, the ethical dimension, and the legitimacy of the opponent, is not part of 
the conflict.  Mouffe argues that agonism is a process of synthesis, not decisionism.  In 
agonism, the enemy is not an enemy, but an adversary, and victory/defeat does not mean 
elimination or domination.  Common ground is established and neither side subsumes the 
other. Rather than power relations with the goal of domination, a synthesis is formed instead; 
as mutually different, the two sides are equivalent: i.e., the logic of (mutual) difference is 
more politically holistic than the logic of equivalence. 
Mouffe (1999a) is compelled to defend her approach of engaging with Schmitt, stating that 
agonism ‘is not some kind of “left-wing Schmittism” that would agree with Schmitt that 
liberalism and democracy are in contradiction, and conclude that liberalism is therefore to be 
discarded.’  Moreover, that ‘the strategy is definitively not to read Schmitt to attack liberal 
democracy, but to ask how it could be improved.  To think both with and against Schmitt’ 
(1999a: 5-6), i.e., to develop an agonistic approach to theory building, Mouffe treats Schmitt 
as an adversary, as legitimate, and thus engages with, rather than blocking, his theories: 
‘there is […] a challenge in our current world situation to locate the self in the Enemy Other 
and to identify those circumstances that obstruct negotiations’ (Sievers et al., 2006: 171), 
Mouffe is leading by example.   
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Any emergence of debate is a sign of the Political – this applies to the concept of the 
Political itself.  Mouffe argues that, for the primacy of the Political to continue – which is 
the foundation of Schmitt’s philosophy, difference must persist – for, in Schmitt’s concept, if 
one side were to subsume the other, or if one side is decided upon over the other, difference 
would be eradicated, thus negating the Political.  This is comparable to the argument that 
Schmitt suspends the Political in the concept of the Political.  Decionism, as a strategy for 
managing disputes associated with emergences of the Political, is conceptually akin to 
antagonism insofar as it blocks alternatives.  Agonism represents an alternative strategy, one 
that might also have the impact of facilitating greater potential for innovation within 
organisations.  Agonism entails conditions by which meanings are open to rearticulation, and 
fixed meanings and hegemonies are less able to form: agonism is not a means to an end; it is 
a process, open and ongoing.  Agonism suggests that while difference is inevitable, it is only 
a problem if the social insists on conformity.  Conformity does not encourage innovation, and 
in repressing the Political, simultaneity and friction in strategic management discourse 
misses many emergences of innovation.  By applying scientific method to the Social, 
instrumentalism and structural functionalism in strategic management are arguably examples 
of decisionism regarding what is not independently demonstrable. 
In a hegemonic frame of reference, friction is judged to be innovation when it can be 
appropriated and put to work in reconstituting and maintaining the hegemonic framework; 
while friction is judged to be problematic when it cannot be appropriated, when it represents 
an incongruent frame of reference.  While radical innovation might be defined in context of a 
social discourse, in its emergence it takes place at the level of individuals.  
Change agents hold the power of selection regarding resistance as positive or negative 
(Thomas and Hardy, 2011).   As directors can be considered as Schmittian sovereigns, and as 
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the power of directors is dispersed to change agents in structure of organisation, change 
agents also have a Schmittian position of power: to decide upon the exception.    In 
adjudicating and labelling which forms of adaptation (the Political) are accepted as 
innovation, and which are rejected as friction, the change agent exercises the hegemonic 
relation and reproduces the hegemonic frame.   
Arguably, ‘the labelling of actions as resistance involves interpretation’ (Maitlis, 2005; 
Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325), which in context of the Political suggests that individual 
adaptation is judged as friction or innovation by the personal interpretation of the change 
agent, in context of their personal interpretation of the articulatory practices.  In short, the 
Political resides in the judgement of change agents.  Different change agents might interpret 
and label the same individual adaptation differently.  This can be good or bad for individual 
adaptation, and for organisational change, depending on the reference frame of the change 
agent: innovators ‘still risk being labelled as resistors in the event that their challenges are 
construed as antithetical to organizational interests’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 325); novel 
ideas and practices can be labelled by change agents as resistance to the detriment of 
successful organisational renewal (Ford et al., 2008; Piderit, 2000), with the further nuance 
that ‘negative reactions to change may be motivated by positive intentions (Piderit, 2000)’ 
(Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 324). 
In Newton’s conception, friction directly opposes the trajectory of the object.  However, 
‘resistance is what opposes power, not simply diametrically but transversally, opposing by 
going off in a different direction’ (Kelly, 2009: 109).  In this description, resistance could 
represent renewal, a change in direction, not simply a resistant force.  Rather than seeing 
resistance as a problem, ‘as something to be avoided or eradicated’, alternative approaches 
propose that demonizing resistance can ‘interfere with successful change’ (Dent and 
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Goldberg, 1999; Furst and Cable, 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 324).  It could be stated 
that ‘successful change’ can be associated with ‘going off in a different direction’, but doing 
so also risks being labelled as negative friction, in either case the judgement in made by a 
human being in context of the Political, not by the absolute frame that social construction is 
treated as being.   
Organisational members can ‘enhance change initiatives by challenging taken for granted 
assumptions’ (van Dam et al., 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 324).  This chimes with 
Foucault’s purpose of archaeological method as a way of critiquing conceptual inertia, and 
places it in context of organisational strategy, such that what is taken for granted in strategy 
is conceptually inert, and holds the organisation back – i.e., conceptual inertia can be a 
problem.  When organisational members challenge the historical a priori articulatory 
practices, in the Political moment, the challenge is likely to be labelled by change agents as 
friction, in relation to a hegemonic frame.  This is on the basis of incongruence to the 
absolute, to the simultaneity of knowledge associated with ahistorical concepts.  Combined 
with the positivistic process of elimination, combined with the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
concept of evolution, combined with Schmitt’s Hobbesian perspective, and strategy of 
decisionism, the core concepts of strategic management discourse are typically intolerant of 
individual adaptation.  It is worth noting that this applies to orgnisations as well as agents, as 
organisational practices occur within and are evaluated by a wider social and environmental 
context (Bitektine, 2011).  Radical innovation may invoke a process of evaluation (Egri, 
1997).  This relation to the wider surroundings makes organisations a part of power relations 
with(in) its environment, which may also include organisations acting as change agents. 
A more Mouffeian strategy of agonism, of synthesis instead of decisionism, is a more ethical 
alternative, which is more rooted in a reality without absolutes, and is more legitimate.  
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Mouffeian change agents would not hold fixed relations of power over subordinates, they 
would not dismiss alternative frames as the strategic frame would not be hegemonic, 
Political moments would not result in decisionist outcomes, but a process of synthesis 
between the strategic frame and the frames of organisational members, in this way the 
strategic frame is not constructed according to any single perspective or worldview.   
In short, the Political reveals that an organisation (such as a society) will never be in total 
agreement on any issue – for this would be the antithesis of a society.  Therefore, as 
synchronisation is assumed to be a strength and a boon for survival chances in a Darwinian 
and uncaring environment, organisations have strategies – systems of Politics – for managing 
the emergence of the Political.  These strategies can be antagonistic at one extremity, and 
agonistic at the other extremity.  An organisational strategy that is antagonistic – that is 
Schmittian – is a deterministic strategy of Decisionism, in which debate is not worthwhile 
and determinism is knowingly pushed onto matters that are known to be indeterminate.  
Antagonistic strategies therefore seek to repress the Political whenever and wherever it might 
emerge.  Arguably, such strategies are synonymous with the militaristic conception of 
friction, such that autocratic leaders (or managers; change agents) make decisions on behalf 
of subordinates who are expected to do as instructed.  However, an organisational strategy 
that is agonistic – that is Mouffeian – is a strategy of synthesis, in which debate is not the 
precursor to a decision that will stand for all time, a process of determination, but is a 
strategy that facilitates the emergence of the Political whenever and wherever it may emerge.  
Arguably, such strategies are less commonplace in business organisations, but could facilitate 
the bubbling up of innovation, via the Political, compared with Decisionist systems of 
antagonism. 
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Dominant narratives have been linked to organisational inertia (Naslund and Pemer, 2012) 
and a ‘resistance to strategic renewal outside the frame of current strategy’ (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003; Mallette and Hopkins, 2013: 104).  Hegemonic frames in strategic 
management discourse can lead to a limited capacity for change, by being tethered to the 
dominant meanings of concepts.  For instance, strategic myopia can lead to unforeseen 
outside competitive shocks which are then detrimental to organizational survival (Levitt, 
1960). 
The Political moment holds the potential for innovation. Articulatory practices of a discourse 
hold the power to change by being the benchmark of change, but, as far as an individual is 
able to influence discursive change (which the theoretical framework of this chapter suggests 
is possible), originates in the personal reference frame of individuals, in the Political. 
4.4 | Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the discourse of strategic management relates to the 
discourse of motion.  Each of the core concepts is founded on the concept of simultaneity, 
and in doing so makes claim to be founded on an independently demonstrated universal truth; 
this is because simultaneity is based on the concept of an absolute/universal inertial reference 
frame.  I propose that simultaneity is an historical a priori, an example of conceptual inertia.  
Conceptual inertia refers to a concept treated as absolute, including the concept of an 
absolute inertial reference frame (simultaneity).  Inertia of concepts, Foucault argues, is a 
symptom of a position of dominance in a discursive formation.   
Special relativity tells us that there is no simultaneity, no absolute benchmark.  Nonetheless, 
we can construct inertial reference frames as benchmarks by which to judge motion.  In the 
discourse of physics, inertial frames are legitimate for anything, with none privileged over 
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any other.  Due to general relativity, we seem to experience reality from much the same 
reference frame, defined by the gravitational influence of the Earth (which exerts more 
influence on all of us than any one if us does on it) and the Earth’s relation with the 
heliocentric celestial system.  In other words, the relative discrepancies in reality for us on 
Earth, according to special relativity, are small enough to have facilitated the Newtonian 
concept of simultaneity.  This is nonetheless a significant caveat: what appears to be 
simultaneous is not, there is no absolute reference frame.   
In context of PDT, articulatory practices are theorized as a discursive frame that makes sense 
of the constitutive outside.  A hegemonic centre can develop within an inertial frame, 
becoming attached to vast swathes of surrounding elements, reproducing and spreading its 
fixed meaning, reconfiguring the articulatory practises of the inertial frame in doing so.  
When hegemonic, the inertial frame is presented as a timeless and absolute.  This allows for 
domination, as there will be little alternative to an order that is timeless.   
Regarding the concept of inertia in strategic management discourse, I propose that the 
continued foundation of simultaneity is a social construction akin to political hegemony, the 
sedimentation of a logic of equivalence, that fixes the meaning of moments into a dominant 
narrative, and thus controls the conditions in which change is defined.  That simultaneity is a 
social construct is significant because, while Newtonian principles are close enough to be of 
use for mechanical principles, there is no legitimate foundation on which to assume that 
social phenomena are subject to Newtonian principles or principles of instrumentalism.  For 
this reason, we must be careful when problematising organisational strategy, for excluding 
alternative perspectives on the basis of simultaneity and mechanical principles is not a 
defensible position. 
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Regarding the concept of Friction, a benchmark is needed to judge motion.  However, 
without simultaneity there is no absolute benchmark, there is no absolute way of determining 
what is frictional.  In context of PDT, an inertial frame of reference is akin to a system of 
organisation (Politics) for managing the Political.  A strategy that reproduces the concept of 
an absolute inertial frame (simultaneity) reproduces the dominance of a discursive frame that 
denies alternatives.  In this way, the strategic frame reproduces itself by defining alternative 
frames as frictional by relation to the absolute benchmark.  
As there is no absolute benchmark for determining which side of a power relation is 
displaying frictional motion, we might then say that friction is the relation between the 
participants, and relates to the frontier between them.  Therefore, social power is related to 
defining what is and what is not to be deemed as friction within organisations.  Determined 
by a Hegemon, the hegemonic frame is enforced by change agents, and the power of the 
(pseudo) absolute is, therefore, often dispersed into delegated roles of authority within an 
organisational structure.  With friction deemed problematic by the power relation within the 
implementation of organisational strategy, the Political is revealed.  I propose that the 
labelling of alternative perspectives as friction is a Schmittian strategy of Decisionism for 
managing the Political – in terms of agonism, as a strategy, constructing simultaneity is 
antagonistic and unethical. 
Regarding the concept of Adaptation, the notion of difference can also apply to what is new, 
what is different in the temporal sense: change.  As a benchmark is needed to judge motion, a 
benchmark is needed to judge change.   The implication of simultaneity is that it gives rise to 
a linear, teleological concept of time, and by extension, a conception of adaptation that is 
based on simultaneity.   
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Again, without simultaneity, there is no absolute and exclusively valid basis for standardizing 
the measurement of change, adaptation and innovation.  In context of PDT, the continued 
basis of simultaneity is a social construction.  Therefore, as with friction, what is new, and 
what is innovative, is defined by relation to the socially constructed reference frame: the 
articulatory practices of the discourse.  A hegemonic reference frame judges difference to be 
innovation when it does not contradict the strategic frame, when it can be appropriated and 
put to work in reconstituting and maintaining the hegemony; while difference is judged to be 
friction when it cannot be appropriated, when it represents an incongruent reference frame.   
The theoretical analysis suggests that the emergence of organisational adaptation and 
innovation could occur at the level of agency, at the Political, in which personal 
interpretations of the constitutive outside are appropriated or rejected by relation to the 
inertial frame constructed by the articulatory practices of the strategy discourse, and the 
personal interpretations of change agents that enforce the frame.  In this way, alternative 
reference frames are a source of innovation as well as friction – they are the same source, it is 
only a matter of how they are labelled in social relations of power. 
The thesis will now apply this theoretical framework to a case study, to ground the approach 
and explore how the core concepts are performed in context of data generated regarding an 
actual organisation.  First, I will explain the methods of data generation and how I will apply 
the theoretical framework to empirical research. 
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5 | Method: Case Study of GM Biotechnology 
For the case study, the strategy discourse will be analysed regarding the concepts of inertia, 
friction and adaptation.  The aim is to try to identify the influence of strategic discursive 
practices on the expression of the Political among organisational members.  The case should 
also relate to a wider social context, so that endogenous and exogenous factors can be 
included in the scope of the analysis that deals with how innovation emerges in 
organisations. 
It was suggested in reviewing the literature, that an approach to the case study is needed that 
enables power relations and politics to be examined alongside the design and implementation 
of organisational strategy, in context of a complex and often unpredictable external 
environment.  The case needs to be one that considers both the material and abstract aspects 
of strategy, and how they relate; that enables an examination of discursive practices and 
radical innovation, such as those that might instigate a wider political debate.  These 
requirements, which emerged from the literature, are the criteria by which I decided on a case 
study. 
5.1 Case Study Application: GM Research Institute 
Arguably, the topic of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) can form a nexus between the 
requirements asked of a case study.  The case study organisation is a world leading research 
institute that specialises in agricultural innovation, and is a leading researcher in crop 
innovation with biotechnology.  This choice of organisation is intended to generate data that, 
in the same set, brings together the theoretical contribution to political theory and strategy in 
organisations, and the methodological contribution to political discourse theory.  I was 
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granted access to the site and conducted in depth interviews with senior members of the 
organisation and some ‘lower ranked’ members over a period of three months.   
5.1.1 | Material-Abstract 
There are some studies that draw on technology as a case study to bridge the gap between the 
abstract social and the material (e.g., Bridgman and Willmott, 2006).  Moreover, de Rond 
and Bouchikhi (2004: 59) use biotechnology as a case study for ‘treating dialectical tensions 
as a normal (neither functional nor dysfunctional) fact of alliance life’ by ‘drawing the 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological implications of a dialectical perspective on 
alliances’.  GM biotechnology is chosen specifically for a case study as this phenomenon 
involves the construction of nature in a material sense, as well as an abstract sense.  In this 
way, GM biotechnology blurs the traditional boundary in positivism between what is and 
what is not independent of social influence.  
This thesis also treats the concept of GMOs as contingent in the same manner as strategy, 
inertia, and so on.  That relates to the abstract, to the ideational.  To what extent we might 
consider the same to apply to the material, that the materiality of GMOs is also contingent, is 
one of the questions considered by the thesis.  How the abstract, ideational, meanings of 
GMOs relate to the material GMOs means considering how they combine.  As GM 
biotechnology deals in gene function – and functionalism is based on positivism and 
determinism – what does PDT imply for the identification of gene function and the 
construction of GMOs – when PDT is based on constructionism and the acceptance of 
paradox?  This approach is arguably highly suitable for a case study involving genetics, 
insofar as the alphabetic representation of genetic code marries the material with the 
symbolic.  The concept of the genetic code is uniquely positioned as a form of text, in that it 
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bridges the material (biological) and the abstract (ideational) that is often treated as a 
Cartesian duality. 
The A, C, T and G denoted bases constructs a DNA/genetic sequence, which is conceptually 
segregated into sections, known as codons, according to a ‘function’ that is observed in 
context of an organism’s environment.  ‘The information required by an organism to 
reproduce itself is carried by its DNA, encoded in the base sequence and organized as a 
series of genes.  Gene expression is the term used to describe the process by which cells 
decode and make use of this information to synthesize the proteins that are responsible for 
cellular function’ (Winter, et al., 2002: 11).  In other words, A, C, T and G bases, grouped 
into threes, hold the instructions for the cell to construct the proteins it requires to function.  
There are 20 different amino acids that make the various proteins required by the cells.  
There are four base letters.  There are 64 different three-letter combinations that can be from 
four base letters.  Interestingly, most amino acids have more than one codon associated with 
them – ‘codons that specify the same amino acid are called synonyms’ (Winter, et al., 2002: 
10) – this is interpreted as being an evolved safeguard against excessive mutation.   In 
addition to the amino acids, there is an ‘initiation codon [AUG]’ and three ‘stop codons: 
UAG, UGA and UAA’ (Winter, et al., 2002: 11).   
Due to the methodological differences between mainstream strategy and PDT discussed 
above, GM technology is chosen specifically for a case study.  Due to the techniques 
involved in biotechnology, GMOs are a suitable case for exploring the blurred ontology, and 
contested epistemology, that are the basis of PDT.  Similarly, the methodology of PDT is 
well suited for examining organisational strategy in context of the GM political discourse. 
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5.1.2 | Political Issue 
For the purpose of this research, GMO is studied as a contemporary political issue, as 
contested in meaning.  PDT offers an approach to consider how meanings can be contested.  
PDT enables an examination of the Political regarding interpretation of GMOs.  GM 
technology is a form of innovation and is approached as a novel and innovative concept and 
practice – an example of radical innovation, one that is being evaluated in wider society.  The 
case organisation has a strategy of crop innovation, in context of the wider social and 
ecological environment that encompasses it.  This environment involves an international 
political debate surrounding GM technology.  Therefore, the case is a biotechnology 
organisation, which has a strategy of crop innovation, participating in the GM political 
discourse. 
PDT enables a focus on exogenous factors, on the global food and population issues, 
European Union regulations (strategic discursive practices) and protest movements, that 
might influence the design and construction of GMOs in the organisation (expressions of the 
technology).  A change since the period of data collection is the context of the UK’s planned 
exit from the EU.  PDT also enables an endogenous focus on discursive practices in the 
strategy discourse, the influence they have on the expression of the Political among members 
of the case organisation, in the case of opinions and understanding of GM (the abstract) and 
in the design and construction (the material). 
The construction of meaning associated with GM crops, by organisational personnel, enables 
an examination of power relations in the strategic construction of GMOs.  Therefore, the 
relation between the concept of innovation/adaptation, friction/dissent and inertia can be 
studied in an organisation with a strategy that emphasises innovation.  This case allows for 
this relation to be studied in context of a technologically innovative production method that is 
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the focus of a polarised political discourse in wider society.  The political debate over GMOs 
connects PDT to a critical analysis of some of the core concepts of mainstream strategic 
thinking, which this methodology then applies to a case organisation that participates in the 
debate. 
Therefore, the theoretical association between organisational inertia, friction and adaptation, 
can be compared with the qualitative data generated regarding the practices and perspectives 
of staff, in context of the power relations connected with the discursive practices of the 
organisational strategy discourse.  This will enable an analysis of possible relations between 
the Political and innovation; the power relations that evaluate which instances of the Political 
count as innovation; the discursive practices that are the foundation of the evaluation. 
The analysis is a consideration of political tensions in the design and implementation of 
organisational strategy, with regard to the discourse of GMOs, both abstract and material, 
that is facilitated and limited by the regulations of organisational strategy at various levels.  
Discursive practices facilitate and limit the field of discourse.  PDT enables an examination 
of the politics and ethics involved in the standardization of practices and perspectives among 
organisational members, at various levels of organisation, regarding GMOs; an examination 
of how meaning is constructed regarding the possible future of GMOs, according to the 
discursive practices that might contain the past.  That is to say, the extent to which the past 
influences not only the present, but also the future – the concept of what is possible.  From 
the analysis, the intention is not to arrive at a decision regarding the role of GMO technology 
in society, if it has one or not, but it is to form a discussion of the political and ethical 
implications that the core concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation have in mainstream 
organisational logic, illustrated by the subject of GMOs, that arguably forms a suitable nexus 
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between the issues that are of interest to this research project, and requirements of the chosen 
discursive methodology. 
5.1.3 | Application to OS and GM 
The aim of using PDT is to systematically examine the discursive formation to consider how 
strategic discourses ‘constitute and organize social relations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014: 96); 
to examine the organisation of the discourses: the articulatory practices that connect concepts 
together; the moments that represent inert concepts; and therefore the inert conceptual 
framework of articulatory practices that defines what is frictional, incongruent.  PDT also 
enables a consideration of organisational strategy in context of the discourse of GMOs.  
Beginning with the concept of discursive elements: ‘strategic decisions as elements of a 
strategic discourse, operating at both the structural level of social reproduction and the 
instrumental level of intentional communication’ (Hendry, 2000: 955-978).  Elements gain 
meaning through articulatory practices.  Strategy involves meaning-making and procedures-
of-practice for the organisation: ‘meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of 
rules’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2002: 2).   Organisational strategy includes a historically 
specific system of rules regarding both organisational perspective and practice.  Sometimes 
articulatory practices become fixed into inert structures, sedimenting elements into moments.  
Moments are comparable to inert concepts, in description and role in their relative theoretical 
frameworks. 
The genealogy of the core concepts can be supplemented with an analysis of PDT.  Laclau 
and Mouffe describe a hegemonic network of moments, some of which are referred to as 
nodes.   The nodal point, like a nexus, is considered to be a dominant sign around which 
other signs are ordered.  The nodal points are identified as those signs or statements that 
provide meaning for the discourse. As such, other signs acquire their meaning in the 
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discourse via their relation to the nodal points.   This is contextual: other signs may have 
other meanings in other discourses, by also being related to other nodes.  The analysis of the 
organisation of the discourses is focused around the nodal points.  Identifying and describing 
the nodal points can help to clarify how the discourses are organised via the nodes.  The 
genealogical analysis then contributes to understanding how the framework of nodes was 
constructed.  This will be done first with core concepts of strategy research, and then applied 
to the nodes that emerge from the political discourse analysis of GMOs.   
Laclau and Mouffe use the concept of hegemony to explain aspects of the social that reveal 
themselves as fixed in meaning.  Hegemonies ‘sediment’ meanings to signifiers: ‘the major 
aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilise the nodal points that form the basis of 
concrete social order by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers – as 
possible’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 15).  This could be considered as thematically 
comparable to competitive advantage as it is conceived in OS.  Rather than referring to 
hegemony as though it were some sentient yet abstract spaghetti monster, we might locate 
the hegemonic framework within organisational operations in the interactions of 
organisational members.  The extent to which the constituent members of the organisation 
participate in the process of constructing GMO, in both the abstract and material sense, 
relates to power relations in strategy discourse.   
In organisational strategy, the conception of resistance as forming at the points where 
relations of power are exercised (Thomas and Hardy, 2011) is interesting regarding the PDT 
conception of moments.  Thomas and Hardy (2011: 326) argue that power and resistance 
‘operate together in a web of relations in which power is never complete and possibilities for 
resistance always exist.’  This description is comparable to that of nodes in PDT as partially-
fixed and potentially amenable to rearticulation.  They also argue that ‘power is exercised 
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through multiple points of pressure and so too is resistance’ (Thomas and Hardy, 2011: 326).  
If resistance forms at points where relations of power are exercised, then resistance forms at 
each moment, at each constituent aspect – each node – of the hegemonic constellation.  
Therefore, we might propose that resistance forms at nodes where relations of power are 
exercised.  As points of power relations, nodes reveal the political.  i.e., for every point of 
power there is resistance; for every node there is a power relation; for every organisational 
routine, there is another way. 
A comparison between the organisational perspective, laid forth in the strategic discourse, 
and the perspectives of agents that work for (and constitute) the organisation, might reveal 
something of the rules and power relations – discursive and articulatory practices – at play 
regarding the perspective of GMO in the organisation.   
For the purposes of this research, an organisation is conceptualized as a politics system of 
relations and rules (regarding those relations) that manages disputes arising from the 
Political.  In this study, adaptation is associated with the Political, with personal experience 
and expertise.  Organisational strategy is treated as a discursive frame, as a system of politics 
for managing differences that emerge due to the Political.  In this case, the Political emerges 
during power relations between upholders of organisational strategy and the personally 
creative differences of staff.  What are the power relations in an organisational strategy 
pursuing innovation, how do they relate to strategic inertia, friction and adaptation?  
Innovation, incorporated by the organisation, is a result of a frictional dynamic between 
individual adaptation/creativity and strategic alignment/structural function. i.e., between 
strategic management discourse (as a system of politics for managing differences that emerge 
due to the Political) and the Political, which when it emerges represents an opportunity for 
strategic adaptation and innovative structures, practices and concepts.  ‘Instead of confining 
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politics to the tasks of building consensus or consolidating communities and identities’, 
Laclau and Mouffe ‘shift the emphasis of democratic politics to the processes of dislocation, 
contestation and resistance’ (Kerppinen et al., 2008: 7). 
This also relates to innovation, and how innovation is conceptualized in organisational 
strategy, both in the design and implementation of strategy.  Innovation is relatable to the 
Political, the organisational strategy, if hegemonic, would exclude incongruent perspectives 
and practices.  Therefore, hegemony is revealed where perspectives and practices are fixed, 
where there is a reduced capability for subjective difference.  Arguably, this suggests that 
hegemonic formations reduce the capability for radical innovation within an organisation. 
Radical innovation, new signifiers, is arguably represented by GMOs.  Novel signifiers can 
represent a perspective that is incongruent to the inert structure of any number of levels of 
discourse.  An organisation participating in the GM conflict is a discourse embedded in a 
wider discourse.  The simplification of the GMO debate, and the positions taken on either 
side, are treated as representative of the logics of equivalence and difference.  Hegemonic 
formations fix meanings to concepts, excluding alternatives. Therefore, the political conflict 
over GMO is treated as a contest between two hegemonic formations – pro and anti.  
Moreover, logics of equivalence and difference, and chains of association, are thematically 
applicable to the OS conception of strategic alliances and constellations. 
In the analysis, the logics of equivalence and difference are applied to the concept of strategic 
inertia and renewal.  The approach of the analysis here is to examine the framing strategies 
employed by each side of the antagonism, both generally and individually.  As antagonism 
denigrates the Other, in the political discourse arising from the contested signifier of GMO, 
antagonism would be an attack on the perspective of the Other.  For instance, arguments 
presented by the pro side to denigrate the anti perspective, or vice-versa.  Similarly, an 
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antagonistic relation would be revealed in defensive (or boastful) arguments regarding GM.  
In context of OS, the concept of antagonism and blocking shares common themes with the 
conception of competitive advantage.  I will analyse the data for blocking strategies, to gain a 
closer view of the antagonism in the political discourse.   Antagonism will be analysed in 
context of contested nodes, within which political subjectivities are revealed.    
A discursive node in a political discourse is not equivalent to an organisational node in a 
strategic alliance.  They are related nonetheless, as the organisations are participants in the 
discourse.  Therefore, the differentiation is worth making.  Constellations of organisations 
partipate in constellations of discursive conflicts, but the nodes of each constellation are not a 
‘one-to-one’ mapping, such that the discursive constellation cannot be overlaid onto the 
organisational constellation, and vice-versa.  What remains is to articulate their relation, such 
that an organisation within a political discourse can be located within a discourse, in terms of 
its relation to the discursive nodes, its positioning within the discourse, on a variety of 
discursive locations. 
Agonism approaches are atypical for applications of PDT, ‘Mouffe’s contribution […] has 
often been used as a tool for criticizing the flaws and biases of existing approaches, rather 
than for institutional proposals or solutions to concrete political questions’ (Karpinnen et al. 
2008: 7).  Therefore, engaging with the issues of inertia and innovation, in context of the 
contested meaning of GM, from a Mouffeian perspective of agonism, address this gap in 
strategy and political theory research. 
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5.2 | Generation of Data 
5.2.1 | Reflexivity 
I collected the interview data in the summer of 2014.  I began writing the analysis in the 
summer of 2016.  In this two year period – which flew by – I would often reflect back on the 
interviews but did not commit anything to writing.  The reason for this was that I was still 
working on the conceptual framework, deciding what was needed and what might be 
removed, tightening up the focus and so on.  In this way, I began developing the conceptual 
framework before collecting data, enough so that I knew the general area of conversation that 
would be useful in the interviews.  At the same time, the conceptual framework, and the 
questions, were and are, open enough that the data collected was not particularly 
overdetermined towards a theoretical construct: strategy being the most prominent example.  
Indeed, when I visited the organisation and took part in the interviews and tours, I did not 
have organisational strategy as my main focus of research.   
At the time, the conceptual framework I had developed guided me enough to know that I was 
interested in using political discourse theory as a way of studying the interaction of minds in 
organisations and how some ideas and concepts are accepted while others are not, some 
persist while others fade.  During my time with the interviewees, strategy was something that 
became a recurring theme, despite it not being specified as a subject of particular interest in 
my work beforehand, or in the interviews as they played out.  That strategy was a prominent 
theme is something that emerged from the data collection.  In a similar spirit to Paroutis and 
Heracleaous (2013: 941) – who ‘instead of treating strategy as a concept with a 
predetermined meaning,’ approach strategy ‘as a contingent concept, allowing it to emerge 
from the data’ – almost unintentionally, this research treats strategy in the same way.  With 
further theoretical research and work, I felt that strategy as a focus of study also provides a 
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sound way of using political discourse theory to study the interaction of minds in 
organisations (this will elaborated in due course).  Therefore, the data collection process 
assisted me in focusing my research into the subject area of organisational strategy. 
The development of the thesis, then, was not a linear process.  The data and the conceptual 
framework informed each other, rather than the former following the latter.  Moreover, I 
went back and reviewed the strategy literature in depth following the data collection.  Only 
then was I able to find a connection I was happy with between a political discourse analysis 
of my data and fulfilling the requirements of the field of study (organisation and 
management), by at least being relevant in content.  It might only be a slight exaggeration to 
say that the conceptual framework and the data only came together somewhere towards the 
end of my allotted period of research.  For this reason, it would be somewhat fraudulent to 
construct a conventional and linear narrative out of the literature review, conceptual 
framework and methodology chapters – one that gives the impression of designing research 
steps and following them as one might design and follow instructions to a recipe. 
5.2.2 | Sampling 
As the debate associated with GM crops is rapidly changing – due to the introduction of new 
EU laws, new forms of GM crops, and increased public engagement – I collected new data 
with the intention that this will reflect the contemporary status of the debate. 
For the case organisation, I approached an agricultural research institute who granted me 
access to their site to conduct fieldwork.  Why interviewees engage with my research is an 
important consideration (Clark, 2010), as are situations in which potential interviewees are 
not selected (Kristensen and Ravn, 2015).  At Organisation X, out of a staff roster of in 
excess of 500 organisational participants, a list of potential interviewees was given to me, by 
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the main point of contact I have established with the organisation.  I contacted the personnel 
on the list, who were then free to decide if they wanted to participate or not following my 
invitation/request.  Of a list of approximately twenty names, just over half responded 
positively to say they would participate.   
An obvious corollary of this is that the chosen interviewees may have been chosen for a 
reason.  It is not for me to speculate what these reasons may be, but if this is the case, it does 
have an impact on the impartiality of the research.  For instance, whether ‘being volunteered’ 
might induce a sentiment of disgruntlement and sense of obligation, or alternatively a sense 
of altruism, or self-promotion, ambivalence, or whatever response(s), from the selected 
interviewees, is worth acknowledging, as this will likely have some influence on the manner 
of engagement with me from the outset of the interview, which will influence the 
construction of data.   There is not the space to make an analysis of their mood at the time of 
interview a central consideration in the analysis, but the point is worth making.  During 
correspondence with the participants, to arrange the interviews, all were helpful and there 
were little signs as to a sense of being forced to participate.  In the course of some of the 
interviews, however, there were occasionally some signs of disgruntlement about 
participation. 
Ten members of staff were interviewed – one twice, the second time being a tour of the 
facilities.  It is worth noting that I also took part in interiews with members of organisations 
that oppose GMOs.  However, these are not included in the final analysis for three reasons.  
Firstly, access to an organisation that opposes GMOs was not secured and the original 
intention of a comparative analysis between two organisational perspectives of GMOs was 
not possible within the time allotted to complete the PhD.  Secondly, related to the first, the 
scope of the project moved towards the politics of strategy within an organisation.  Finally, 
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the theoretical framework became the major contribution of the thesis with a larger section of 
case study analysis being reduced to conform to the word limit of the thesis. 
5.2.3 | Interviews 
As a case study, the construction of meaning associated with GM crops is treated as 
contingent.  Qualitative interviewing is well suited for studying connections and differences 
in the processes of knowledge construction (Enosh et al., 2008).  The term ‘Genetic 
Modification’ is likely to elicit different responses from different people, and this is purpose 
of the data collection and analysis – to gain some insight into these responses and to infer 
something of what the term means to different people, regarding GM crops.  During analysis, 
careful attention is paid to how interviewees describe and make sense of the concept of GM – 
regarding the issues they associated with GM and their perspective of them – as well as their 
related responses during the interview narrative as a whole. 
The purpose of the interviews is to allow the interviewee to construct a definition of GM 
during the interview, insofar as their consideration of what GM means to them and to society.  
Asking them to a) discuss the issues they associate with GM, and b) to discuss their 
perspective on the issues, hopefully helps to a) avoid providing the interviewee with 
associations, to reduce the amount of researcher influence on the response of the interviewee 
(arguably a critical weakness of Q methodology); and b) to perhaps facilitate a subjective 
account of meaning regarding GM, that might deviate from an organisational perspective.  
The approach to interviewing in this research focuses on generating data that represents, in 
part, the perspective of the participants.  In other words, I have drawn on the method of 
loose-structured, in-depth, narrative interviews to ‘provide accounts of insiders’ (Phillips and 
Hardy, 2002: 24) out of the generated data.  The approach holds the assumption that each 
individual is unique, with a unique political subjectivity, and a unique political subject 
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position.  Therefore the study needs to be at least partially based on the personal experience 
of the individual. 
I have tried to include the approach of ‘inter-view’ Kvale (1996), which acknowledges that 
the interview is a dual process.  For this reason, I have chosen to take an informal approach, 
to facilitate a conversation, rather than an closed, survey based approach, as I felt that to 
proceed through a sequence of pre-determined questions would place an inhibiting structure 
to the generation of text, and overtly influence the text toward any preconceptions I probably 
have regarding the subject matter.  Therefore, the interview was an opportunity for the 
participant to discuss their perspectives on GM crops, and any other subjects that might 
tangentially crop up, in which I am keen to listen and to understand their position on the 
various facets of GM crops.  There are questions that I asked, but they are quite vague, and 
more like themes than specific questions, and for this reason possibly more open to 
interpretation by the respondent.  This is the intention, at any rate.  As the interview 
continued, I would on occasion ask specific questions in response to the interviewee’s 
narrative, and would be careful to choose an appropriate moment to do so, i.e., at appropriate 
breaks in the interviewee’s narrative, so as not to break the stream of thought in the 
interviewee’s responses.  This means that sometimes I would take the conversation back to 
an earlier point, which is undoubtedly an influence on the construction of data.  This 
approach also means that the narrative is not required to follow a linear progression.  The 
four main areas of conversation are: 
1) The background of the interviewee – their education, employment history and 
how they arrived at the role they now occupy in the organisation.  Also personal 
interests, hobbies outside of work, etc. 
2) What their role is at the organisation 
3) The issues they identify as associated with GM crops 
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4) Their perspective on the issues they associate with GM crops, 
but the conversation can range into any direction whatsoever.  Once the conversation seems 
to have exhausted the issues proposed by the interviewee, and if appropriate in the context of 
the conversation, I asked the interviewee if there were any issues that may be unaddressed.  
While the majority of the conversation came from the interviewees, the influence of my 
contributions can only be considered as interventions, as such the data collected is 
unavoidably co-constructed.  That said, this does not entirely diminish the point made above 
regarding encouraging the interviewee to propose their own issues first, and is for this reason, 
considered as a preferable method.  The data will provide some insight regarding the way the 
interviewee perceives GM (at the time of the interview). 
A significant aspect of this research is to study power relations in context of organisational 
strategy, and the influence power relations might have on the perception and practices 
associated with ‘innovation’ in organisational strategy.  The case study is GM, therefore, the 
analysis aims to study power relations and organisational strategy in context of perceptions 
and practices associated with GMOs.  It might, possibly, seem strange that this project 
concerns organisational strategy, but that organisational strategy is not the focus of the 
interviews during data collection.  This is a deliberate part of the methodology.  Rather than 
simply asking interviewees about organisational strategy, it seems sensible to indirectly 
enquire as to organisational strategy by directly asking about perspectives of GM.  This is 
because direct questions may be problematic regarding a subject such as organisational 
strategy.  Interviewees might well feel uncomfortable being asked to evaluate the strategic 
goals of their organisation, as if they were to speak completely frankly, they risk offending 
the ‘powers that be’, and in a situation in which the researcher (myself) has since departed 
the organisation, the interviewees presumably wish to remain in the job – or, at least, not 
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been dismissed on the basis of the interview they provided for a visiting researcher.  As such, 
it seems wiser to not ask questions that explicitly engage with the issues I am interested in 
regarding organisational strategy formulation.   
As such, discussing perceptions of GM with interviewees could potentially also generate data 
regarding the politics of organisational strategy.  By being more indirect, this approach may 
elicit less guarded responses from the interviewees, and in doing so generate more reliable 
data regarding strategy.  If so, this would combine the issues of political dynamics and 
organisational strategy together in the same data.  However, by the same reasoning, it is 
likely that the interviewees will be more guarded in their responses to questions regarding 
perceptions of GM, so this problem cannot be side-stepped entirely.  Nonetheless, any 
probable instances of a guarded response regarding GM will be revealing.  Being personnel 
of the organisations chosen for study, some interviewees will, inevitably, be ‘media-trained.’  
This is due to the position of the organisation in the GM debate, and the organisational 
strategy regarding public communication. At some stages of the interview, some 
interviewees may resist, or hold back, information, for whatever reason (Wolgemuth, 2012).   
The concept of the unreliable narrator in literature has been transposed to interviewees in 
reflexive methodology (for example, see Watson, 2006).  The interviewees may or may not 
have been instructed to ‘tell’ a particular narrative regarding their perspective of GM, which 
each interviewee may or may not then have decided to adhere to.  This introduces an 
apparent issue of validity into the data, a tension between the narrative the interview might 
want to tell, and the narrative they feel they should tell – however, this tension is part of the 
phenomenon the thesis is trying to study.  This ‘muddy interactional tension’ can be used as a 
tool of analysis (Lippke and Tangaard, 2014: 136) in context of PDT.  Insofar as this tension 
might be argued to reflect the dynamic between the ‘power’ inscribed in the organisational 
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strategic publications/instruction, and the interviewees who are subject to this power relation 
by being members of staff employed by the organisation (Foucault, 1967).   
It is noted that the constructionist position means that in the process of data generation, I 
must be careful not to take the ‘official rhetoric’ of the organisations and personnel at face 
value, not to influence the discourse unduly by ‘putting words into the mouths’ of the 
participants, and being sensitive to marginalised perspectives in different organisational 
contexts (Durand and Vaara, 2005: 17). 
Moreover, I should endeavour to remain sensitive to the co-construction of data, by myself 
and the interviewee – the influence that my interventions would have on the direction of the 
conversation – such that all inferences I make about the data will be done so with consistent 
caution, and with consistent awareness of the subjective interpretation of the data being 
performed by myself as analyst.  Being aware of these methodological problems does not 
mean they can be circumnavigated.  These are the issues associated with social research that 
are almost cliché, but remain as valid as ever.   
Whichever approach I take to generating and analyzing the data, ‘you cannot escape from the 
interactional nature of interviews, that the ‘data’ [is] collaboratively produced’ (Rapley, 
2001: 318).  The implications of this are that my approach to the interview, and my 
contribution to its construction, influences the ‘trajectory’ of the interviewee’s discourse.  As 
such, the interviewee is a respondent – they are responding to the interview, to my presence, 
questions and interventions, and to the environment in which the interview takes place.  
Therefore, the generation of data in an interview is a snapshot in time, from the perspective 
of my ‘lens,’ and is just one version of events that the interviewee may have constructed.  
The version of events that the interview constructs is, in this way, ‘contingent on the specific 
    167 
local interactional context’ (Rapley, 2001: 318).  In many cases, I found, some of these issues 
were emergent during the conversation, i.e., between myself and the interviewee, we co-
constructed issues associated with GM.  By allowing the meaning to emerge during the 
generation of data, arguably the second hermeneutic (Giddens, 1986) can be reduced in 
influence.  Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that my subjective perspective cannot be 
removed from the research (Davies, 2012). 
As such, I recognise that the researcher – in this case, me – unavoidably influences what is 
occurring by the very act of participating and interviewing (e.g., see Pezalla et al., 2012).  
Such an interpretation of interviews undermines the certainty with which OS often appraises 
performance of staff.  Moreover, this approach of constructionism should not be dismissed 
by the practical and scientific minded practitioners of organisational strategy.  The 
uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics states the same ‘measurement problem’, 
emphasizing subjectivity and contingency.  This may be elaborated on in the discussion, or in 
the appendices.  While the process of interviewing is acknowledged as constructing the 
persona of the interviewee, the ‘respondent’, in some form of interpellation, similarly, the 
‘performative’ aspect of being an interviewer means that the interviewer is also a constructed 
role (Denzin, 2001).   The role, or persona, of the interviewer is constructed during the 
interview process.  There is also an argument that this process is flexible and simultaneously 
constructs the interviewee as an interviewer during the duration of the interview discourse 
(e.g., Cassell, 2005). 
An interesting discussion on power relations within the co-construction of meaning between 
interviewer and interviewee is found in Jacobsson and Akerstron (2012), who focus on 
situations in which the interviewee ‘has the upper hand,’ not, as commonly assumed, the 
interviewer.  I felt this dual interpellation during the course of interviewing, particularly in 
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regard to one especially media-trained person.  During this interview, one of the first I 
conducted during the research, I had to consciously resist a persona of ‘newspaper reporter’, 
hunting for obscured details and hidden evidence of an unknown scandal.  This persona was 
not my intention, but during the interview it felt like I was being spoke to as though I were a 
newspaper reporter, and the construction of the conversation was following ‘pre-established’ 
paths of discourse that the interviewee has presumably walked before on numerous 
occasions.  I.e., I felt like I was being guided through the discourse, as opposed to either 
setting the trajectory, or co-constructing one (as in Rapley, 2001, above).  As such, in 
situations such as this, I attempted to stay alert to this interpellation of interview personas, 
and to develop an interviewer persona that can steer the discourse beyond the standard 
‘media’ lines, but also without instigating a sense in the interviewees that I was ‘looking for 
dirt.’  In short, to gain a degree of trust during the course of the interview.  This was a 
difficult intention, and was more successful in some cases than in others.  Generally, this just 
meant that I laughed at their jokes, and was sympathetic to most of what they told me.  I 
would, on occasion, lightly contest their assertions, or, on other occasions, ask questions 
about topics that are not explicitly relevant to the subject of the research, so that the relation 
between interviewee and interviewer was not purely based on a discourse of GM. 
A small set of interviews was conducted.  Each is in-depth, producing a rich set of data 
regarding the subjective position of the interviewee, and the meanings 
(definitions/properties/predicates) that each interviewee associates with GM crops, and 
associated themes of strategy.  The duration of the interviews was generally between 45 
minutes and 90 minutes.   Nearly all the interviews were conducted face to face and followed 
a discursive approach.  During the interviews I tried to develop a rapport with the participant 
(e.g., Pitts and Miller-Day, 2007).  One way I did this was to laugh.  I laughed naturally at 
points in the conversation that I genuinely found amusing, however – in the interest of 
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transparency – I used laughter as a way to build rapport, doing so in response to moments 
that did not always genuinely elicit a ‘laugh out loud’ response for me – I did not, however, 
stray into sycophantic, or misleading responses (for a thoughtful further discussion on the 
role of laughter in interviews, see, for instance, Chafe: 2007; or Myers and Lampropoulou: 
2015).  For the most part, rapport building took began and ended with the interview, but as, 
at Organisation-X, I had a desk on site for three weeks, and stayed on site for a week, I had a 
general presence that meant that I interacted with some staff members indirectly just by 
‘being around’ during the office working hours, and others directly via incidental ‘bumping 
into each other’ as we went about our day. 
5.2.4 | Recording and Transcription 
I recorded the interviews and retained the recordings, which allows for reiterative analysis of 
the interaction in the interviews, and the construction of highly detailed interview transcripts 
(Myers and Lampropoulou, 2015).  I have anonymised all the data, however, there is always 
the chance that anonymous data could be related back to the participants involved by a close 
analysis of the comments, in context of the profiles and roles of organisational personnel 
(Saunders et al., 2014).  In the transcriptions, I included all pauses, instances of ‘trailing off’ 
and non-vocabulary utterances.  Background events are also included for their affectual 
disruption/influence.  I also included instances of laughter in the transcription.  Placed in 
context of the discursive moment, a laugh might be interpreted in different ways (Myers and 
Lampropoulou, 2015).  I am not studying laughter here, but it might be interesting for 
academics that do study laughter. 
Recording the interview enables the conversation to flow, relatively unimpeded by the note 
taking of the researcher.  Moreover, as opposed to a written survey, the interviews construct a 
discourse, which are captured sonically in the moment without being processed through the 
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act of note taking by the interviewer.  As such, recording facilitates a less conventionalized 
form of data, a more stream-of-consciousness construction of discourse.  From a Lacanian 
perspective, that the words had not been subjected to the ‘written form’ of communication, 
and reduced further to notes, or shorthand, means that they are less influenced by the 
conventions of the ‘written form.’  As such, the content of the interviews is more likely to 
jump around, back and forth, between different themes, as opposed to a systematic process.  
Discursive interviews do not typically follow a linear A-B-C progression, and for these 
reasons I have chosen to use recording as a preferred method to note-taking. 
The transcript texts are considered as discursive definitions of the associated concepts (i.e. 
GMO), insofar as they represent a constructed perspective of GM.  In other words, the entire 
set of data is considered as a complex discursive definition of GM, constructed from the 
various and different perspectives of the sources of the data.  I.e., all the data collected is 
considered to ‘definitional’, so that the term ‘definition’ is not here associated with the goal 
of a concise and precise determination of ‘GMO.’  This study is interested in the complexity 
of definitions, in the aspects of meaning that are revealed through discursive constructions as 
definitions. 
5.2.5 | Limitations 
One of the most glaring limitations to this approach is that every interviewee is an 
unfathomably complex being that is beyond the scope of any single methodology or 
technique of analysis.  For this reason, any associations made in the analysis are inevitably 
also the associations of the researcher, in which I take on the role of an editor of the 
interview ‘data’.  Arguably, according to some schools of literary theory (e.g., Barthes, 1967, 
1977; Greenblatt, 1988), the act of interpretation is inseparable from the act of editing.  
Moreover, any conclusions proposed, any knowledge claimed, regarding the material is 
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inextricably subjective to the researcher, impossible to repeat, and says nothing certain of 
what GM really is or what it ‘means’ to anyone beyond the context of the research project.  
In other words, this research constructs a discursive moment in time, and can only be 
analysed in these terms.   
A more negative aspect of recording is that it was a regular occurrence in several interviews 
that a participant would noticeably ‘be aware’ of the recorder, and this would have an 
affective influence on the discourse.  The same applies for myself.  It is more than likely that, 
without the recorder, each interview would have developed differently to the recorded 
version.  There were times when the recorder was seemingly forgotten about, but these times 
were typically followed by a glance at the recorder, the presence of which would then 
intervene in the interview narrative to an extent that is beyond the methodological scope to 
describe.  The recording is audio, therefore does not contain data of the physical aspects of 
the interviews, as a video might.  As such the interviews of data collection are the ‘recorded 
version’ of the discourse, the ‘on-record’ version, and can only be analysed in these terms.   
However, it is conceivable that video recordings would have led to a different discourse.  The 
affective reaction to different media might be different depending on the medium and the 
sensibilities of the discussants at the time of recording.  Video, for example, might be 
considered more comprehensive recording of data than audio, but interview participants, 
when discussing a controversial topic for instance, might feel less comfortable expressing 
their thoughts freely, and therefore might respond to video in a more guarded manner – this 
is of course speculation, but a speculation that does not to me seem far fetched, that forms of 
recording discourse influence discursive practices. 
A significant limitation of the method of data recording is that while 45-90 minutes might be 
the time that the recordings last for, but does not include the unrecorded interaction both 
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before and after, for example, the arrangement of the meeting, the moment of initial meeting 
in person, the request for permission to record, the post-interview small talk and so on.  
These interactions are external to the data, yet are part of the construction of the data 
nonetheless, therefore I consider the data collected to be a partial representation of the 
discourse constructed in the interview process.  A related limitation of the method is that 
there are a myriad of unseen processes that contribute to the experience of phenomena, which 
are outside the scope of data generation and analysis.  In terms of OS, this consideration has 
two further aspects: whether the process of strategy formulation can be regarded as both 
‘official’ and ‘unofficial.’  Official process being those that are identifiable by the 
organisational structure – in publications and interviews – while unofficial processes are all 
the interactions, conversations in corridors, individual circum-research, personal perspectives 
and influences, that get interwoven into the formulation of strategy, that are not an ‘official’ 
part of the process.  The official process is likely to be fairly visible, in publications and 
interviews, however unofficial processes are much harder to link with the process of strategy 
formulation, and may generally be invisible to the data collection methods. 
As such, to try to analyse the discursive construction of organisational strategy (regarding 
GM) is likely to be an exercise of identifying the tip of an iceberg, with the bulk of the 
phenomenon submerged beneath a surface of intelligibility.  Both ‘official’ and visible 
processes in organisations, make up only part of the organisational perspectives and 
practices; that a substantial amount of the organisational operations are ‘unofficial’, are not 
acknowledged in ‘official’ organisational discourse.  In the analysis, I am not attempting to 
‘psychoanalyse an organisation’, to try to identify unofficial processes that contribute to 
official discourse – the justification that would doubtless be required for such an approach is 
outside the scope of this thesis (Frosh and Emerson, 2005) – but it is worth acknowledging 
that, in the data collected, regarding organisational strategy in context of GM, and 
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interviewee perspectives of GM, there will be more that is not said than is said, and therefore 
any inferences drawn from and about the data should be considered in context of this 
acknowledgement, and that much that contributes to the formulation, construction, of 
organisational strategy (regarding GM) will inevitably be missed by this research. 
Due to the scope of the data, this consideration is much more detailed regarding the pro GM 
side, compared with the anti.  There is an opportunity for progressing the research in doing a 
similar analysis with an anti GM organisation, and then a comparison.  I have a significant 
amount of data generated that I did not engage with in the thesis, therefore there is potential 
for future projects to analyse this data for a richer understanding of the construction of 
meaning regarding GMOs in an organisation in pre-Brexit Europe.  In this case, there would 
also be scope for a comparison with a U.S. based organisation that produces GMOs.  A study 
of this type would draw out any cultural similarities and differences regarding the meaning of 
GMOs that is constructed (as an umbrella term and for each individual construct), as well as 
the power dynamics within the organisation regarding the negotiation of meaning, and how 
this meaning influences the applications of the technology, and how these applications 
influence the meaning of the technology for wider U.S. society.  A comparison of this kind 
could generate some interesting and unpredicted findings. 
5.2.6 | Additional Data: Organisational Publications 
The organisational publications of interest to me for this analysis include internal 
publications, such as those of the official strategic plan and organisational regulations, as 
well as public communications.  The organisational data collected relates to the regulations 
and protocols regarding acceptable behaviour, and perspectives regarding GMOs. 
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An appropriate way for conceptualising organisational publications is a contentious issue in 
discourse analysis.  Such texts might be considered as ‘naturally occurring’ (Wood and 
Kroger, 2000; Phillips and Hardy, 2002).  Arguably relating to Giddens (1986) concept of the 
double hermeneutic, Wood and Kroger (2000) argue that, if all discourse is constructed, the 
concepts of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ data are not easily differentiated.  Some argue that 
whether ‘natural’ texts exist is debatable (Phillips and Brown, 1993).  In which case, a 
researcher cannot claim to have had no influence on the data.  Therefore, it must be 
acknowledged that the interview data in this research has been constructed in context of the 
research questions, the literature and the methodology, and therefore follows a structure that I 
imposed, to which I am also subject and obliged to abide by, by the conventions of academic 
research.  Nonetheless, acknowledging the source of the text, and hence its construction and 
location prior to the research, is part of the research.  Doing so also helps to make visible 
how the research process has interpreted the text. 
Organisational publications are not written by an organisational hand, they are written by the 
participants that belong to the organisation – most likely, by organisational participants 
whose role in the organisation is to write organisational publications, probably in context of a 
brief given by other (senior) participants.  Nonetheless, the organisational publication is 
important as it reflects something of the (co-)construction of top-down hegemonic discourse.    
Nodes can be identified in the publications the organisations release to the public, regarding 
‘definitions’ of ‘GM’ and ‘organsational strategy’, and also in internal publications, 
regarding employee conduct and organisational strategy.  
5.3 | Coding 
Once the data was organised according to the broad codes of inertia, friction and adaptation, 
I reviewed the draft by going through each section.  The broader codes of inertia, friction and 
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adaptation were then refined during the process to include sub-codes.  The sub-codes were 
also altered and amended along the way, as I reviewed more data.  Even at this stage, I found 
myself moving data from one code to another, often finding that larger chunks of data could 
be relevant to more than one sub-code and having to find a way to contextualise the data 
most fittingly, including by changing the sub-coding scheme.   
That this process has led to the data being decontextualised is a risk, but one that is often the 
case of qualitative discourse analysis.  I have strived to maintain an integrity of context when 
categorising the data and interpreting it, and the transcripts have been submitted along with 
the thesis so that any doubts over interpretation and context can be reviewed by the reader at 
their will.  Indeed, I found that interviews to be extremely interesting, and there is much in 
the data that I have not used for reasons of analytic scope, and any future research that is 
interested in GM technology, organisational strategy, or another field of interest, might find 
the data useful.  In other words, I do not feel that the data has been exhausted by any means 
by the analysis of this thesis, or by the perspective with which I approached the research. 
After I finished coding the interviews, I began to code the strategic communications.  As this 
continued, I organised the data so that the strategic communications are positioned first, and 
the interview data follows, to enable a comparison.  Via this comparison, alignment and 
dissent might be seen, which suggests articulatory practices forming the official strategy 
discourse. 
5.4 | Summary 
I trace the effects of inertia, friction and adaptation within a case study, using these core 
concepts to make sense of subjectivity and strategy, and using discourse theory to understand 
them.  As the organisation is in the knowledge economy (e.g., strategically producing GM 
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genomes IP).  It operates at a nexus between wider political discourse and internal political 
discourse.  I am looking in the data for the presence of inertia, friction and adaptation in the 
discourses of strategy.  I am also using them as theoretical concepts with which to critique 
their effects in the discourse.  This is a consideration of how the organisational strategic 
management of knowledge reproduces these concepts: Politics as the strategic management 
of knowledge, reproduces these concepts as a system of organisation for managing disputes 
that arise due to the Political.  It is in the context of the strategic management of knowledge 
that dissent is defined and judged – i.e., inertia, friction and adaptation/innovation 
The thesis analyses the politics of innovation.  Using discourse theory, the thesis grounds the 
theoretical critique of knowledge management in an empirical case study, in which the 
strategic management of knowledge is analysed via discursive power relations both within 
the organisation and between the organisation and its discursive environs,  
Thesis also considers the ontology and epistemology of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), in context of the strategic operations of the case organisation and personnel.  Which 
is to say, putting these together, the construction of GMOs, both ideationally and materially, 
is analysed through the social constructionist lens of PDT, in context of the strategic 
management of knowledge, and the power relations associated with this management, both 
within an organisation, and between an organisation and its environs.   
The above discussion makes visible the various stages in the analysis.  These stages outline 
the how the data is analysed in relation to addressing the research questions.  The steps were 
iterative and while they are separated for ease of communication to the reader, this is not a 
‘true’ representation of how the research was conducted.  Nonetheless, each step did take 
place in the analysis and demonstrate how I constructed the research, although the research, 
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in practice, is not necessarily conducted in the linear chronology set forward in the discussion 
above. 
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6 | Data Analysis 
The theoretical framework enables an analysis of the performance of the concepts of inertia, 
friction and adaptation in the strategy discourse, with a focus on implications for the 
construction of meaning, power relations and practices.  Alongside the analysis of the core 
concepts is an analysis of instances in which the Political is manifest, and an analysis of 
agonistic approaches to strategy, enabling a consideration of how agonistic strategy allows 
for the Political to manifest itself. 
6.1 | Inertia 
The genealogy indicates that the concept of inertia could be considered a node of strategy 
discourse within the analytical frame of this thesis.  This section will illustrate the ways in 
which the mainstream concept of inertia is performed in the official strategy and in the 
accounts of interviewees.  There will also be an analysis of how the performance of inertia 
relates to manifestations of the Political. 
6.1.1 | Structural and Practical Inertia 
The case organisation is made up of 300 research staff, 150 non-scientific support staff and 
50 PhD students (Org-X International Strategy: 5).  The structure of the organisation is 
performed in the practices and interactions of the individuals – the way in which labour is 
divided in context of the organisational strategy.  In recurring performances – in the routine 
reproduction of structural divisions of labour – illustrations of structural inertia can be traced 
in the accounts of the interviewees: 
We also have a department for strategy… but people in the department will belong 
to more than one ISP… so… the ISPs are… independent units, if you want, as a 
theme, financially, of how they are run… and then there is a person who is 
responsible for each ISP… so it’s a senior scientist… so the four senior scientist, 
each one of them overlooking particular ISP, and this is decided on the basis of the 
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expertise as well of course and the relevance that they.. specific project has with a 
particular ISP… so, and I work with all the scientists at Org-X... so that 
communications team… we have been.. I mean depending on how you see it… but 
so.. let’s say three people  (Ms Blue: 128-135) 
There is a department, function, specialising in strategy, which indicates the prominence of 
the concept within the organisation: 
The purpose of the Strategy is to ensure Org-X is performing cutting edge scientific 
research on the critical factors responsible for plant productivity, crop quality and 
agricultural sustainability and engage with the public to translate results (Org-X 
Strategy: 3) 
The organisation has what might be considered more traditional functions, but the staff are 
also organised into functions orientated around ISPs that transcend the traditional divisions.  
Elsewhere, it is explained that the ISPs are designed and organised in accordance with the 5-
year strategy.  This account also describes the rationale for appointing personnel to 
leadership positions in the ISPs.  The rationale is based on path dependence (check this is 
discussed earlier) and the alignment of personal expertise with the strategic aim of the ISP.  
The ways in which ISPs are structured and interact is expanded on in an additional account: 
I lead a group… it’s slightly.. it’s not quite as clear as that.. because the group I 
work in has three, sort of people at the project leader who collaborate very closely 
together… so… who’s the leader of the group varies depending on what.. what 
we’re talking about… (Mr Orange: 48-51) 
The interviewee, Mr Orange, is not comfortable claiming to be an ISP leader, due to the 
involvement of other personnel at the same level of the hierarchy.  This account indicates 
that, concerning ISPs, the strategy is a departure from the Clausewitzian clear-chain-of-
command structure that is often favoured in organisations.  It could be speculated that this 
structure is associated with the ISP, and therefore the research side of the organisation, as 
opposed to the traditional functions.  Further illustration of the organisational structure and 
its relation to the strategy is provided in another account: 
I..  lead a.. a.. lab, really.. of about 6 or 7 people.. that.. and we have a number of 
functions.. one of the functions that is easiest to.. to describe.. is that we run a kind 
of a factory for making transgenic plants, so.. for making.. taking a plant and 
adding an extra gene, if you like.. but.. so that forms, sort of, a routine part of the 
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job.. but also I have a responsibility to think of ideas, to bring money here – to 
apply for grants, essentially – to bring in money for specific projects  (Mr White: 
85-90) 
This account is provided by the leader of a division, this structure illustrates the hierarchical 
structure that is commonplace in modern organisations, and that is traceable to Clausewitzian 
military theory.  Divisions are often referred to as functions in mainstream business 
management discourse.  In drawing on the factory analogy to describe the division he leads, 
Mr White draws on functional structuralism and scientific management for the analogy.  Mr 
White’s department performs a specific function(s) within the organisational structure, this 
function(s) is scientific; moreover, factories, emulating Ford’s factory design, are often 
designed in accordance with principles of scientific management.  Therefore, in this case, 
scientific management is applied to industrial science, such that a research institute is treated 
as a factory.  Moreover, the emphasis on the function of ‘making transgenic plants’, 
involving scientific principles that are based on determinism, indicates the presence of the 
concept of the absolute, of simultaneity and of an inertial reference frame by association, in 
the concept of strategy and in its performance.  There is also an illustration of practical 
inertia – of the routine – regarding the construction of GM organisms.  The leadership 
position seems to carry with it the recurring responsibility for innovation, which means the 
role is also one of change agent, and illustrates how responsibility for innovation – and the 
power to choose what is and what is not innovative – lies with the management roles, as 
discussed in the genealogy.  This is an indication of the Political within the change agent, 
which will be analysed more closely in due course, along with manifestations of the Political 
regarding those who are not leaders of organisational functions. 
Ms Blue works as part of the communications team, indicating, and the team ‘works with all 
the scientists’, which hints at the prominence for the organisation of discursive strategy, both 
internally – suggesting that there is a strategy of alignment and discursive management – and 
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also externally, in engaging with the outside world.  Discursive strategies have, more 
recently, become a form of practical inertia: 
Ms Blue and Mr. E have really driven this with this project in particularly, that 
we… you know, we get… what we’re trying to do into the public conscious (Mr 
Ochre: 210-212) 
I mean.. the way that we see it… is that we… we… are doing research and so we 
have a research question and we’re trying to understand something… and we do the 
experiments, and we get some results… and then we have to explain to the people 
what is the research, what is the purpose, and what is the results (Ms Blue: 249-
252) 
We had a kind of a..  a pact.. that we would.. a number of scientists in the institute 
would try to speak to the media.. we would.. we would..  proactively go out and.. 
try to engage with media, and explain what we do.. explain the science.. really 
emphasise that it was an experiment, that it wasn’t a.. wasn’t a.. first step in a 
commercialization process (Mr White: 342-345) 
There is an indication of power relations, wherein the communications team are able to 
influence the interaction of organisational members in their interaction with the public.  A 
pact is quite a strong term to draw on to describe an agreement – often used in relation to 
unbreakable bonds – indicating the construction of shared values as a strategic directive, and 
the construction of an absolute inertial frame of reference.  The most salient of practical 
inertia in the case organisation are the classical experiments: 
So.. there are other experime.. so they started nine experiments from 1843 until.. 
er.. 1860s.. and, from those nine, now we have eight that are continuously running 
(Ms Blue – Tour: 54-55) 
The classical experiments are an example of a deliberate strategic inertia, in this case 
practical.  A routine that has been continued for the value both as a research resource and for 
the purposes of maintaining tradition, the classical experiments – concerning the relationship 
between soil composition, chemical additives (such as types of fertilizer), and agricultural 
output – were started at the same time that the organisation was founded.  As a tradition, 
these experiments provide symbolic value to the organisation, a tangible, practical link to the 
past, occurring in the present. 
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The continuation of these experiments provides value to the organisation as both a historical 
data record, and as a continually useful source of data generation.  The soil samples that are 
generated are preserved in an archive, meaning that data regarding soil conditions and 
agricultural output can be retrieved for a broad range of environmental conditions.  
Moreover, while there are some issues of storage space, the intention is ‘to continue 
collecting at the same rate’ (Ms Blue – Tour: 258), continuing at the same rate is the 
Newtonian definition of inertia: no faster, no slower. 
6.1.2 | Inertia and Newton 
The genealogy describes how the concept of inertia can be traced back to Newtonian 
mechanics.  The critique suggests that the associated Newtonian concept of simultaneity has 
also been carried into the concept of inertia in strategy discourse – alternatively that the 
concept of simultaneity was reproduced in the use of the concept of inertia in strategy 
discourse, and sedimented as an articulatory practice.  In the strategy discourse of the case 
organisation, a concept of simultaneity is suggested in the official strategy: 
Our history is one of excellence and our future will ensure that we deliver the 
highest quality science or maximal impact on agricultural practice […] creating a 
new and exciting chapter in its long and illustrious history (Org-X Strategy: 2) 
Mission statements and references to a singular and universal organisational history are a 
common feature of organisational strategies, and the strategic communications of Org-X is 
no exception.  The above statement indicates the notion of the absolute in the organisational 
construction of time, the analogy of a new chapter reproduces the flipbook notion of time, 
which is constructed from the concepts of absolute space and time: simultaneity.  This is an 
illustration of how the concept of simultaneity is reproduced in the organisational strategy.  
The notion of time is constructed with a collective pronoun, ‘our’, which suggests the 
construction of shared values – being on the same page.  The dominant narrative arguably 
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helps to construct and reproduce a logic of equivalence, to construct a system of shared 
values, of simultaneity.  This is an example of the construction of an organisational reference 
frame, and, by being based on the concept of simultaneity, of a potentially hegemonic 
practice. 
Present practices are given meaning by relation to the past.  The influence of the historical 
identity of the organisation is strong in its stated mission, and subsequently on the design of 
the present organisational strategy.  This is a form of strategic inertia that is deliberate, and 
considered to be a strength of the organisation.  The performance of the concept of 
simultaneity and of meaning being given to current practice, by relation to historically 
constructed meaning, is illustrated in the following account: 
It’s very important to continue this for crop science […] the intents of the research 
for 90 years (Ms Blue – Tour: 463-464) 
So.. in the 1930s, because that’s when it [the mural] was commissioned.. so, the 
reason the reason the director at the time, was that, he was.. what he wanted to 
demonstrate was that, because the remit of the research that we do here has do all 
with furthering publics of agriculture and farmer practice, and so on.. so, and he 
wanted to demonstrate that there was a change, that they were experiencing at the 
time a change in agriculture – a modernization if you want, and so on – and he was 
aware of this happening … what he wanted to say was that, Org-X was really the 
centre of all this innovation (Ms Blue – Tour: 444-450)  
Figure 1: the Mural 
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The mural arguably reproduces a sense of status and of pioneering research.   The theoretical 
framework discussed the spatial centrism of maps, and the temporal centrism of GMT and 
railway time.  This mural arguably represents both these centrisms in context of socio-
economic practices: the organisation is at the centre of an agricultural revolution.  Arguably, 
then, the mural represents a symbolic inertial frame of reference.  The mural neatly indicates 
the conceptual placing of the organisation as a centre of innovation with regards to wider 
society, suggesting that the frame of reference applies outside of the organisation, the 
organisation is the benchmark for progress and change.  Moreover, to me, the sentiment of 
the mural suggests that, being at the centre of a rapid and significant shift in agricultural 
practice, it is almost as if the organisation is presented in such a way that, for the 
organisation, time is progressing faster than for its surroundings, which would suggest a 
temporal relativity – a localised time dilation.  This perspective implies that the 
organisational inertial frame of reference is not absolute, does not apply outside the 
organisation.  In which case, the sentiment of the mural is to maintain a relative temporal 
status (pioneering research), while constructing a spatial-temporal centre to which the 
Outside is to be aligned, which is potentially hegemonic in intention: a hegemonic centre of 
innovation.  In short, the surrounding are expected to align themselves to the inertial frame of 
the organisation. 
The official strategy and the mural emphasise that the organisation is a research institute, 
with charity status, that focuses on agricultural innovation. The mural also serves as a 
reminder for those who pass by it, a regular stimulus to ideationally encode a sensibility of 
pride and also inspiration.  If the intention includes that of reinforcing an ethos, this indicates 
an implicit understanding that manifestations of the Political might emerge.  Whether the 
intention is to repress or encourage and hone emergences is unknown, although it is 
reasonable to assume that the effect could be on both to varying and different extents to 
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different organisational individuals and at different times for the same person.  
Notwithstanding this unknown, the data indicates that the history of the organisation 
influences the construction of meaning given to current practices. The practices of the 
organisation, in context of the sentiment of the mural steeped in meaning-laden iconography, 
become inert insofar as being a recurring performance of organisational intentions – in this 
pictorial combination of action and meaning, the organisation does not change, it shall 
remain as innovative as ever before, yet the surroundings will change, by catching up with 
the innovative trajectory of the organisation’s research. 
Illustration of current practice being given meaning in relation to the future, defined by the 
official strategy, can also be seen in the data.  The adjectives used to describe this new 
chapter are concepts that frame the construction of meaning for organisational practice in the 
future.  Reflecting this meaning of the future, the accounts illustrate a willingness to express 
excitement associated with work in the present: 
I wake up every morning, happy and wanting to come to work.  I’m not satiated by the 
work, there’s always something new to.. learn.. yeah.. absolutely.. I’m very stimulated by it 
(Mr White: 217-219); 
 
…it’s the sort of thing that gets microbiologists excited (Ms Red: 419); 
 
…there’s that kind of.. you know, excitement and.. and buzz you get from some interesting 
research (Mr Yellow: 525-527) 
These statements reflect the official strategy in the adjectives ascribed to the new chapter in 
the history of the organisation, that current practice is given meaning in context of a lens that 
gives meaning to the future.  This pattern arguably illustrates the influence among individuals 
of the construction of simultaneity in values as part of organisational strategy.  If the 
accounts are sincere, this reflects the alignment in values between individual and official 
strategy, which may have existed before employment with the organisation, in which case 
they do not necessarily indicate any influence, and may or may not represent power relations.  
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If insincere, a statement could represent power relations, in the interviewee reproducing 
official strategy discourse that is not necessarily representative of their personal perspective.  
In the case that the reproduction of the official discourse is indoctrinated or pressured, these 
accounts would illustrate a repression of the Political and an obstacle to the Political from 
being expressed.  Moreover, that this repression is internalised to some degree by the 
interviewee.  Sincere or otherwise, these statements are an indication of the frame – the 
discursive practices – that gives meaning for present practice, defined by relation to an 
imagined, an aspired, future of the organisation.   
The data indicates that the strategic discourse constructs the reference frame in which a sense 
of organisational identity is reproduced and in which relations of meaning are attached to 
organisational practices.  The concept of simultaneity is performed in the discourse in a 
manner that gives meaning to present practices in context of the past and the future.  The 
extract of organisational strategy is also indicative of the construction of shared values.   
Some of the ways in which the concept of inertia is performed in the discourse have been 
analysed, indicating the presence of simultaneity in the organisational strategy.  As the 
theoretical framework describes a connection between simultaneity and instrumentalism – 
with the concept of simultaneity being the basis of independent demonstration, which is the 
basis of instrumentalism – the analysis will trace this connection in the data in the next 
section. 
6.1.3 | Inertia and Instrumentalism 
By constructing a sense of time and change that contains the absolute and connecting it with 
independent demonstration via that absolute, the concept of simultaneity is an articulatory 
practice that connects the concept of strategy to the concept of instrumentalism.  
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Instrumentalism is a school of thought that considers theories to be tools, such that they are 
considered to be a reliable source of determining causal chains and relationships.  I propose 
that, if there is no absolute, then the foundation of instrumentalism, that tools are a reliable 
source for determining universals, and that theories can emulate this tool-like reliability, falls 
apart.  The association of tools with the absolute (the universal inertial frame) will be 
explored first, and then analysed with regard to the implications of this association, and its 
legitimacy. 
Based on the concept of an absolute inertial reference frame, the instrumentalist frame of the 
strategy discourse gives meaning to organisational practices and techniques involving GM 
biotechnology, and to the technology itself: 
Org-X considers that it is the specific characteristics of new crops and not the 
technology by which they are derived that should be the basis for determining their 
acceptability.  Org-X will continue to produce and communicate impartial, science-
based information on diverse farming systems of production, including organics, in 
the support of improving the sustainability of agriculture and enhancing the 
environment […] In addition to the potential practical application of GM 
technology, it is an essential research tool and integral to fundamental studies 
aimed at understanding more about the biology of organisms and their interaction 
with the environment (Org-X on GM Crops: 1) 
To me, the start of this statement is reminiscent of Martin Luther King’s speech at the 
Lincoln Memorial Rally in 1963: ‘I have a dream that my four little children will one day 
live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of 
their character’.  In both cases, the plea is for judgement to be made based on the character, 
not, in one case physical appearance, and in the other, technological method.   
The next part of the statement regards the strategic goal of the organisation.  As discussed in 
the theoretical framework, a goal – an objective – is the benchmark by which the 
performance of an organisation is judged, regarding the rate of progress in reaching the goal.  
As part of the absolute, the objective is a future status that progress towards which can be 
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measured.  Strategic inertia, in this context, means steady progress towards a goal.  The goal 
set by the strategy is the development of knowledge, and the approach to knowledge in the 
strategic frame is teleological and absolute.  The goal, then, is a future state of knowledge, a 
real physical state in the future, a moment in time composed of matter and energy in various 
distributions (clusters and dispersals), in which the state of knowledge has changed.  
Simultaneity, in this way, perceives knowledge as a configuration of matter and energy at a 
moment in time – in this frame of simultaneity, at this level of elements, knowledge as 
something that is associated with the conscious mind, and inanimate matter and energy are 
indistinguishable, knowledge is reduced to information.  As information, progress towards 
the development of knowledge is considered to be measurable, within the remit of 
instrumentalism.  That the information produced is to be ‘science-based’ is an objective 
aligned with a strategic frame based on simultaneity.  The scientific frame – and by 
association – is performed in the data, for instance: 
I think, the EU like.. well.. the.. the parts of the EU that supports science, like 
scientific bodies here and everywhere else, will take an objective view (Ms Red: 
201-203) 
There is also an illustration of shared values of instrumentalism, seen in a patterned emphasis 
of science as an identity: 
We as scientists want to gain data, whether it’s positive or negative (Ms Grey: 216-217); 
 
I’m an academic, I’m a research scientist (Mr White: 87-101); 
 
I’m a scientist (Mr Ochre: 103; 212); 
 
I’m a research scientist (Mr Blonde: 94); 
 
…for scientists like me (Mr Green: 148);  
 
…as a microbiologist… (Ms Grey: 441). 
The last section of the statement describes the meaning that is given to GM technology 
within the organisational frame.  In the instrumentalist strategic frame, the meaning given to 
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GM distinguishes between the technology and the products, this differentiation is reflected in 
the accounts of interviewees. There is another discursive pattern here, with shared values 
echoed across different accounts: 
GM for biologists is that it’s just a workhorse thing, you know.. not the same as making 
terminator plants (Miss Red: 428-429);  
 
GM is a technology, GM has nothing to do with what you’re.. it doesn’t dictate what you’re 
making, it’s just a way of doing it, there are lots of things that you can do with GM (Mr 
White: 377-379);  
 
GM is a technique, it’s not the actual crop (Mr Ochre: 228-229). 
In terms of the theoretical framework, this meaning of GM technology shares the same 
characteristic as an empty signifier: the property of being able to be imbued with meaning.    
As meaning develops from the uses of the technology, the data frames the GM debate as 
being attached to the products, not the technology itself.  An implication of this frame is that 
any political controversy associated with GM products can only be associated with the 
products themselves, the technology is absolved from responsibility.  In a PDT lens, the way 
the discourse frames products means GM products share characteristics with contested 
signifiers: contested meaning.  In which case, the contest over products is a contest over 
signifiers that are generated by GM techniques, but are not GM technology.  A PDT analysis 
of the discursive frame suggests that, as the technology is seen as a tool, the technology is 
separate from the act and outcome of its usage, the identification and use of the tool is in the 
conceptual eye of the holder: 
well, I like to think of it as a kind of a.. sewing machine in a tailor shop.  So you 
walk into a tailor and you see the sewing machine.. it doesn’t tell you anything 
about the clothes you make – you make a pair of trousers with the arse hanging 
out.. and you know.. or the most beautiful suit in the world – but it doesn’t.. you 
can’t tell that by looking at the sewing machine.  So that’s it.. the technology is 
absolutely neutral (Mr White: 450-454) 
In the performance of this form of instrumentalism in the discursive frame of the 
organisational strategy, the tools of GM are associated with the absolute, simultaneity is 
associated with instrumentalism.  Without inherent ethical attributes, GM technology is being 
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presented as neutral.  This frame could be interpreted as suggesting that GM is neutral in 
meaning.  In other words, the meaning of GM is arguably influenced by instrumentalism, 
wherein GM technology is a tool and neutral in further meaning by being independent of 
anthropomorphic meanings.  In the discursive frame of Org-X’s strategy, Tools are 
considered to be a form of independent demonstration that can be used to then manipulate 
that independent environment.  The contradiction in this perception is that if the environment 
is independent, then it should not be able to be manipulated.  In which case, the tools are not 
synonymous with independent demonstration, nor with simultaneity nor the absolute.  When 
in use, tools are not absolutely neutral.  The logic that tools are neutral is founded on the 
concept of the absolute, that there is a universal inertial frame of reference, and that this 
inertial frame of reference indicates that the outcome of the use of the tool is the same for 
you as it is for me.  With regard to the sewing machine analogy, we could say that the 
concept of an inertial frame of reference suggests that the clothes produced are one size fits 
all.  Through a PDT lens, this would be considered to be a hegemonic conception of tool use, 
and therefore the form of instrumentalism displayed in the data is arguably a hegemonic 
conception of GM techniques. 
Through a PDT lens, the neutrality of the technology signifier is not questioned in the 
account, therefore is considered to be absolute, ‘absolutely neutral’, and outside of political 
interpretation.   Here is the difference between the instrumentalist and the PDT frames: PDT 
would not consider a signifier to be absolutely neutral, a signifier can only be a signifier if it 
can be occupied with meaning, empty signifiers are arguably neutral in meaning, but they are 
signifiers-in-waiting, at most they signify their potential to be imbued with meaning.  
Therefore, if, according to the Org-X strategy and interview accounts, no meaning can 
occupy GM technology, it cannot be a signifier.  A PDT perspective might consider the 
technology not to represent the independent environment, but to be part of the constitutive 
    191 
outside, and this would indicate the potential for different interpretations, the potential for the 
emergence of the Political regarding both the technology and the produce of its usage. 
Therefore, the instrumentalist frame arguably acts in a way that might repress manifestations 
of the Political, regarding the technology, but encourages manifestations of the Political 
regarding the uses and products.  In short, within the frame of the organisational strategy, the 
meaning of the technology is not only not open for reinterpretation, it is inaccessible to 
interpretation; the uses of the technology are open for interpretation, and encouraged.  What 
this distinction means, and by associating the technology with the absolute, is that the 
technology itself is not open to debate, the technology exists and is staying, only its uses may 
be debated.  In fixing the (lack of) meaning in this way, the strategy discourse appears to be 
attempting to construct conceptual inertia regarding the signifier of GM technologies.  Put 
another way, the strategy is attempting to construct simultaneity in values. 
One wonders whether the general public’s been influenced by, you know… they 
read, they listen… and they know that a lot of GM crops have grown around the 
world, and there hasn’t been a series of news items saying, you know, catastrophic 
disasters associated with GM, it’s just not been there, it’s not been evidenced, so, 
you know… that argument, to a certain degree, has disappeared… I think the 
general public has moved along a little bit, to say, ‘okay, this is in the world now, 
so what’s in it for me? (Mr Ochre: 185-191) 
This account indicates that construction of value in the wider social environment.  Less 
debate over GM products, due to the public getting more used to the existence of the 
technology, connects the association of the technology with the absolute, as outside of 
political interpretation: the fading of the technology as a political issue into the background 
suggests that with the passing of time,  what was once political can become perceived as 
absolute.  In PDT, this process is known as sedimentation.  The account also illustrates the 
concept of self-interest, arguably derived from rational choice theory based on the concept of 
competitive advantage.  Rational choice theory is discussed in the section on friction, and 
competitive advantage will be discussed in context of adaptation.   
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The genealogy suggests that functionalism is tied to the concept of independent 
demonstration, and therefore to simultaneity and the absolute – to the concept of a universal 
inertial frame of reference.  In this section, I have tried to show that the distinction between 
tools and the theories-as-tools approach of instrumentalism have collapsed in the strategy of 
Org-X, and that this is reflected in some of the interview data as well.  By collapse, I mean 
that there is a reification of tools, such that tools and instruments of measurement are 
assumed to be synonymous with independent demonstration by virtue of an absolute that 
denotes a universal truth.  Rather than theories, it is the tools themselves, such as those 
involved in the techniques of GM biotechnology, that are considered to be a reliable source 
of determining causal relationships in the strategy discourse of Org-X. 
The next section will analyse ways in which the concept of functionalism is visibly 
associated with this form of instrumentalism in the strategy discourse. 
6.1.4 | Inertia and Functionalism 
In the performance of inertia in the organisational strategy, the concepts of simultaneity and 
instrumentalism are also performed and associated with one another.  The genealogy 
describes functionalism as a tangent of independent demonstration and instrumentalism.  
Functionalism is a concept that gives meaning to instruments as being systems of smaller 
instruments.  The operation of the system requires each instrument to perform a role, with 
contributes to the functioning of the whole.  In a functionalist frame, components are defined 
by their functional meaning.  In this section, I propose that the conception of tools as 
synonymous with independent demonstration is combined with the concept of functionalism, 
leading to a discursive frame that associated tools with the independent demonstration of 
universal truths regarding the meaning of genes.  The meaning of genes is known as their 
function(s) in context of the larger organic system they are part of. 
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Firstly, I will analyse how a functionalist frame is performed in the strategy discourse of the 
organisation: 
Numerous plant genes have now been cloned and their functions determined 
(although only a fraction of the 35-40,000 genes that are possessed by higher 
plants). So-called functional genomics is set to produce an explosion of information 
driven by access to large databases of sequence data and the capacity, by cross-
species comparisons, to develop testable hypotheses on gene function. The other 
side of the functional genomics coin is the facility to exploit sequence homology to 
locate and isolate a gene for a particular function in any plant species of interest 
(Org-X on Crop Biotechnology: 2) 
The production of information is based on identifying genetic functions.   Functionalism is at 
the heart of the organisational strategy.  The research strategy is to determine the function of 
various genes, more specifically, to identify desired traits and to associate them with specific 
genes.  An account frames the meaning of genes within structural functionalism: 
We know that a gene is just a collection of […] bases.. A and T, G and C.. and 
sometimes a use thrown in there, and sometimes something else thrown in there.. 
you break it down and then everything is […] just components.. they could slot 
together […] you look at things from almost a Lego perspective (Mr Green: 269-
274).   
Here, functions are associated with genes, which are constituted of smaller components, 
indicating structural functionalism.  As part of the research process, genes are added or 
removed by virtue of the function they are determined with: known as over or under 
expression.  As a practice, the GM process typically involves judgement regarding the 
function, and the gene by association: 
GM technology allows the introduction of a novel biosynthetic process that is 
outside the natural variation of the crop species or, alternatively, allows an 
undesirable attribute that is a universal characteristic of the crop to be eliminated 
(Org-X on Crop Biotechnology: 130-133) 
Referring back to the official strategy’s frame of GM biotechnology as a neutral tool, and 
argument that products should be judged by character not method of construction, if we 
judge according to character, and in a functional structuralist lens, we associate character 
with genes, then we are still subsuming character to physical structure, to construction, only 
this time on the ‘inside’ as DNA.  This is arguably as reductive as judgement according to 
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‘outward’ physical appearance, as superficial as judgement according to skin colour, and 
represents an issue with the internal logic of the discursive frame.  In the organisational 
discourse, genetic characteristics are considered to be universal, and are arguably judged on 
the basis of an absolute independent frame of reference: 
With specific bits of DNA, where you know the sequence, where you know the 
function of the sequence […] and you can.. demonstrate that that function happens 
if you move it into another plant.. then.. I think that’s.. that’s fair enough  (Mr 
White: 729-732) 
Determining function via independent demonstration is the basis of GM research strategy.  
That GM technology is framed as a tool, and genes are framed as functions, is evidence that 
the articulatory practices of the strategic frame connect independent demonstration, 
instrumentalism and functional structuralism.  The concept of simultaneity is arguably the 
foundation of the logic of these articulatory practices, and therefore, as simultaneity is 
founded on the concept of a universal inertial frame of reference, the Newtonian conception 
of inertia is reproduced in the strategy discourse of the organisation.   
The ‘Lego perspective’ mentioned in the account above is not dissimilar to the description of 
elements in PDT.  What is not shared is the determinism or objective perspectives.  
Determining the meaning of a gene, that is to say, to determine its function regarding a trait, 
is to fix its meaning.  PDT might consider the process of identifying traits as a form of social 
construction, that they are not exclusively part of the Real, and, by extension, genes could be 
considered to be elements, floating signifiers that are attached into a framework of relational 
meaning.  Through a PDT lens, the aim of knowing functions would not be considered to be 
a teleological production of universal knowledge, but rather a contextual understanding of 
how genes are expressed in different environments.  
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In PDT, an element with fixed meaning is a moment, and is part of a hegemonised structure.  
Through a PDT lens, an organism is a framework of moments, a constellation of genetic 
elements.  Within a hegemonic frame, the meaning of the GM functions, of GM events, 
represses alternative interpretations, represses the expression of the Political.  By fixing 
meanings to genes the strategy is decisionist and antagonistic.  Therefore, who judges which 
genes have which functions, and which functions are associated with which traits, which 
traits are desirable/undesirable, and that traits are permanently fixed to genes, holds a 
Schmittian position of power.  How this judgement is performed in the organisation is turned 
to next, as part of tracing the concept of friction. 
That the meaning of genes can be determined, and that these meanings are universal truths, is 
the combination of instrumentalism to structural functionalism.  The concept of inertia 
provides the basis of the concept of simultaneity (as a universal inertial frame of reference); 
simultaneity forms the basis of the concept of independent demonstration; and independent 
demonstration forms the basis of the instrumentalist approach in the strategy of Org-X; the 
strategy of Org-X is to determine the function (the meaning) of genes. 
6.2 Friction 
The genealogy identified the concept of friction to be of importance to the mainstream 
strategy discourse.  Friction is connected to the discourse via the concepts of inertia and 
functional structuralism in the discourse – the concepts are all connected via the articulatory 
practice of simultaneity.  The genealogy traced the concept of friction to Clausewitzian 
military theory.  Clausewitz associates friction with the notion of risk and chance, which he 
ascribes to both internal and external factors.  This section of the analysis will focus on the 
ways in which the concept of friction is performed in the accounts of interviewees. 
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6.2.1 Internal Friction and Human Error 
The official strategy of the case organisation states that: 
Risk may take many forms from personal danger to an individual to organisation 
reputation to data integrity, depending on the activity being profiled (Org-X on 
Risk: 5-6) 
According to Clausewitz (2006: 66), internal organisational operation is everywhere a source 
of friction.  Again, according to Clausewitz, a major form of internal friction is human error.  
Error and misconduct is acknowledged in the organisational strategy: 
Scientific misconduct, as defined by the Royal College of Physicians, is taken to 
include but not be limited to plagiarism, piracy and fraud:  
 Plagiarism: the copying of ideas, data, text or other form without 
permission or acknowledgement, whilst presenting them as original.  
 Piracy: the deliberate exploitation of ideas from others without full and 
express permission to do so.  
 Fraud: the deliberate deception, including invention (falsification) or 
omission of data during analysis, presentation and/or publication.  
This definition covers proposing, conducting and reporting research. It does not 
include honest error or honest differences in scientific interpretations, hypotheses or 
judgements of data (Org-X on Misconduct and Whistleblowing, 2011: 220-230) 
The official strategy defines error as unplanned behaviour that is not a form of misconduct.  
This includes differences in interpretations of data, which could be considered to be instances 
of the Political in context of the theoretical framework.  The influence of human error is 
illustrated in an account of an interviewee: 
I’m not a great fan.. of, say producing pharmaceuticals in plants.. not because 
they’re not safe, but I think  someone will eventually put them in the wrong bag.. 
because you have to allow for things going wrong […] human error.. and you 
know, that.. that happens.  Stuff which you’d label as non-GM is actually GM.  If 
someone’s got 5 sacks of maize, one of which is expressing, say.. a human growth 
hormone, or something like that.. it sometimes, someone’s gonna send that to the 
wrong place, or put it in the wrong bed, or put it in the wrong bin.  So, I wouldn’t 
like to rely.. I don’t like to rely on isolation or segregation.. I think if it’s safe, you 
do it.. if it’s not safe, or you have problems, you don’t do it.     And providing the 
technology is inherently safe, apart from that, the questions are ethical questions, 
they’re not questions for people like.. people like me  (Mr Blonde: 110-122) 
    197 
The hypothetical example provided illustrates the potential for strategic friction to occur in 
human error.  The account suggests that due to the inevitability of things going wrong in the 
segregation of GM and non-GM food, the risk is not worth taking when it comes to GM 
constructs that are designed for specific purposes that would have a detrimental effect if in 
the wrong context.  The interviewee states that the consideration of GM technology is the 
remit of ethics, not science, and distances the science of GM from the ethics.  In stating that 
ethical questions are not suitable for scientists, there is a suggestion that science is amoral 
(mirroring the instrumentalist framing of GM technology as an impartial tool), and that in 
conducting science, scientists are either unwilling, or unable, to step outside of an amoral 
frame of mind.  If unwilling, then this indicates power relations at play regarding the 
motivation to not engage with ethical questions; if unable, this indicates either a sense that 
scientific training is not capable of engaging with the ethical issues of GM technology, or it 
suggests a functional structural perspective of psychology, in which the minds of scientists 
are constructed alike and the minds of philosophers are constructed alike, and both sets of 
minds are constructed differently from the other and can neither transcend nor traverse the 
divide.  This view is in contrast to logics of equivalence and difference in PDT, in which 
groups are formed with more fluidity.  In PDT, neither a scientific issue nor an ethical issue 
would be the sole preserve of a particular group of like minded people, while simultaneously 
being entirely beyond the grasp of another.  Moreover, in PDT, a mind is not determined by a 
functionalist perspective, such that the issues that a mind can or cannot engage with are 
determined at birth, or become fixed at any other stage of life – indeed that a mind can 
engage with all issues, and only cannot engage due to a political, not biological, influence: a 
repression, not a limitation. 
6.2.2 External Friction 
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The official strategy of the case organisation states that: 
Risk refers to uncertainty of outcome, whether positive opportunity or negative 
threat, of actions and events. It is the combination of likelihood and impact, 
including perceived importance (Org-X on Risk: 35-37) 
The definition of risk above shares Clausewitz’s association of friction with uncertainty, or 
chance.  Clausewitz also describes an external source of friction as being the unpredictability 
of the environment, the fog of war.  The performance of this concept is illustrated in the 
account: 
Nature itself always has always had away of overcoming things, and always.. you 
know, ousting, kind of, man’s technology.. and I always think.. you know, always 
have caution as well, and always have.. actually, you know, have a plan B (Mr 
Yellow: 405-407) 
This account expresses a personal view on the place that GM technology has in context of a 
changing environment.  That nature ousts technology is an illustration of external friction in 
the Clausewitzian meaning; having a plan B, a contingency plan, is a strategy formed in 
relation to this view of external friction.  Elsewhere, the notion of external friction is 
illustrated regarding social sources: 
Mr Orange: it’s a combination of the red tape and the sort of aggro you might get 
from protestors, really… 
Me:  right.. so that.. that’s quite an obstacle… 
Mr Orange: …Oh yeah… of course it is, yeah… (Mr Orange: 319-322) 
More specifically to the organisation, friction is associated with regulatory red tape and with 
protest movements and demonstrations.  The data indicates that the concept of external 
friction is performed both in the meaning applied to the power of nature to undo human made 
plans, and in the meaning applied to protest groups and externally set regulations.  In short, 
one meaning applies to friction in the Real – changes in the constitutive outside, while the 
other meaning applies to friction in the Social, resistance in the social environment.  
Clausewitz describes action in war as being like moving through a resistant element (see 
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genealogy) – in the accounts of interviewees, the constitutive outside and the social 
environment are both sources of friction.  These forms of external friction will be analysed in 
more detail. 
Constitutive Outside and Contamination 
An example of how the constitutive outside can be a source of friction in the construction of 
GM crops can be seen in the data: 
Bits of plant will be left behind… and they have a good chance to regenerate.. and 
that’s really true, they will be there… we have some trial sites here, Miss Red 
might have talked to you about them, where we’ve had.. we’ve had GM trials, like 
oil seed rape..  and ten years on, oil seed rape is still coming through… and that’s.. 
that is GM possibly, yeah… so.. so there’s a legitimate concern that you would 
need to know in which parts of the land you actually have grown GM crops, and 
that there will be a history of those crops (Ms Grey: 3621-367) 
This account indicates that the ecological environment is not segregated from the practices of 
the organisation, namely experimentation with GM organisms.  That small pieces of plant 
matter survive and are recycled in soil means that, as the intention is that GM material should 
not survive in the fields after trials, their survival represents a form of friction.  The issue of 
‘contamination’ can be considered an example of friction associated with the constitutive 
outside, in that it is the non-social interaction between biological matter that is the root of the 
problem.  It is worth mentioning that the organisation has strategies to deal with this issue, by 
spraying surrounding fields, or establishing verges around GM field trials.   
Antagonism and Protests 
As a form of friction in the social environment, the organisation has seen protest groups 
come onto the site: 
It’s quite.. Fort Knox up there.. the actual cage, you know, to get in and out, it 
seems to be quite… costs the tax payer a lot of money, but they haven’t actually 
come on this year and had a.. had a wander around, at all, we’ve had no incursions 
(Ms Grey: 225-228) 
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A field trial being conducted at the time of visit is heavily guarded.  Aristophanes says that ‘it 
is from their foes, not their friends, that cities learn the lesson of building high walls’, which, 
in the case of this organisation, could be interpreted in context of PDT to represent the 
attitude of antagonism between the producers of GMOs and resistance movements.  Which is 
to say, the Schmittian friend-enemy distinction could be seen as performed in the 
construction of ‘Fort Knox’: built in response to events framed in militaristic language as 
‘incursions’, also illustrating the Clausewitzian influence in the strategy discourse; built in 
anticipation of future incursions, that did not take place, illustrating either an effective 
strategy of deterrence, or the fallibility strategy based on path dependence, due to the 
unpredictability of the social environment.  Regarding GM technology, the Political is 
expressed in the antagonism between the logics of equivalence and difference.  This 
antagonism is performed in the ‘incursions’, which are elaborated on in another account: 
They came in.. um, the middle of the night..  destroyed it, and then left again 
without leaving any trace.  So.. but even when protestors were..  were caught, were 
filmed, you know..  there were two kinds of strategies: either you go in in the 
middle of the night, do it, and then either claim responsibility or not, but at least 
then, the.. the damage is done, or you.. you take your own film crew, you tell 
everybody you’re doing it, and you create a big hurrah about doing it, and then the 
police are obviously there, and then there becomes a bit of a fight, everyone films 
it, and, you know.. it’s on the TV the next day.  So it depends what strategy the 
NGOs are using at that particular time (Mr White: 316-324) 
The account describes protestors in language that could be interpreted as framing them in 
terms of an elite guerrilla military unit, or perhaps as a cowardly sabotage ring, but mainly in 
a sense of antagonism and actions of war.  There is also an indication that counter strategies 
are designed by analysing the strategies of the ‘enemy’ consideration of enemy strategy, 
which can change.  The performance of antagonism also features in another account, 
regarding the motivation for the protests: 
People oppose the technology because, in a way, probably, I think, maybe, it is 
easier if you block the technology, then you don’t have a complication of looking 
into the different traits.. but… but it is… but the technology can be used for some 
very useful and good traits… so it is not rational to block the technology that could 
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enable, you should look into our research, but you really need to follow each 
particular case, independently as in separately, I think (Ms Blue: 473 478) 
The use of the term ‘blocking’ relates to antagonistic strategies (quote).  As does the non-
differentiation, the treating all GM products as homogenous – the logic of equivalence and 
difference is suggested here to be a blocking strategy, as GM is all equivalently different to 
the accepted form of food.  The blocking strategy of protest movements can be compared 
with the earlier discussion of instrumentalism, in which the official strategy states the desire 
that GM products will be judged for their characteristics, not the technology that constructed 
them.  These positions form an antagonistic pair; a dialectical position regarding the 
categorisation of GM food, and suggests that friction is associated with the antagonism, not 
determined to one side or the other.  A more agonistic evaluation of the protests is found in 
another account: 
One of the problems that you get in the debates between the two sides.. is.. is that, 
to be honest… both sides tend to be.. to be too black and white… the antis, sort 
of… find every possible reason why you.. why you might not want to grow GM, 
however.. however unlikely some of these things are, particularly some of the 
environmental aspects, I would say… but at the same time, some of the pro GM 
people, don’t.. I guess, they don’t want to.. to suggest that there might be any risk 
associated with them, so they tend to come out with rather bland statements saying 
there’s nothing.. intrinsically… well, there isn’t anything intrinsically unsafe about 
GM… but that’s not to say that you couldn’t create dangerous things with GM… 
but because of the way that the argument tends to be… any.. any slight… it’s the 
same with any.. in public argument… any sense that one side is conceding a little 
bit of territory, the other one leaps on it.. so.. so neither side are willing to give any 
round… you know.. it’s like any.. public argument…  and.. and quite often I listen 
to the pro GM arguments and think, well that’s not really true, or that’s over-stating 
the case slightly, I would say [laughs]… so… I’m sympathetic to both sides in a 
case… I use to collect for Greenpeace when I was a student… but… you know… 
but they did go.. they’ve sort of sold themselves down the river a bit with… with 
their antipathy to GM (Mr Orange: 799-915) 
The use of the term territory illustrates the divided discursive terrain, the two sides in the 
debate represent the logics of equivalence and difference – the two camps.  The statement 
that each side leaps on ground conceded by the other suggests the performance of a frontier, 
and implies a contest for discursive territory, for control of the discourse and the meaning 
attached to GM technology.  In this interpretation of the account, to fix the meaning of a 
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concept – in this case GM technology – is to have control of the discursive terrain – for the 
terrain to be one homogenised territory – in other words, to establish a discursive hegemony.  
The antagonism could then be seen as a contest between rival hegemonies-in-waiting, as each 
side blocks the other.  The interviewee considers this to be a problem – a form of friction – 
performed in the discursive strategies of each side, in which issues are under or over stated in 
order to gain political advantage.  The account is sympathetic to both sides, which could be 
considered an illustration of agonism. 
EU Regulation 
Another form of external friction arising from the social environment is that associated with 
external regulations to which the organisation is subject.  At the time of visit, the UK remains 
in the EU, and is subject to EU law, including GMO regulations: 
I’m just saying that the European system is very rigorous, and I think other systems 
are also very rigorous, but for us… for me, as a European citizen… my system is 
suffic–  I believe that it is sufficient enough for me to feel safe… that… you know, 
we are eating safe food (Ms Blue: 498-491) 
The system is considered to be scientifically rigorous and effective at maintaining safety and 
precautions against risk.  Applications for GM trials are judged by a committee in the 
organisation, regarding viability, and alignment with strategic interests.  If accepted, the 
applications are submitted to EU regulation procedures for review for permission to construct 
them.  If accepted, the application is then considered by politicians: 
The only one that’s ever been approved for cultivation.. happened before the system 
was put into place.. so one.. I wouldn’t say snuck through the system.. but one was 
approved for cultivation before EFSA was even formed.  There was a.. it was.. it 
was.. authorized by a different system that was before the.. the European Food 
Safety Authority was formed in.. in.. 2001.  But since then.. since 2001.. there 
hasn’t been any other approvals for cultivation in Europe.. and that’s not because 
EFSA hasn’t deemed them safe.. it’s because the political step hasn’t worked in a 
sense.. well, has worked, depending on how.. it’s.. it’s.. it’s not functional in the 
sense that it.. it.. it just sits on the dossier, it doesn’t decide on anything (Mr White: 
533-540) 
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Only one application has been approved for cultivation on EU soil, and this application pre-
existed the regulatory system that is in place, which further illustrates both that the process is 
rigorous, and the extent to which applications made by the organisation are restricted.  
However, the account evaluates the process in terms of functionalism and critiques the 
political aspect of the system.  The process is described as being slow, for halting the 
progress of applications, which relates to a motional conception of organisational practice.  
There is an indication of the performance of relative friction and relative functionalism – as 
opposed to the absolute functionalism and friction that the genealogy suggests is considered 
staple to the mainstream strategy discourse – in that, for the organisation, the political stage 
is dysfunctional, yet there is acknowledgement that it may be functional for those wanting to 
prevent GM crop proliferation.  More specifically, the source of friction is connected to the 
political processes that are part of the regulation procedure: 
Of the question is a political one, or an ethical one.. then someone should tell 
people, rather than pretend it’s a scientific one (Mr Blonde: 136-137) 
This the UK, we’ve voted 17 times ‘yes’..  Austria… is that Austria?..  that’s.. is 
that Austria?... some of them, you know.. they’ve..  voted 17.. 15 times ‘no’, on the 
same.. same dossiers...  and this is purely political.. Greece.. voted 15 times ‘no.’  
What’s this one here.. this is.. that’s Austria.. 18 times ‘no’ (Mr Blonde: 210-213) 
The influence of the Political is here seen at the level of international relations.  While the 
nations are referred to as single entities, the voting patterns are nonetheless representative of 
outcomes of systems of power in each of those countries, in which varying degrees of 
consent and dissent would likely be present in the background, missing from the final figures.  
The voting patterns within the EU framework are discussed as a form of friction in the 
interview accounts.  The EU system requires greater consensus to be established before Org-
X can carry out research that the strategy intends to be conducted, when this consensus is not 
reached, the regulations become an impediment for intended research in the organisation. 
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The concept of dissent was associated with the Political in the theoretical framework.  The 
ways in which dissent is illustrated in the data is analysed next, to analyse the power relations 
in the strategy discourse of the organisation, as a system of Politics for managing the 
Political. 
6.2.3 Dissent and the Emergence of the Political  
As with the official strategy, the following extract also uses a collective pronoun, indicating 
shared values and the potential for the subsumption of individual to group: 
We pride ourselves to say that we are the world’s oldest continuously running 
agricultural research station (Ms Blue – Tour: 68-69) 
A professional pride is also illustrated in the historical identity of the organisation.  
Clausewitz (2007: 144) argues that ‘it would be a serious mistake to underrate professional 
pride (esprit de corps) as something that may and must present in an army to greater or lesser 
degree’, and it would appear that the aspects of the organisational strategy are in agreement.  
The genealogy suggests that the rationale for this aspect of strategy is in large part to reduce 
dissent, viewed as frictional from the perspective of the organisational frame.  The theoretical 
framework argues that construction of shared values, of logics of equivalence, carries with it 
the repression of the Political.  In these ways, power relations can be seen in the construction 
strategy discourse. 
Dissent is a form of friction that we can analyse as being constructed and labelled by power 
relations in organisational structures.  The genealogy suggests that, in the mainstream 
strategy discourse, the term dissent is often taken to mean things such as unruly, or difficult, 
trouble, or insubordination; the negative connotation of dissent is something that has become 
associated with the term, but is not an intrinsic meaning.  Dissent is the opposite of consent, 
i.e., it means to disagree.  As disagreement, dissent necessarily refers to two or more 
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contrasting views.  The inclusion of a hierarchical meaning to the term is indicative of power 
relations involved in the definition of dissent – which means this time the attachment of 
‘dissent as subordination’ to one or more of the dissenting sides.  The side that is not 
dissenting is the side with power over the others; the side that is not dissenting is the side that 
displays this power in the act of successfully labelling contrasting views as forms of dissent, 
with the associated negative connotations.  This section analyses how dissent is defined and 
performed in the organisation, within the accounts of interviewees. 
Dissent and Power Relations 
The internal strategic communications states how, 
Reasonable debate on, and criticism of, research work are essential parts of the 
scientific process and an environment should be actively developed where such 
open debate is encouraged with due consideration to deadlines that may be 
externally applied.  In order to maintain the high standard expected of us, this 
approach of self-criticism applies not only to science but equally to other activities 
and professional jobs at Org-X. Some broader areas of misconduct related issues, 
including “whistle blowing” (Org-X on Misconduct and Whistleblowing, 2011: 36-
43).   
The official directives give some insight into what is considered acceptable as dissent, and 
what is not.  In this statement, the official strategy loosely defines a boundary between what 
is, and what is not, frictional dissent: ‘reasonable’ criticism is encouraged, while misconduct 
and whistleblowing are prohibited.  There is also an indication of synchronization to external 
deadlines, which would imply a direction of power relations in which the organisation is 
subject to an external – and possibly senior – level of authority.  In other words, the 
organisation distorts its timeframe to match that of the externally set deadline, indicating the 
direction of power toward the external influence – the organisational reference frame is not in 
the centre in this case. 
The official parameters of dissent are performed in the accounts of interviews, illustrating the 
power relations established by the strategy discourse in the organisation: 
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It’s not a bad thing to be critical as long as you are not destructive… being critical 
is good in some instances, it is in general as a practice it is helpful (Ms Blue: 363-
365) 
This statement is almost a paraphrasing of the official position, implying that the strategy 
discourse has been internalised to some extent by the interviewee.  Alternatively, perhaps the 
interviewee had a hand in the design of the official strategy.  In other words, the direction of 
influence is not fully clear and is open to some speculation.  In either case, the alignment 
between the official discourse and the interviewee’s statement suggests that there is a 
construction of meaning, regarding dissent, that is a shared value of what constitutes 
frictional dissent in the organisation.  In other accounts, there are illustrations of dissent that 
skirt more closely to the boundary: 
GM maize is grown widely in Southern Europe… you couldn’t grow it without the 
corn borer resistant trait… so it’s grown in Italy and South of France.. and probably 
in Greece, and used as animal fodder, and a lot of conventionally fed animals get 
that and most people will have eaten stuff that contains it, or has eaten stuff that 
contains it… and the public don’t seem to know, or need to know… the EU keeps it 
quiet but, I mean, it happens… and a lot of animal feed is imported from Brazil, 
and from the US, is GM… so the EU.. I mean the EU know… (Ms Red: 195-201) 
The biotech companies don’t.. don’t police themselves very well.. particularly some 
of the bigger American biotech companies… you don’t necessarily believe them 
when they say that such and such a thing is perfectly safe… [laughs]… (Mr 
Orange: 420-423) 
Both of these accounts indicate that there are ethical issues surrounding the production and 
consumption of GMOs that are not in the public discourse.  They illustrate the performance 
of dissent that may not be acceptable to the official definition of reasonable criticism, and 
represent manifestations of the Political.  Elsewhere, there is an example of dissent regarding 
structural changes in the wider organisational network: 
They closed down [Org-Y], and brought.. a proportion, probably about a third of 
the staff, back to here.. so.. I guess… not many of us were thrilled to be coming 
back to [Org-X]… but that was ten years ago, sort of, eleven years ago (Mr Orange: 
28-32) 
The relocation appears to have been unpopular, and detrimental to esprit de corps.  Changes 
of this type would be enacted by change agents, and therefore are associated with power 
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relations.  In the interview accounts, there are further indications of the performance of 
power relations, here regarding the management of dissent in the organisation: 
Mr Ochre: … because there are people at Org-X that are… you know, are not pro 
GM, perhaps they’re not anti GM, but they certainly not necessarily would be pro 
GM, so, yeah… 
Me: well, yeah, I suppose, just related to that… Is there any friction in the 
organisation, between people? 
Mr Ochre: Not that I’ve come across… either individually at like a coffee break, or 
more formally in a presentation… but I’m quite sure that people, you know, have 
reservations… 
Me: That’s interesting… ‘cause it applies to say Rothamsted, but also just to wider 
societal… phenomena… to what extent peoples personal values…  
Mr Ochre: … get subsumed into the institution… 
Me: yeah… and the balance between… ‘cause obviously individuals constitute, sort 
of, social structures… 
Mr Ochre: there’s what 400 people in this organisation?   Just statistically, some of 
them have got to be, but whether they express it… perhaps they feel that because 
they’re not directly involved in it, you know… it’s not… not their thing, I don’t 
know… 
Me: So that’s another area I’m interested in as well… 
Mr Ochre: yeah.. so that’d be if you can find those people to talk with in the 
institute, I guess that would be a real nugget, but there not going to… they’re not 
going to come and find you, I don’t think… 
Me: Yeah, well, I’m slightly careful abut who I approach, because when I first 
made contact with… with… Mr Y, he was very receptive to me coming down, and 
passed my conversation on to Mr White… so I had a good conversation with him… 
and then he sort of sent me a list of people who I could contact… so I don’t know if 
I go outside, whether I would start annoying… 
Mr Ochre: it’s probably… wise… if you want to keep everything on good terms, 
just to stick within that sort of remit, really, I think, to be honest… (Mr Ochre: 564-
588) 
There is an indication of the nexus between organisational discourse and the mind of the 
individual, and of the construction of shared values that can occur.  This could be interpreted 
as an illustration of the tension between the Political and the system of Politics that manages 
differences that emerge due to the Political.  This account suggests that there are some 
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individuals in the organisation who might not have a favourable perspective of GMOs.  To 
hold this position is a form of dissent that appears to be considered frictional when 
considering that they are not visible, and therefore presumably there is some discomfort in 
the expression of the Political in this case.  There is also a gentle suggestion that there might 
be repercussions if I were to try to speak to those with anti GM perspectives, and an 
indication that the interviewees have been selected may not represent a cross-section of the 
perspectives of organisational personnel.  Amongst the staff I am allowed to speak with, and 
who have agreed to speak with me, some of them are consciously aware of having to keep 
within a permitted range of discourse during the discussion: 
I think, we were.. we were kind of asked just to not engage with the.. you know, 
just to.. we were given a.. a line to, kind of.. you know, to say if people asked about 
it… (Mr Yellow: 321-322) 
‘Cause it’s quite difficult for a… as an employee, you know… Org-X has a stance 
on it, I have a stance on it, so… it’s difficult to… yeah (Mr Ochre: 560-561) 
That depends what it is… I have to be a bit careful what I say.. just in case I 
[laughs]..  upset my colleagues.. but yeah… I mean.. I don’t think I’ve said 
anything contentious, and I’m not… […] and I don’t think I’ve said anything 
specific.. I don’t think I’ve got anything particularly to complain about my 
colleagues… I might have been rude about Monsanto.. but.. I don’t really care 
about Monsanto… I don’t have anything to do with agri-chemical companies…  
(Ms Red: 551-558) 
I end up doing quite a lot of media and public understanding stuff.. I mean.. I’m one 
of the few spokespeople in the institute.. [looks over his left shoulder, sees me 
looking over too] I’m looking towards the director’s office, sorry [laughs] so I’m 
one of the few spokesmen in the institute where the director is happy to, you know.. 
have a journalist talk.. talk to, because.. you know..  (Mr White: 235-239) 
These accounts indicate organisational strategy regulates discourse with the outside.  The 
accounts also illustrate the performance of a system of Politics to manage the Political, and 
possibly moments in which the Political is checked by the system of Politics by the 
individual themselves.  This would indicate the internalization of power relations and of the 
system of Politics by individuals.  Staff are expected not to court controversy by expressing 
their own opinion.  At the same time, internally to the organisation, staff are encouraged to 
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voice constructive criticism.  Either way, the discourse is a domain of strategy.  Here we see 
strategy as system of Politics, as a system of organisation to manage differences due to the 
Political.  The guidelines communicated in the official strategy might be argued to be 
discursive practices, rules regarding what statements are permitted to be constructed. 
The same applies with external regulation.  One particular interviewee describes their 
frustration with the EU regulatory system, and how they aim to circumvent it and conduct 
field trials in other areas of the world: 
Ms Grey: for me, personally, if I’m going to do.. as I’m trying to do a.. a GM 
solution for a particular.. disease problem in.. in wheat, that effects the floral tissue 
and therefore goes into the grain.. I’m.. I’m now only gonna do it with 
collaborations in Brazil and China.. and I’m only gonna plan to launch in either 
Brazil or China..  I’m not even gonna attempt to do the field trials here in Europe 
[…] I won’t bother, it would take so long… and if I get it and it works out there, it 
can go commercialisation.. into.. into production straight away.. so I.. so that’s my 
own personal strategy.. other people on site don’t agree with me to do that… but, 
as I said, I want to actually.. get it out there.. I’ve tried once before, had a field 
trial.. and it all got caught up in red tape, so.. you know.. so this time I’m actually, if 
I’m going to do, I’m going to just overseas and do it that way…  
Me: … do you find that there are frictions like that with other.. with.. with other 
areas of Rothamsted, as a whole…organisation..? 
Ms Grey: Well, it’s interesting to note…  I mean.. because we’re such a wide site… 
I mean.. I’ve got.. I’m..  I’ve got colleagues on site who are very anti GM, in the 
ecology groups...   (Ms Grey: 810-819) 
Ms Grey’s argument can be interpreted as perceiving the EU regulation as a form of external 
friction: external regulation to reduce risk is here associated as an additional form of 
procedural friction.   There is also further evidence of friction within the organisation, which 
supports the account discussed above regarding power relations and shared values.  As a 
form of personal strategy that deviates from the official position, and also from the position 
of colleagues, this account illustrates a form of strategy as dissent, a strategy that is the 
expression of the Political, a strategy that is a personal adaptation to the frictional situation. 
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The concept of friction is performed in the strategy discourse of Org-X and in the accounts of 
interviewees.  With Britain having voted to leave the EU, it is worth considering the potential 
changes to the regulation process that may occur.  Arguably, a lessening of regulation 
stringency is a potential consequence.  The interview discourse does not engage with this 
topic as the data was generated almost two years before the 2016 referendum. 
As an organisational strategy for managing the Political, the official definition of dissent is 
part of a system of Politics.  Dissent, in the manifestation of the Political, is allowed as 
reasonable and constructive criticism, and may change the system of Politics.  To do so 
would mean changing the meaning of dissent, altering the boundary between what is and 
what is not frictional.  In the evaluation of what constitutes frictional dissent, systems of 
Politics (organisational strategies) might be antagonistic and seek to fix the definitional 
boundary, or agonistic and facilitate reinterpretation of the definition.  With the theoretical 
framework, a fixed boundary between frictional and non-frictional dissent can be thought of 
as a frontier, as an antagonism, frozen in time; while a reinterpretable boundary can be 
thought of as an agonistic and dynamic synthesis.  How this distinction is performed in the 
strategy discourse of Org-X is turned to next, in context of the concept of adaptation. 
6.3 | Adaptation 
The genealogy traced the concept of strategic renewal to that of Darwinian evolution, with a 
Schmittian and Hobbesian – an antagonistic – interpretation of evolution.  This section traces 
the ways in which the concept of adaptation is performed in the accounts of interviewees.  
Additionally, the manifestations of the Political, thus far traced mainly in terms of friction, 
are here analysed in terms of innovation, with regard to more agonistic notions of strategy 
illustrated in the data.  As more agonistic instances of strategy allow for the expression of the 
Political, the connection is made that innovation is related to the expression of the Political.  
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By extension, the capacity for adaptation by an organisation is associated with the 
illustrations of the Political within the accounts of interviewees.  In short, the capacity for 
innovation and adaptation within the organisation is traced in the data to the instances of 
agonistic strategy that allow for the Political to be expressed. 
6.3.1 | Strategic and Practical Adaptation  
The genealogy suggests that the concept of inertia is set in opposition to adaptation, 
representing non-change and change respectively.  It would follow then, that this relation 
applies to each of the forms of inertia identified in the literature review.   
The genealogy suggests that inertia and adaptation represent a manifestation of the Political: 
each concept has been associated with strength and resilience when confronted with 
environmental shifts.  Examples of strategic inertia deliberately performed as a form of 
strength, were discussed earlier in the chapter, here adaptation is also described as a strength: 
Our strength lies in our ability to move with the times and embrace the evolving 
scientific challenges through creativity and ingenuity (Org-X Strategy: 4) 
In a PDT analysis, the association of either renewal and/or inertia with strength indicates 
strength is a trait, or characteristic, that is being determined toward inertia and/or adaptation 
in the strategy discourse – this construction of meaning is suggestive of a discursive frame 
that includes articulatory practises of functionalism.  Arguably, to approach strategy as either 
inertial or adaptational would be too reductive an approach for analysing this organisational 
strategy: it is clearly a combination of both: 
What do we need by the strategic funding, would mean that every five years we 
would develop a research strategy (Ms Blue – Tour: 100-101) 
The review did indicate that there are proponents of a mixed approach, and it would seem 
that the case organisation does.  The renewal of the strategy every five years is an indication 
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of a compromise between inertia and renewal, which could be considered an illustration of 
agonism in the strategy.  As the strategy is designed with regard to a changing environment, 
the agonistic strategy could be interpreted as being designed with regard to the constitutive 
outside.   
Practical renewal or adaptation refers to a change in the routines of the organisation.  The 
most prevalent theme of the data is the development of new technologies for genetic 
modification.  Illustrations of practical inertia have been discussed, which can be considered 
in juxtaposition with the performance of practical renewal analysed in this section.  The 
official strategy states: 
We need new ways of working to speed up innovation (Org-X International 
Strategy: 19) 
which, in context of practical renewal, can be interpreted as suggesting the importance of 
innovating organisational practices to increase the rate of innovation of products (and another 
implicit performance of the concept of inertia, in the concept of non-inertia: change in 
speed).  The connection between GM practices and innovation is echoed in the accounts, for 
instance: 
GM technology creates jobs, it provides solutions, it drives innovation (Mr Green: 
414) 
The connection between innovation and GM technology that is made in this statement is 
itself also given meaning, such that innovative practices are associated with the creation of 
jobs, indicating an economic frame once more.  For example, a significant recent innovation 
in GM practice is the advent of a technique known as CRISPR-Cas9. 
Adaptation in research practices has also taken place in response to the friction of protest 
groups and political obstacles.  Through a PDT lens, the development of new GM techniques 
indicates an organisational strategy to reframe the meaning of GM technology by 
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constructing new forms of GM products, thus dislocating the term GM from the ‘first 
generation’ of GM crops.  This same strategy also has implications for the regulation of GM 
research and products: 
It’s just the words [of Genetic Modification]’ that frighten people (Ms Red: 455) 
Some of the newer techniques now, that involved what you would call genetic 
modification, leave no trace in the plant genome, or bacterial genome… there are 
now methods where if you want to delete a gene that perhaps reduces the quality of 
something […] there’s a way of doing it very precisely that leave no trace, but it’s 
genetic modification method, it’s just […] you can’t detect it… and then there’s a 
philosophical question, ‘is that genetically modified by law?’.. Yes it is, because it 
involves a procedure that can only be done with In Vitro technology, but what you 
end up with is nature-identical to something that you might have found by chance, 
but is precise […] you’ve removed something… so I think it’s been moved on a bit 
now, and the methods have certainly become much more sophisticated (Ms Red: 
212-221) 
I’ve become aware of synthetic biologists trying to get round ‘nasty genetic 
modification’, by inventing a new area which is exactly the same, but is called 
synthetic biology, where you put together units of DNA to make new 
constructs…and they said.. they’re mostly engineers that do that.. and they say… 
‘but we’re synthetic biologists, we’re not those nasty genetic modifiers’…. and they 
thing the public won’t know… but the public will probably find synthetic biology 
even worse… (Ms Red: 455-460) 
Techniques that sort of border on the idea of GM, but are not currently considered 
to be GM (Mr Orange: 90-91) 
Arguably, the reframing of GMOs toward nutrition and quality has become possible due to 
the advent of new methods of manipulation.  Moreover, there is a semantic caveat over what 
is legally considered to be ‘GM’ that is being utilised by aspects of the organisational 
strategy and some staff. 
6.3.2 | Darwin and Adaptation 
Within the official strategy discourse, there are illustrations of how the concept of evolution 
is performed, for instance: 
Our International strategy is evolving but will be built around these broad principles 
(Org-X International Strategy) 
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Which indicates that the concept of evolution is important to the strategy itself, the strategy 
evolves.  Darwin’s work argues that evolution is an environmentally driven phenomena, 
there is an explicit reference to the influence that environmental evolution has on an 
organisation, and how the strategy is designed in context of this: 
A feature of this Strategy is that it is designed to be flexible to meet the demands of 
the rapidly evolving scientific environment that surrounds it (Org-X Strategy: 4) 
This statement also describes rapidity of change, which is an illustration of the conceptual 
context of motion through time – which calls back to the Newtonian concept of inertia, a 
flipbook notion of time that can be flipped faster or slower, but nonetheless is treated as 
simultaneous.  An example of an environmental shift is provided in the following account: 
In 2011, when the human genome was first sequenced – the human genome is 
about three thousand million of these letters, A, T, C, Gs, you know.. in various 
different.. sections – it cost 100 million US [$] to.. to sequence all of those 3,000 
million sequences.. so 100 million.. you.. you can now have your sequence, your 
sequence.. your genome sequence, for abut 4 or 5 thousand pounds […] so it’s.. 
it’s.. a very.. it’s a massive change (Mr White: 137-143) 
This account describes the drop in cost of sequencing a genome, which we can assume has 
had a major impact on the strategy of the organisation.  For instance, research costs would 
have dropped in tandem, allowing for more extensive and ambitious research design.  On the 
other hand, private companies might be able to start doing similar work, introducing an 
increasing competition.  Competitive advantage is a concept in strategy discourse that the 
genealogy traces back to economic theory and an interpretation of evolution.   
Competition and Collaboration  
Darwin focuses on environmentally driven selection pressure, Schmitt focuses on politically 
driven selection pressure.  The genealogy suggests that there is a Schmittian interpretation of 
evolution and competition in the mainstream strategy discourse that associates antagonism 
with innovation: 
    215 
With the advent of.. of nuclear power.. […] you can use ionising radiations.. or.. or 
fast atom bombardment, things like that… but a lot of that is based around, sort of, 
nuclear chemistry (Mr Orange: 93-103) 
Just after the Second World War… when some dwarfing genes were brought in 
from Japan… as, sort of, spoils of war… they originated in Korea… (Mr Orange: 
68-70) 
Both these accounts associate innovations in GM research with the Second World War, 
which, in a more ironic statement, are described as ‘spoils of war’.  While the interviewee is 
uncomfortable with the connection, the account nonetheless indicates a Schmittian 
perspective that innovation is associated with antagonism.  In context of the theoretical 
framework, it might be suggested that innovation is associated with friction – the association 
between friction and antagonism is not synonymous, leaving space for agonistic 
opportunities for innovation, arising from friction associated with emergences of the Political 
within an organisational system of Politics.  Moreover, the Hobbesian philosophy of 
evolution being a war of all against all is also performed in the accounts.  More specifically, 
associated with the mindset of plant breeders: 
The plant breeders have a continuing programme anyway of improving things.. as I 
said, I think they have to because of a constant war with things like pests, you 
know, fungi and weeds, and insects… that become resistant to chemicals so you 
can’t use them anymore, so they become more of a problem.. and you have to pick 
a variety that’s more resistant to them and it kind of goes on like that… (Ms Red: 
297-301) 
A constant war between pests and hosts is the Hobbesian perspective of evolution – this is 
also the context in which the CRISPR-Cas9 technique is based.  CRISPR-Cas9 is an ancient 
biological defence mechanism that organisms have developed to repel viral incursions.  The 
process involves the organisms retaining copies of viral DNA (in an archive known as 
CRISPR) which are then used to identify attacks in future, nullifying the viral threat by 
cutting out the viral DNA from the DNA of the organism (performed by a specific protein 
known as Cas9).  GM research has found that Cas9 can be manipulated so as to edit DNA 
sequences according to the desires of the researchers (i.e., not simply viral DNA checks) with 
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hitherto impossible precision.  The biological ‘antivirus programme’ has been co-opted for 
the purposes of genetic modification.  If we follow the Hobbesian organism versus virus 
conditions of life on Earth, then perhaps we could say that Schmittian antagonism is the 
equivalent of civil war between organisms, and in no way an ancient evolutionary truth.  
With the new possibilities that CRISPS-Cas9 offers to GM, one might hope that Schmittian 
antagonism between (multi-cellular) organisms does not lead to the militarisation of crops so 
as to gain competitive advantage, or to continue the strategy of mutual deterrence.  This 
suggests that the concepts of strategic discourse filter down to ‘product design’. 
Part of the meaning of evolution, as constructed in an economic strategy frame, associates 
competitive advantage with uniqueness: known in business discourse as a unique selling 
point (USP).  The accounts reflect the performance of this concept in the strategy discourse 
of the organisation: 
There is two things [sic] that distinguished Org- X, so..so  from other organisations.  
So this is where, no matter how many innovations that there are, it is the classical 
experiments.. [unclear] so this is not now the complete amount of land that we have 
(Ms Blue – Tour: 431-434) 
Other organisations are identified as performing comparable research, and therefore as a 
form of competitor, for instance: 
You have the GISC in.. in Norwich […] there are other places that do […] research 
like.. like Org-X’s.. we’re not unique, so.. GISC will be our, kind of, competitor 
[…] it’s kind of, friendly competiveness.. gee each other on, as it were (Mr Yellow: 
459-462) 
The description of a friendly competitiveness with other research organisations could be 
interpreted as an example of agonistic strategy, with competing organisations not seeking to 
destroy or dominate each other.  The official strategy states that the organisation collaborates 
with over 50 countries (Org-X International Strategy: 15).  Within accounts of collaborative 
projects, there is also an illustration of a logic of equivalence between organisations: 
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We also have different collaborations as well – that there are more strategic 
alliances.. for one, Syngenta, who we have worked with for a few years (Mis Blue – 
Tour: 124-125) 
Some of these collaborations are referred to as strategic alliances, which the review of the 
literature suggests is an area of burgeoning interest for applications of PDT.  The data also 
illustrates associations with commercial organisations: 
We did try.. we did try to play it both ways there a bit, as in Org-X, in the sense 
that.. we were saying that “this has nothing to do with big business, this is just us, 
we haven’t patented this”… mainly.. mainly ‘cause we couldn’t, because it had 
been patented already by somebody else [laughs] but “we haven’t patented this, and 
we’re not.. we’re not sponsored by some big-agritech company.. we’re just.. we’re 
just doing it for public good”… and that.. and that message came across quite well.. 
but, of course, we were doing other things, as well, in parallel, with the big agritech 
companies… but we weren’t putting those in the field on that day… so… (Mr 
Orange: 403-411) 
The account above also indicates a discursive strategy to construct a frame of meaning for 
organisational practices, which underplays the association with commercial projects.  This 
move could be considered a form of strategic adaptation to the friction either experienced of 
expected with regard to commercial collaboration.  That this is a strategy at odds with the 
emphasis on transparency in the official strategy discourse, this account also illustrates the 
manifestation of the Political, a breaking away from the official stance. 
The concept of competitive advantage is performed in the discourse in the manner with 
which the organisation presents its relative strengths, and in the interaction with other 
organisations.  The genealogy suggests that it is as the concept of innovation that adaptation 
has become framed in the strategy discourse.  Moreover, that in mainstream strategy 
discourse, innovation is framed as a means to gain competitive advantage: the 
advantageousness of adaptation. 
Innovation Strategy and Patenting 
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The accounts illustrate how the concept of innovation is performed, organisation makes 
money via innovation: 
The main output of the group is research papers. We don’t tend to make money in 
other ways (Mr White: 91-92) 
We say “we are a publicly funded organisation, we are doing research, we do have 
intellectual property for some of these things, and the reason that we have that is to 
protect this… knowledge” (Ms Blue: 308-310) 
This strategy indicates that innovation is framed within an economic meaning in the strategic 
discourse.  The data suggests that the concept of innovation and patenting – intellectual 
property – is a major strategic theme.  Money is made from research papers by a strategy of 
patenting, which the discourse justifies on the basis that knowledge requires protecting, so as 
to be able to return money to the taxpayer.  In addition to public money, a significant portion 
of the money of the organisation comes from funding and grants, which is competed for with 
other organisations (Ms Blue – Tour: 110-111), performing the concept of competitive 
advantage in the design of strategy.  In the accounts, there is a prevalent directive for 
flexibility, with the purpose of better engagement with the needs of the agricultural industry 
as a means of gaining funding: 
There is an aim, and they’ve decided to make the work more.. important, so that it 
translates, or can be applied..  and so by involving industry you’re.. you have a 
better understanding of the needs of the industry (Ms Blue – Tour: 121-123) 
A strategic ‘aim’ is another target and motion based analogy.  There is some autonomy for 
innovation, but this is tempered by the need for funding, and the strategic directive to gain 
funding via targeting the needs of industry and commercial opportunities.  The data 
illustrates the performance of the concept of adaptation in the strategy discourse: Strategy 
adapts but this is geared toward funding.  While Org-X emphasises its status as a publicly 
funded charity, the strategy of innovation and patenting is nonetheless subsumed into the 
economic frame of competition. 
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The data suggests that the economic frame of adaptation becomes the frame through which 
the meaning of GM technology and GM products are conceptualised and constructed: 
The problem is when… where we’re… we’re persuaded that we have to get 
industrial involvement or otherwise we’re not doing our job, and therefore, having 
got industrial involvement, the industry wants something out of it, and therefore 
you have to produce a product, whether it’s.. whether it’s the right product or not.. 
(Mr Orange: 851-855) 
Moreover, the account illustrates the performance of dissent, and indicates that the 
commercial aspect of the official strategy has a reductive influence on the scope for 
innovation.  There is also a suggestion of the power relations involved in the concept of 
innovation in the strategy discourse, with a hint of change agents defining innovation as 
requiring an association with industrial needs.  In this account, innovation is explicitly 
associated with strategic design, as opposed to a more exploratory approach: 
Well, I’m not sure we do blue skies research anymore…that much… I mean, I 
mean you’d probably call it strategic… I mean, blue sky is more where you do 
something because it’s interesting… not because you think it’ll.. it’ll actually have 
any positive… […] yeah… well that’s what we used to do… that’s the way, I think 
science used to be done… well, I’m not sure that’s true…. I mean, most ma –.. a lot 
of important scientific breakthroughs are made by people who weren’t looking for 
that at all… so that the idea that you can actually target areas of science to actually 
produce the breakthroughs that you need is a bit optimistic… but on the other 
hand… most science over the.. over the last two centuries, have.. the main aim is to 
make money… [laughs] … you know, otherwise nobody would pay for it in the 
end… (Mr Orange: 859-869) 
The association of blue skies research as being something that is done because it’s interesting 
arguably associates blue skies research with the Political.  That is to say, strategic research is 
defined in opposition to blue skies; and if blue skies research is motivated by personal 
interest, then strategic research is not.  In the context of the account, strategic research is 
associated with organisationally designed research – the organisational strategy – and not 
with personal strategy, for this reason, the account illustrates the power relations involved in 
innovation and the tension between organisational strategy and personal motivation and 
interests.  In short, the account illustrates the tension between the Political, and Politics (as a 
system of organisation for managing differences that emerge due to the Political.  In this 
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case, differences associated with the Political are personal research interests.  The system of 
Politics (organisational strategy) manages the Political by subsuming it into strategic 
research design.  To what extent the Political is allowed to manifest itself is looked at in due 
course.   
The account associates strategic research with the aim of making money – an economically-
derived goal – and therefore suggests that it is motivated by the interest of making money.  
Moreover, that as this money is external, the strategic research is motivated by capturing the 
interest of external sources of money.  In which case, the design of research is twice removed 
from the personal interests of the Political – at one level by the organisational strategy, and 
on another by the external motivations that the organisational strategy is trying to gain the 
interest of. 
Arguably, the data implies that strategic research, motivated by the production of wealth, 
limits the scope of GMO design, and influences the goals of the strategy by requiring that a) 
financial income be part of the strategy, and b) that commercially viable designs be 
prioritised, in keeping with a.  On both counts, this could be considered frictional in relation 
to the mission statement that emphasises agricultural innovation.  In other words, while the 
finance enables, it also limits and distorts, the strategic objective of the organisation.  The 
data suggests that the organisational strategy discourse frames GM technology within an 
economic context, and emphasises the competitive perspective that the economic frame has 
become imbued with.  In this way, economics could be about to have a more direct influence 
on the environment than ever before. 
6.3.3 | Innovation and Agonism: the manifestation of the Political 
The official strategy makes it clear that, 
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Any invention is often the culmination of many years of funding by more than one 
agency rather than a discrete event (Org-X on IP: 18-19)  
Like Foucault, the strategy also rejects the notion of an autonomous inventor.  In context of 
the PDT frame of this thesis, this is an interesting definition that does not associate 
innovation with a moment.  It is a definition that is reminiscent of Foucault: 'the field of 
statements is not a group of inert areas broken up by fecund moments’ (2002: 161).  As 
discussed in the section on inertia, the strategic frame reproduces the concept of the absolute 
through the concept of simultaneity, which means that the concept of absolute time (and 
absolute space) are part of the logic of the strategic frame.  In which case, Foucault’s 
proposition of diachronous time is incongruous with the inertial reference frame of the 
strategy discourse.  Therefore, the shared consideration (or rejection) of innovative moments 
– of Eureka moments.   Nonetheless, there is no evidence that innovation is not a eureka 
moment for an individual – the extent to which such a eureka moment contributes to an 
innovation is arguably immeasurable. 
The Political in Innovation 
Innovations are traced back to the personal experience of staff (the Political), and to the 
constitutive outside by extension.  Beginning with the influence of the Political associated 
with change agents on the remit for innovation, then the innovations associated with staff 
subject to change agents.  The data of organisational structure suggests that change agents 
design ISP targets.  Clausewitz (2007: 105) argues that, 
No matter how superbly a great commander operates, there is always a subjective 
element in his work.  If he displays a certain style, it will in large part reflect his 
own personality; but that will not always blend with the personality of the man who 
copies that style.   
This extract indicates the potential influence of the change agent’s personal interests, 
associated with the Political, and the frictions that may occur in the implementation of the 
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system of Politics that are partly derived from the Political of the change agent.  This section 
analyses the manifestations of the Political and the association between this emergence and 
the development of innovation in the organisation. 
There are at least three identifiable change agents among the interviewees, the accounts of 
each illustrate their personal interests and how they align with organisational interests: 
I’m interested in how things work (Mr Blonde: 94) 
This statement suggests an interest in functionalism, but only within context of genetic 
research: 
All my work with GM has been looking at traits, has been trying to understand how 
things work (Mr Blonde: 76-77) 
Mr Blonde now specialises in wheat transformations, particularly dietary fibre, and now 
leads a group.  Another group leader is Mr White, who specialises in genetic transformations 
and is a prominent leader of an ISP strategy.  Like Mr Blonde, the accounts suggest that Mr 
White also has a personal interest in the functionalist interpretation of genetics:  
I had one of these moments where I thought […] I wanna do this as a career, this is 
so exciting.. you know.. the ability to understand what DNA – what genes are – at 
the.. at the molecular level, at the ATGC, you know.. the code that forms the DNA 
(Mr White: 52-54) 
It’s a very compelling experiment to test gene function (Mr White: 160) 
Also like Mr Blonde, Mr White is an official change agent and has influence on the strategic 
direction of a group of people within the organisation.  The third identifiable change agent is 
Ms Grey.  Like Mr Blonde and Mr White, Miss Grey is an official change agent and has 
influence on the strategic direction of a group of people within the organisation: 
Gradually over the first couple of years I then focused it down so that we were 
primarily going to be working on fungi diseases, only on wheat, because that’s the 
main crop species […] in the Southern part of the country (Ms Grey: 78-81) 
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Ms Grey has background experience of commercial agriculture, and suggests a more 
commercial/market frame of reference than many of the academics I have spoken with: 
Unlike some of the other academics, I’m actually directly from industry (Ms Grey: 
23-26)  
In quite a number of those projects, and particularly since 1990, I’ve been working 
directly with transgenic plants… making transgenic plants, analysing transgenic 
plants… and from 1998, I’ve been also making transgenic fungi […] and mixing 
two or three transgenic organisms together (Ms Grey: 38-41) 
The data indicates that the direction of projects is often closely related to the interests of the 
lead scientist, who arguably represents a change agent.  The data on organisational structure 
also suggests that there is a connection between the expertise and personal interest of a 
change agent and the direction taken for a strategic theme – the change agent has been 
chosen for the position on the basis of their relevant expertise, they then draw on their 
experience and personal interests while running the project.  The ISP structure means that 
subjects of the strategy are, as part of this relation, also subject to the personal interests of 
change agents.  This relationship is illustrated in the accounts, for instance: 
My boss, Mr. Blonde […] he’s very much into dietary (Mr Yellow: 83-84); ‘cause 
he’s also based, you know, in Reading […] so, we’re all kind of involved, to some 
extent, to […] the work.. with arabinoxylan dietary fibre.. biofuels… (Mr Yellow: 
113-129) 
In this way, change agents have an asymmetric influence on the strategic direction of a group 
of people within the organisation.  In terms of PDT, this means he has asymmetric influence 
on the frame in which the group conceptualises and constructs GM events – this may be 
suggested within the data associated with staff members that are part of the group.  Whether 
this influence is wielded of not is an important aspect of the role, nonetheless, the role exists 
because of the structural strategy.  However, to return to Clausewitz again on this issue: 
It would be neither possible nor correct to eliminate subjective routine or personal 
style entirely from the conduct of war.  They should be seen, rather, as 
manifestations of the influence exerted on individual phenomena by the total 
character of the war – an influence which, if it has not been foreseen and allowed 
for by accepted theory, may find no other means of expression (2007: 105-106). 
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This extract is interpretable as an illustration of the manifestation of the Political, in context 
of the constitutive outside, and advocates a strategic approach that allows for the emergence 
of personal interpretations – of the Political.  In context of the discussion on the definition of 
friction, arguably mainstream discourse has omitted this caveat in Clausewitzian military 
theory.  Arguably, Clausewitz takes a more nuanced approach to the Political than the 
Schmittian approach that the literature review and genealogy suggest is the norm in 
mainstream organisational strategy. 
Having looked at how the Political is present in the personal interests of change agents, and 
manifest in their interpretation of the remit of IPSs that they lead, power relations are 
illustrated between different emergence of the Political.  This section concludes by analysing 
how emergences of innovation can be traced to the manifestations of the Political among 
staff subject to ISP defined strategic targets. 
Mr Orange has a specific interest in hormone signalling, and experience with the model plant 
for cereal transformation: 
I got myself moved into Longashton, where I could work on something a bit more 
interesting to me, which was hormone signalling’, and while there ‘worked on 
hormone signalling and hormone biosynthesis in arabidopsis and wheat […] from 
89 to 2003 (Mr Orange: 25-29). 
At Org-X, this knowledge is being applied to the ‘20-20 wheat’ ISP, for instance, ‘we tried to 
reduce gibberellin levels, later on in seed development, and we […] found that that.. 
improved preharvest sprouting’ (Mr Orange: 312-314), also in work on shortening wheat.  
Some innovations have also developed from his side projects: 
The E-beta farnesene trial… yeah… in the last couple of years… so I was involved 
in the early stages of that, because we did the original work in arabidopsis which 
showed that it was feasible… but, we decided that it wasn’t really… I mean, it was 
just a side line of wheat we were doing… and we.. we decided that we wouldn’t 
pursue putting it into wheat.. and we let somebody else do that (Mr Orange: 324-
328) 
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Mr Yellow’s background in grain quality genetics is clearly contributing to current strategic 
practice and innovation within the strategic objectives: 
I suppose I’ve always had a interest.. and kind of training.. in kind of, making GM 
[…] technology in plants (Mr Yellow: 12—13) 
I’ve been involved in many projects..  throughout my, kind of, career, based.. more 
or less based on GM.  So.. basically then, looking at kind of genetically-modified.. 
for end use products.. so looking at genes involved in grain quality.. and how by 
altering.. by expressing or knocking-down.. can we actually better understand the 
mechanisms behind.. such as that of pre-harvest sprouting, which I was involved 
with (Mr Yellow: 20-24) 
The emphasis on grain quality is in line with his expertise, as is the more generally focus of 
GM end products. 
During his post-doctoral research, conducted at the case organisation, Mr. Pink had what 
might be called a Eureka moment, which is also an illustration of the Political: 
What struck me in that research, was that.. you often think about how important 
photosynthesis is for growth, but..  under low temperature, sugars accumulated 
indicating that photosynthesis is not that prohibited, under growth, it’s the growth 
processes themselves, that use the sugar, that are inhibited (Mr Pink: 42-48) 
This specific interest of Mr Pink has contributed to innovation within the GM program at 
Org-X, in which drought resistant crops have been designed and constructed: 
Thinking about other ways of improving drought tolerance, which is what I’m 
doing at the moment (Mr Pink: 120-121). 
Should be coming out in Nature Biotechnology, which is quite a high impact 
journal (Mr Pink: 511-512) 
This work will be published, hopefully, very soon, and I think […] will have quite a 
big impact (Mr Pink: 72-73) 
Innovations in drought resistant crops can be traced to Mr Pink’s background experience 
having had an influence on the current interpretation of his set task, in other words, Mr 
Pink’s personal interpretation of the constitutive outside: the Political.  Another example of 
personal interest and the Political leading to innovation is found in the accounts of Miss Red: 
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I discovered bacterial genetics and that’s what I decided I wanted to do… 
absolutely fascinating (Ms Red: 9-10) 
The longstanding interest in bacteria and microbiology ‘explains my involvement with GM 
and my own experience’ (Ms Red: 92-96).  Judging by the data, and not a specific comment 
on the matter, it is arguable that this interest of Miss Red has been siphoned into a remit for 
bacteria to ‘do useful things’ (Ms Red: 75-61), which would suggest that the personal interest 
has been subjected to the strategic frame of reference, with an emphasis on utility, which the 
archaeology suggests is derived from a reproduced notion of the absolute, of economic 
advantage, and of functionalism.  Ms Red’s research continues to provide innovation, for 
instance regarding: 
What we’ve found is that.. the archaea seem to be in large numbers in most of our 
soils, most of the time.. whereas the bacteria, that do the same job of oxidising 
ammonia to nitrate, seem to grow up in response to nitrate fertilizer… now, this 
process is important because ammonia is not very mobile in soil.. but it’s not so 
available for plants.. nitrate.. it gets the plants, they take it up, but it also gets 
washed out of soil if it rains and.. it’s the substrate for being lost as nitrous oxide.. 
so this cycle is very important, and I think what we’ve found is that the archaea are 
sort of chugging along slowly all the time with quite low levels of ammonia, but if 
you add a lot the bacteria are the ones doing it.. so looking at this dual, sort of, 
activity, and I think that this is, sort of, quite new… this is absolutely nothing to do 
with GM, and it never [laughs] will be, I think… but this is.. this is the 
environmental microbiology that we do.. that I’m doing… and I think it’s really 
interesting (Ms Red: 386-397).   
An example of Mr Green’s innovative approaches to solving the problems in his PhD 
research is that, 
One of the first things was, well maybe we should stop targeting the tissues that we 
normally do – cos it clearly hasn’t worked, up til now, maybe we should try 
something different.. so I spent a year, or a year and a half – even two years – 
trying to find new tissue which has chloroplasts in it.. that can be regenerated into a 
whole new wheat plant – which I have done..  so at least that’s something new, and 
novel, and can be published..  but then, the step from taking that to showing that 
you can transform them, is a huge other step (Mr Green: 69-75) 
This innovation is arguably derived from the Political, from the personal interest and 
experience of Mr Green: 
To be fair I was more interested in biotech.  I’ve always been interested in biotech 
(Mr Green: 4-7) 
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I mean, I’ve come here to do chloroplast transformation, and there’s nobody here 
who does chloroplast transformation.. so there’s no guidance, and it’s literally 
been…   me…   just figuring things out for myself (Mr Green: 50-54) 
That the responsibility for innovation can be placed at the door of a PhD student, arguably 
seen as an investment in the future staff of the organisation.  This is also an illustration of the 
performance of the official strategy, that everyone is responsible for innovation.  In the 
account of Mr Green, GM is framed in context of a wider perspective, one that associates 
people’s minds with a capacity for innovation and exploration: 
The whole GM stuff.. about creating jobs, and innovation, and giving things for 
peoples brains to do – cos, you know, we’re a very exploratory people, if you don’t 
get this sort of stuff to people, it’s a waste – it’s also about jobs, letting people 
create.. in an environment that’s conducive to it  (Mr Green: 571-574) 
Moreover, this is an example of an agonistic approach to strategy an environment conducive 
to manifestations of the Political. 
Responsibility for innovation depends on department structure, but overall strategy is set by 
directors.   In many cases, there is a close alignment between organisational strategy remit 
for innovation, and creative interests of staff.  This alignment suggests a specific recruitment 
policy and that the composition of projects deliberately try to align personal interests of staff 
with the strategic goals of the groups they are a part of.  There is a recurring suggestion of a 
functional structuralist perspective of society, and efficiency of matching organisational roles 
(functions) with personal abilities (linked to gene functions).   
Individual staff members do have a significant role in the emergence of innovations.  In most 
cases, personnel are allowed to draw from personal expertise and experience to come up with 
new ideas for GM events.  This process is limited by the remit: to be in line with the strategic 
objective of the organisation.  Innovations are directed toward the strategic goals, the 
discursive practices that frame what innovation is, and influence the construction of 
innovative ideas and applications.  Drawing on the personal capabilities of staff to come up 
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with new ideas, innovations associated with the organisation are creativity that is moulded 
into forms that are congruent with the strategic frame of reference.  It may be that 
innovations are a process of contributions, but even in this scenario, the contributions are 
associated with individuals, drawing on their experience and knowledge, arguably derive in 
no small part from the constitutive outside of the organisation. 
The data indicates that the individual is not entirely subsumed by an organisation of work, 
they are also part of external organisations, and have also the potential for the Political, 
beyond any social organisation.  They retain their potential for the emergence of the Political 
despite alignment to the organisational frame.  The individual person is a bridge between the 
social organisation and the constitutive outside.  The personal frame can also be subject to 
these wider organisations separately form the organisation.  In short, regarding the 
association between the Political and innovation in the organisation, the emergence of 
innovation is traced back to personal reference frames, within conditions of expression set by 
organisational strategy, while organisational strategy is constructed within conditions of 
expression set by wider organisations.  Antagonistic strategies repress innovations by 
subsuming the Political to the system of Politics, whereas agonistic strategies foster a culture 
of innovation by allowing for the Political to become manifest within organisational strategy 
discourse. 
6.4 | Summary 
Worth bearing in mind is that while the interview data indicates the approach taken by the 
strategy, and the importance of the Political, of personal interpretations, (which is 
incongruent with absolutism), the data reflects the sample, and is limited in terms of how 
representative it is of the rest of the GM program, and the wider organisation. 
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The strategy discourse of Org-X reproduces competitive advantage.  The strategic frame of 
the research institute sets what is considered innovation, but innovation is also associated 
with personal interpretation of strategy and adaptation of ideas and procedures.   The 
activities of the research institute occur within the strategic frame of the EU, which also sets 
what is considered innovation.  Antagonisms and agonisms emerge within negotiations over 
strategic direction at various levels of organisation.   
GM events reveal the politics of innovation, in the subjectivity of agents and organisations, 
and in the friction between the novel and the regular (regulation), between adaptation and 
inertia, at many scales of organisation.  Personal adaptations that are systematized by an 
organisation cease to be innovative, therefore innovation is found when agents differ from 
the systemised procedures and institutionalised perspectives – in dissent – whether dissenting 
acts are treated as friction or as innovation is generally approached from the organisational 
perspective according to organisational change agents, and the wider discursive environment.   
In producing GM events, the dialectic between the ideational and the material has become 
significantly blurred.  The technology represents the production of reality; what kind of 
reality we produce with this technology is up to us.  However, in a discourse of strategic 
management that is based on simultaneity, functionalism and survival through attrition, we 
are in danger of reproducing antagonistic interpretations of reality and embedding ourselves 
within them, while denying the legitimacy of alternatives. 
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7 | Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter will connect the data analysis back to the genealogy of strategic management 
(SM), and clarify the contribution of this thesis to the existing literature.   
The findings of the data analysis show how organisational strategy can become embodied in 
the speech acts and working practices of organisational participants.  Moreover, the analysis 
illustrates how the discursive field of organisational strategy is structured, via the 
possibilities and exclusions that are embedded in this structure, which indicate boundaries, 
and can be considered to constitute the parameters of the field.  Putting the genealogical 
findings and the data findings together, the core concepts at the centre of the discursive 
formation can be seen to relate to the boundaries of the discursive field. 
This chapter will discuss the combinatorial meanings of the core concepts in more detail, 
exploring the implications these meanings have for the performance of politics and power 
relations in organisations, and for their legitimacy in being based on simultaneity.  The 
concepts are largely undertheorized with regard to power relations and politics.  They have 
also been critiqued for the reductive theorization of innovation.  The rest of the chapter will 
explore a rearticulation of these concepts with regard to PDT.   
7.1 | The Discursive Centre of SM Discourse 
With the theoretical analysis, I have attempted to show how core concepts in strategic 
management discourse – inertia, friction and adaptation – are positioned in the centre of the 
discursive reference frame.  In this section, I will discuss how the core concepts of strategic 
management discourse are performed in the data of the case study, and critique their reliance 
on the concept of simultaneity. 
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As well as recognising the key role the concepts of inertia, friction and adaptation often have 
in the formulation of strategy, the literature review also reveals calls for a reconceptualisation 
of each of these concepts in some way.  By rejecting the articulatory practice of simultaneity 
that runs through the usage of these concepts in SM discourse, I propose that the concepts 
become dislocated enough to enable their rearticulation. 
7.1.1 | Inertia, Adaptation and Friction 
In the genealogical findings, the concept of strategic inertia is argued to be closely derived 
from the Newtonian concept of inertia, and by extension Newtonian concepts of change and 
linear time.  In Newtonian physics, inertia describes a state of motion that is either at 
complete rest or at constant speed in a fixed direction.  Moreover, for Newton, inertia is also 
a resistance to change. 
The genealogy traced the concept of strategic renewal to adaptation in Darwinian evolution.  
The genealogical findings suggest that Darwin is drawn on in the concept of competitive 
advantage, which, in the discursive intersections between economics and organisational 
strategy, has generated the concept of innovation, and motivation for innovation.  The 
genealogy suggests that it is as the concept of innovation that adaptation has become framed 
in the strategy discourse.   Moreover, innovation is framed as a means to gain competitive 
advantage: the advantageousness of adaptation. 
In the genealogical findings, the association of resistance as a negative force in strategic 
management discourse has been traced to the concept of friction in Clausewitzian military 
theory.  For Clausewitz, friction is associated with organisational personnel making mistakes 
and risks emerging from an unpredictable environment.  Internal friction is related by 
Clausewitz to a malfunctioning machine, while external friction is related to a source of drag 
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on organisational motion.  Being military theory, both forms of friction occur in context of 
organisational conflict.  Clausewitz emphasizes that friction is invariably negative and 
strategy must strive to prevent friction and to adapt to it as and when it arises. 
Proponents of inertia argue that it is the outcome of the evolutionary refinement process and 
key to future survival; proponents of adaptation argue that inertia prevents an organisation 
from adapting to turbulent changes in the environment, and reduces the chances of survival.  
However, despite the implications for survival, factors that are related to inertia and renewal 
are under theorized (Mallette and Hopkins, 2013).  Moreover, the mainstream and orthodox 
approaches to organisational strategy lack a sufficient consideration of the politics and power 
relations involved in the construction and performance of the concept of friction. 
The data illustrates some of the ways that the concept of inertia in organisational strategy can 
become embodied in the speech acts and working practices of organisational participants.  
The current strategy of the organisation is a five year plan, after which time it will be 
reviewed, while during this time the objectives are fixed.  The fixed objectives are 
illustrations of strategic inertia, while the classical experiments are an example of deliberate 
practical inertia. 
The classical experiments correlate with the orthodox conception of change as being a 
product of routines, their historic routine is considered to enable change in other areas of 
strategic practice, i.e., the findings of the classical experiments continue to inform current 
practices and contribute to research strategy.  Determining the function of genes is also an 
illustration of practical inertia that is considered to enable change – determining genetic 
functions is a routine part of the job for some of the participants, the data suggests that the 
organisational strategy associates innovation with determining gene function and applying 
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the knowledge where it sees fit.  The outcome of determining gene functions can also lead to 
changes in other organizational practices, such as if a particular gene is determined to be of 
strategic interest, offshoots of research could be in motion that represent a form of strategic 
change for the participants. 
With an emphasis on adaptation to changes in both the natural and social environment, the 
findings in the data indicates a mixed approach between strategic inertia and adaptation as a 
means of establishing and maintaining competitive advantage.  By also emphasising the 
intent to be a pioneering presence in the social environment, the organisational strategy 
performs the association between adaptation and innovation. 
The adaptation and innovation in the data indicates that the concept of competitive advantage 
is important in the strategy discourse of the organisation.  Illustrations of how the concept is 
performed include the manner with which the organisation presents its relative strengths 
(USP), and in the interaction with other organisations.  The data indicates that the 
organisation competes for funding with similar institutes for research grants.  Furthermore, 
there is an explicit strategic aim to engage more with industry, which associates the strategy 
with competitive advantage in more clear connection with economics.  The data also 
discusses strategic alliances and a friendly competitiveness as sources of competitive 
advantage.   
In the strategy discourse, adaptation has been associated with a Schmittian and Hobbesian – 
an antagonistic – interpretation of evolution.  Darwin focuses on environmentally driven 
selection pressure; Schmitt focuses on politically driven selection pressure and self-interest, 
which is reflected in the concept of RCT.   
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The findings of the data illustrate performances of a Hobbesian interpretation of evolution, in 
the host-pest conflict that is considered to be as old as life, making it pre-Social and a priori.  
The host-pest conflict is illustrated several times across the data, for instance in the 
development of CRISPR-Cas9 techniques.  Like Hobbes, Schmitt argues that conflict is a 
priori to the Social, and calls this the Political, associating it with the concept of self-interest.   
Self-interest is a concept that is also prominent in economic theory as RCT.  Economic 
theory evaluates innovation in terms of the potential for profit, which is a measure of utility 
in both the design and assessment of innovations in strategy discourse.  Whether inertia or 
adaptation is a suitable strategy for survival or not is typically a question of relative profit.  
The data indicates that in the strategy discourse, reasoning is considered to be performed 
according to the concept of self interest and also assumed to be performed by others on the 
same basis.  For instance, the rationale for patenting discoveries (of gene functions) is a way 
to ensure returns for the taxpayer – i.e., “we do it in your self interest”, without making any 
comment on the earnestness of this statement, the statement reflects the basis of self-interest 
for the rhetorical move of making the practice attractive to others – i.e., to associate patenting 
functions with an attractive concept, in this case the attractive concept that is emphasised as 
associated with patenting gene functions is money in your pocket (in a round and about way), 
which also performs the economic association of self interest with financial distribution. 
The data suggests that the organisational strategy discourse frames innovation, including GM 
technology, within an economic context – the organisation makes money via innovation and 
reflects the competitive perspective that the economic frame has become imbued with.  The 
data also implies that strategic research, motivated by the production of wealth, can inhibit 
the scope of GMO design.  The profit motive influences the goals of the strategy by requiring 
    235 
that a) financial income be part of the strategy, and b) that commercially viable designs be 
prioritised, in keeping with a.  In other words, while the finance enables, it also limits and 
distorts, the strategic objective of the organisation.  The association suggests that strategy 
discourse is performed at level of product design, regarding the Hobbesian competitive 
advantage of GMOs in the environment as well as the economic environment. 
Clausewitz justifies the inflexible hierarchical structure and clear chains of command on the 
basis of the extreme environment of war and the value of experience that is typically 
associated with those in positions of command (2007: 68-69).   The literature indicates that 
justification for drawing on military theory is that life is a war of all against all, and business 
is no different: a Hobbesian interpretation of evolution, and therefore to Darwin.  By 
extension, framed in terms of a life or death situation, due to the association with Hobbesian 
evolution, business strategy that draws on military theory claims to justify hierarchical 
structures of chains of command. 
The structure of the organisation – the way in which labour is divided in context of the 
organisational strategy – is performed in the practices and interactions of participants.  In 
recurring performances, in the routine reproduction of structural divisions of labour, 
structural inertia can be traced in the data.  The data illustrates that the case study 
organisation is structured into traditional functions, including a department of strategy.  This 
structure illustrates the hierarchical structure that is commonplace in modern organisations. 
The findings of the data indicate a pervasive sense of organisational conflict, with ‘Fort 
Knox’ defenses built in response to events framed in militaristic language as ‘incursions’, 
and protestors are framed in some interview accounts in terms of an elite military unit, or 
sabotage ring, but mainly in a sense of antagonism and actions of war, illustrating the 
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influence of militaristic terminology in the strategy discourse.  There is also an indication 
that counter strategies are designed by analysing the strategies of the ‘enemy’.  The literature 
indicates that organisations can wage campaigns of information warfare over emotive pubic 
issues (MacKay and Munro, 2012), which is a form a discursive conflict, a militarization of 
social interaction, and a Schmittian strategy of antagonism.   
The findings of the data analysis also show how the concept of friction is associated with the 
changing environment, for instance in the challenge of climate change, in the risk of 
contamination and in the risk of an environmental response to GM crops.  Friction in the 
social environment is also illustrated in the findings.  External friction is associated with 
regulatory red tape and with protest movements and demonstrations. EU regulation of GM 
research and practice is considered a form of external friction in the data: external regulation 
to reduce risk is here associated as an additional form of procedural friction.  With Britain 
having voted to leave the EU, arguably, a lessening of regulation stringency is a potential 
consequence.  
The data indicates that the concept of friction is also performed in the practices and speech 
acts of the organisational participants.  The emphasis and detail regarding strategic policy on 
risk and regulation suggests that internal organisational operation is everywhere in contact 
with chance and a potential source of friction.  For instance, the organisational strategy can 
be interpreted as associating individual errors with friction. 
Notwithstanding the prevalence of the concept of friction in the data, regarding GM related 
practices – differentiated form other forms of research and other organisational practices of 
‘housekeeping’ – the organisational strategy departs, to some degree, from the Clausewitzian 
clear-chain-of-command structure that is a hallmark of orthodox organisational strategies.  
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Therefore, the structures formed for GM practices are not as preventative of the potential for 
friction to arise.  As these structures are also responsible for innovation, there is an 
implication that more flexible structures are designed to be more facilitative of innovation, 
which implies by association that innovation is can be facilitated by friction.  This will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter, first, I turn to the attachment of each of the core 
concepts to the concept of simultaneity. 
7.1.2 | The Political Construction of Simultaneity 
In its current conception in strategic management research, inertia has been critiqued for 
being applied to social phenomena without due consideration of sociological theory and 
research.  The mainstream approaches follow quantitative and empirical methodologies.  The 
genealogy suggests that this could be traceable to Newtonian mechanics and the concept of 
inertia.  The genealogy suggests that the concept of strategic inertia is based on the concept 
of simultaneity.   
Empiricism, with its emphasis on independent demonstration, is often credited to Hume 
(2007 [1748]); Instrumentalism, with its emphasis on corroboration and falsifiability, is 
partly credited to Popper (2003 [1935]).  Hume was inspired by Newton’s mechanics, and its 
basis in the concept of simultaneity, which, for Hume, provides the basis for independent 
demonstration as the means to gain knowledge of chains of causality; and for Popper, it 
provides the basis for independent demonstration as the means to test causal hypotheses.  To 
describe a causal mechanism, change needs to be noticed.  Motion, in the Newtonian sense, 
is change, and Newton’s Laws of Motion describe the causal mechanisms of motion.  To 
describe motion requires a benchmark, which, in the discourse of physics, can be a frame of 
reference.  Newton’s concept of simultaneity, a universal frame of reference, defines that 
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everyone everywhere will agree on what is happening at a given moment.  Simultaneity is 
based on the concepts of absolute space and absolute time.   
The review indicates that orthodox approaches to strategy contain the notion of simultaneity, 
of an absolute reference frame that demonstrates causal relations independently of human 
influence.  In these approaches, the linear notion of time is Newtonian, while the happening 
of events is not considered to alter the spatial dimension in any way.  In other words, the flow 
of oganisational practices is treated as taking place within a flipbook notion of change, and is 
based on simultaneity, is based on a frame of reference that is independent of human 
influence.  
Being a scientific research institute, the organisation reproduces an empirical philosophy, 
which is traceable to Newton, via Hume.  Based on an absolute inertial reference frame, the 
empirical frame of the strategy discourse gives meaning to organisational practices.  This is 
true of contemporary practices, such as those involving GM technology, and even to the 
produce of the technology.  Determining gene function is associated with empiricism and 
simultaneity.  Gene functions are determined, and therefore fixed in meaning.  This is the 
application of the absolute to biology, which, in context of genetic evolution, suggests a 
connection between Newton and Darwin. 
The case study data indicates that the notion of the absolute in the organisational construction 
of time, the analogy of a new chapter reproduces the flipbook notion of time, which is 
constructed from the concepts of absolute space and time: simultaneity.  The concept of 
simultaneity is performed in a manner that gives meaning to present practices in context of 
the past and the future.  The classical experiments are an example of a routine that has been 
continued for the value both as a research resource and for the purposes of maintaining 
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tradition, and could be considered inertial.   An example I find particularly interesting is the 
mural: 
The data indicates that the strategic discourse constructs the reference frame in which a sense 
of organisational identity is reproduced and in which relations of meaning are attached to 
organisational practices.   Arguably, the mural neatly represents a symbolic inertial frame of 
reference.  The mural also indicates the conceptual placing of the organisation as a centre of 
innovation and knowledge with regards to wider society, suggesting that the frame of 
reference applies outside of the organisation.  In the mural, the organisation is the benchmark 
for progress and change.  The data is also indicative of the construction of shared values.  A 
pact is quite a strong term to draw on to describe an agreement – often used in relation to 
unbreakable bonds – indicating the construction of shared values as a strategic directive, and 
the construction of an absolute inertial frame of reference.  As with many organisations, the 
use of collective pronouns by participants indicates a sense of assimilation of individual to 
group, elsewhere there is an explicit acknowledgement of shared values and the potential for 
the subsuming of the personal into the group. 
Aguably, the mural represents a symbolic frame through which to interpret change.  The 
judgement of change, like motion, requires a benchmark, a frame of reference.  It is worth 
noting that Darwin’s theory of evolution was conceived in a cultural environment in which 
Newtonian mechanics and absolute time were dominant.  Darwin’s theory of biological 
change on Earth was subsumed into Newton’s notion of time, and typically still is.  For 
instance, the concept of utility – prominent in economics – derives from Hume’s notion of 
independent demonstration (therefore Newton).   Simultaneity and empiricism are applied to 
organisational change as a result, such that what is new is considered to be simultaneous and 
measurable by extension. 
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As mentioned above, the implication of simultaneity is that it gives rise to a linear, 
teleological concept of time, and by extension, a conception of evolution that is based on a 
linear, teleological concept of time.   Evolution as simultaneous, which is to say, what 
constitutes a selection pressure, or an adaptation, is assumed to be simultaneous, to be agreed 
upon by everyone everywhere.  
Via the concept of independent demonstration, the methods of empirical positivism typically 
involve a process of elimination.  Arguably, the process of elimination also influences the 
culture of competitive advantage.  Competitive advantage sees evolution as a refinement 
process of progress within a linear and mutual experience of time.  It is arguable that the 
association of simultaneity with Darwinism lends a more pernicious aspect to competitive 
advantage, one that can be compared with the philosophy of Schmitt, as a battle between 
friends and enemies.  This frame is applied to knowledge as well as to business strategy, and 
in the association of knowledge with competitive advantage (such as in the RBV approach to 
strategy), the two are combined. 
The economic lens imbues the notion of utility with the concept of financial profit – by 
extension, survival advantage is based on profitability, or sustainability: change is measured 
in terms of profit, which is socially relative and competitive by association.  Simultaneity in 
competitive advantage means that we would all agree on what and who is weak, and what 
and who is strong; who is successful and who is not, and that these are not social constructs.  
Due to empiricism, relative profit becomes an indicator of success in a perceived 
evolutionary battle for economic survival, the strongest are those who make and retain the 
most money: stand up, homo economicus, and be counted. 
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As discussed, Clausewitz justifies hierarchical structure on the basis of the extreme 
environment of conflict, and therefore correlates with the Hobbesian interpretation of 
evolution.  In Clausewitzian military theory, the hierarchical structure is typically combined 
with a structural functionalist perspective – which can be interpreted as the application of 
empiricism and simultaneity to the Social.  Further entwining military theory with 
evolutionary biology, functional structuralism is generally associated with organisms – à la 
Durkheim (1912), who, relatedly, subsumes deviance into functionalism (Pope, 1975), thus 
arguably subsuming adaptation to structure – but Clausewitz applies it in a more mechanistic 
way, describing a military organisation as a ‘machine’ (2007: 66).  By extension, this 
introduces the possibility (via the association with simultaneity and empiricism) of ‘scientific 
management’ (Taylor, 1911).   
Scientific management combined with functional structuralism places the emphasis on the 
role, not the performer of the role – the performer becomes increasingly interchangeable, as 
with the concept of replaceable parts.  In this frame, any instances in which the performer of 
the role expresses themselves personally is a deviation from the role, it shifts the emphasis 
away from the mechanistic approach, and therefore, in this frame, is considered inefficient: 
frictional.  In this frame of interconnected concepts, for an organisational participant, an 
organic being, to express themselves personally in the performance of the role – i.e., to adapt 
it according to personal choice – is a possibility that is excluded by the discourse of scientific 
management. 
Military theory advocates clear chains of command in hierarchical structures, such that 
adaptation is only permitted by those in positions of power: 
Bonaparte rightly said […] that many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-
chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler 
(Clausewitz, 2007: 59) 
    242 
In associating leadership with transferrable skills found in physics, Clausewitz relates 
leadership and strategy further to Newtonian concepts.  Furthermore, in the statement above, 
Clausewitz, via Napoleon, seems to either suggest an exceptionalism in which positions of 
leadership, in knowledge as well as in organisations, are the remit of select individuals and 
not the domain of those without ‘the gifts’ of a Newton; or that the level of friction faced by 
organisations is complex to the extent that effectively no-one can be reasonably expected to 
ascertain.  In both interpretations, ‘a Newton’ is still paced in a position of some reverence, 
which at the very least indicates the breadth of influence in Newtonian concepts.  Arguably, 
mainstream strategy displays the first interpretation, leadership positions are generally 
assumed to be associated with individuals (or teams) that are more competent at decision-
making than others, which implies that they are more competent at identifying, assessing, and 
adapting to friction as it emerges (among other skills): 
Detailed orders can then be given on the spot, allowing the general plan to be 
adjusted to the modifications that are continuously required.  The strategist, in 
short, must maintain control throughout (2007: 133) 
The literature also indicates the assumption, derived from the empirical frame, that 
organisational friction can be measured (according to the strategy designed by the 
director(s)).  However, while Clausewitz draws on the Newtonian concept of friction, he 
emphasises that his use of the term is to describe phenomena that cannot be measured, and 
therefore his mechanistic functionalism is metaphoric, and does not associate itself with 
empiricism. 
As Clausewitz distances his concept of friction from empiricism, it is not associated with the 
absolute, but with power relations (and risk), and can therefore include political differences.  
Nonetheless, in context of an inflexible hierarchical structure, the evaluation of friction is 
associated with leadership positions, which define the concept of organisational friction for 
the majority of organisational participants.  The empirical frame of organisational strategy is 
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then used as a benchmark for organisational friction, such that the empirical is applied to the 
non-empirical (for instance, measuring the performance of participants).  Data generated 
from this application is typically treated as independent demonstration.   
If each ‘organisational moment’ is considered to be both absolute and independently 
demonstrated, alternative perspectives and accounts are by definition absurd and eliminated.  
In an absolute frame, what is frictional – what it means for the organisation to move forward, 
and what is holding the organisation.  If agreement is total, then any action incongruent to the 
absolute is frictional.  Within a frame of functionalism, friction is a problem.  In short, within 
the articulatory practices formed by the concept of simultaneity, the concept of friction is 
absolute – the concept of friction is conceptually inert and no longer analysed.  Similarly, it is 
in context of the notion of simultaneity that adaptation and innovation are judged. 
7.1.3 | Without Simultaneity 
The genealogy indicates that simultaneity in quantitative values is not absolute, does not 
exist in the discourse of physical science.  Simultaneity is perceived to exist because of the 
relative weight of the Earth and other celestial bodies compared to the speed and weight of 
each of us – generally speaking, we experience space and time according to an Earthly 
perspective in a physical sense, but there are nonetheless differences that are generally 
imperceptible to the human senses.  If the conditions of the Earth’s orbit changed, then the 
benchmark for quantitative measures would change.  Empiricism works, but only as long as 
the Earth provides us with a stable inertial frame of reference. 
Arguably, ‘everyday experience thus fails to reveal how the universe really works’, meaning 
that special relativity is not felt at the speeds and distances we are used to here on Earth’, 
‘one is hard pressed to find the survival advantage offered by a firm grasp of relativity’ 
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(Greene, 2004: 77).  This statement indicates the performance of competitive advantage to 
knowledge – the utility benchmark.  The association between survival and utility has 
established a hegemonic grip on the construction of time and space, to the extent that we 
simplify our reality to fit in with socially constructed notions of utility. 
Even with Einstein’s concept of special relativity, quantitative values indicate the continued 
use of (relative) simultaneity in empiricism.  An inertial frame of reference is referred to so 
as to make sense of moments and change.  The notion that empiricism, when applied to 
gauge organisational performance and other social and conceptual foci, provides an 
independent verification is an illusion.  The literature review and the data analysis indicate 
that the Newtonian concept of simultaneity is a common assumption in strategic 
management.  Simultaneity is a foundation for empirical approaches to organisational 
performance, and justification for the legitimacy of synchronisation, and as a benchmark for 
the evaluation of incongruent perspectives. 
The theoretical framework relates the strategic construction of shared values in organisations 
to discourse theory.  Through a lens of discourse theory, cognitive inertia could be reframed 
as conceptual inertia, as an ephemeral yet inertial structure marking out the discursive field, 
an unchanging structure that reproduces itself and fixes meanings to concepts within its 
framework.  In this literature, the concept of inertia is arguably not theorized enough 
regarding power relations at play in the construction of the concept itself, and in the 
performance of the concept by strategists and organisational participants. 
Einstein’s concept of relativity means that, in contrast to Newton’s concept of simultaneity, 
every position is an equally valid reference frame.  As simultaneity does not exist, not even 
in physical science, then it becomes less clear to what ideal benchmark a strategy of 
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constructing simultaneity in shared values is aspiring to emulate.  Without an independent 
benchmark for evaluating utility, utility of ideas and actions is Political.  Treating utility as 
empirically provable is the performance of a Schmittian strategy of Decisionism, an 
antagonistic strategy for managing the Political. 
In the theoretical framework, I propose that the fictional concept of simultaneity ties the three 
core concepts together, and is therefore a dominant articulatory practice in the discourse of 
strategic management.  A strategy of constructing shared values – a strategy based on 
simultaneity – is an antagonistic system of Politics, a system for managing disputes emerging 
from the Political that opts to subsume the Political, rather than risk losing itself in a 
synthesis. 
7.1.4 | Summary 
For practitioners and researchers of organisational strategy, an approach of PDT can explore 
how unintentional organisational inertia can be a consequence of competitive strategies, 
which are generally intended to encourage adaptation and innovation.   
Empiricism is based on independent demonstration, which is in turn dependent on there 
being an inertial frame of reference independent of the social.   The notion of an absolute 
benchmark for empirical verification has emerged and receded in the discourse of physics, 
yet the concept of simultaneity remains in other discourses.  The theoretical framework 
proposes that simultaneity is a social construction, which I refer to as qualitative 
simultaneity; qualitative simultaneity is a construct of shared values, a conceptually inert 
framework, a benchmark by which alternatives are judged as either adaptation or friction. 
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Without simultaneity, the core concepts, in their current meaning in the discourse, are 
dislocated and become amenable to rearticulation.  Without simultaneity, there is no absolute 
and exclusively valid basis for standardizing the measurement of change, adaptation and 
innovation.  There is no legitimacy for absolutising the meanings given to change, to the 
happening and passing of events. 
The theoretical framework proposes that qualitative simultaneity is treated as though it were 
an empirical benchmark; that, in actuality, qualitative simultaneity is a form of political 
hegemony, of an inertial frame grounded in asymmetric power, not independent and 
impartial verification; that social power is related to defining what is and what is not to be 
deemed as friction and as adaptation within organisations.  The next section will discuss this 
process – the politics of innovation – in closer detail. 
7.2 | The Political Construction of Friction 
In context of PDT, I have proposed that simultaneity is a social construction, and not an 
absolute.  Therefore, I propose that the core concepts are detachable from the framework of 
their interrelated meanings, from the framework that forms the frozen kernel of strategic 
management discourse.   
As I have repeatedly indicated, the theoretical framework of this thesis treats organisational 
strategy as a system of Politics.  I have also suggested that the articulatory framework of the 
strategy discourse facilitates and limits the possible expressions of organisational strategy.  In 
this way, the organisational reference frame and the possible strategic direction are closely 
related, and are defined within power relations.  This section explores how friction is defined 
within power relations operating at the level of strategy discourse. 
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7.2.1 | Defining Friction 
Without simultaneity there is no absolute benchmark, there is no absolute way of determining 
what is frictional.  Therefore, what is frictional is defined by relation to the socially 
constructed reference frame: the articulatory practices of the discourse.   
In the data findings, strategy can be seen as system of Politics, as a system of organisation to 
manage differences due to the Political.  The findings of the data analysis indicate the nexus 
between organisational discourse and the mind of the individual, and of the construction of 
shared values that can occur.  The data analysis illustrates instances where power relations 
involved in the construction of shared values are rendered visible.   
The guidelines communicated in the official strategy might be argued to be discursive 
practices, rules regarding what statements are permitted to be constructed. The official 
directives define discursive boundaries that differentiate between what constitutes frictional 
dissent, and what does not: misconduct and whistleblowing are prohibited, and participants 
are expected not to court controversy by expressing their own opinion when talking with the 
public or press; at the same time, internally to the organisation, they are encouraged to voice 
reasonable constructive criticism.  The findings of the data analysis indicate that power 
relations regulate discourse between organisational participants and the outside, this includes 
differences in interpretations of data, which could be considered to be instances of the 
Political associated with empirical work. 
The findings of the data analysis indicate that the overall strategy is set by directors, and 
illustrates ways that power relations are manifest in the performance of the discursive 
boundaries, between those privileged to adapt the strategy discourse and those who are not – 
for instance, ISP leaders and subordinates.  The accounts suggest that there are some 
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individuals in the organisation who might not have a favourable perspective of GMOs.  To 
hold this position is a form of dissent that appears to be considered frictional when 
considering that they are not actively visible.  This could be interpreted as an illustration of 
the tension between the Political and the system of Politics (that manages differences that 
emerge due to the Political).  The data illustrates the performance of a system of Politics to 
manage the Political, including moments in which the Political is self regulated by the 
participant.  This would indicate the internalization of the system of Politics by the 
participants, and therefore the internalization of power relations.    
The PDT approach articulated in this thesis applies the theoretical framework of hegemonic 
constellations of fixed meanings to the asymmetric power relations in orthodox strategy 
discourse, such that in the design of strategy, unchallenged articulatory practices privilege the 
construction of meaning to be the remit of a central minority, at the exclusion of the majority.  
PDT also theorizes that fixed meanings are not actually fixed, but are open to rearticulation, 
if they can be dislocated from the hegemonic formation. 
Repeated associations are a rhetorical device intended to fix associations of meaning to 
concepts, and are, therefore, a discursive strategy.  The findings of the case study data 
indicate that the definitions of discursive boundaries are echoed multiple times across the 
internal strategic communications.  The design of the strategy is not a democratic process, 
therefore the opportunity to design which meanings become anchored to which practices, as 
part of the system of shared values, is not itself a process in which all participants share equal 
weight of opinion.  Discursive approaches enable a theorization of the processes that govern 
the construction of systems of Politics: the construction and performance of organisational 
strategies.   
    249 
As mentioned above, PDT describes relative frameworks of fixed meaning, and provides a 
theorisation of strategic discourse as a system of Politics for managing disputes emerging 
from the Political.  In context of PDT, a framework of inert concepts is an inertial frame of 
reference, which becomes a benchmark for judging action.   Moreover, the concept of an 
inertial frame of reference is akin to a system of organisation (Politics) for managing the 
Political.  In this way, the inertial frame is referred to as a benchmark for judging 
organisational friction.    
Therefore, in this thesis, the concept of inertia is reframed in context of PDT.  A theorization 
of strategic inertia that draws on PDT offers a more nuanced and a more coherent approach 
to problematisating power relations associated with the construction of shared values in 
organisations.  This includes a consideration of the concept of inertial reference frames as 
hegemonic and the implications this has on the meaning of friction. 
Foucault (2002) argues that the inertia of concepts in a discursive formation is a symptom of 
a position of dominance in a social formation, and indicative of the repression of a buried 
alternative meaning.  A strategy that reproduces the concept of an absolute inertial frame 
(simultaneity) reproduces the dominance of a discursive frame that denies alternatives.  In 
this way, a strategic frame reproduces itself by defining alternative frames as frictional by 
relation to an absolute benchmark, which is presented as absolute but is constructed.  
The literature and data both suggest that inertial frames are often treated as absolute in the 
design and performance of organisational strategy.  When treated as absolute, the inertial 
frame becomes hegemonic.  To fix the meaning of a concept is to establish a discursive 
hegemony.  When hegemonic, an inertial frame is presented as a timeless and absolute.  This 
allows for domination, as there will be little alternative to an order that is timeless.  A 
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hegemonic simultaneity in values unilaterally treats friction as a problem, and therefore some 
values and perspectives are first deemed alternative to the status quo, then treated as a 
problem by association.    
In the discourse of physics, the notion of an absolute frame of reference no longer remains a 
favoured view – this begs the question as to what ideal the construction of qualitative 
simultaneity is seeking to emulate.  If there is no absolute basis, no absolute frame of 
reference, for determining what is frictional, there is no objective basis for labelling 
alternative logics as frictional – organisational friction is the realm of political, not scientific, 
analysis.  Frictional practice can be described, within the conceptual framework of this thesis, 
as individual views of, and approaches to, strategy that are deemed arbitrarily not to fit in 
with the strategic objective.   In the theoretical framework, the concept of dissent as friction 
was associated with the Political.  Dissent is a form of friction that is constructed and 
labelled by power relations within organisational structures.   
In the theoretical framework, power is theorized as the power to judge ‘motion’, to construct 
the inertial reference frame (framework of articulatory practices) from which to judge 
whether alternative reference frames are considered to be frictional: the power to choose.  
This is a Schmittian definition of power, the power to decide.  Schmitt argues that debating 
unresolvable issues is a waste of time – in a reflection of Clausewitzian mechanistic 
functionalism, Schmitt considers debate to be temporal inefficiency and proposes a strategy 
of Decisionism (Hirst, 1999).  A Decisionist frame is a strategy that constructs simultaneity 
in qualitative values – alternative perspectives are eliminated, but without any basis in the 
principle of independent demonstration.  However, at least with Schmitt there is no pretence 
that there is a scientific basis, whereas the justification for power relations and the 
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construction of friction in strategy discourse is obscured behind a veil of appropriated 
scientific reasoning. 
I have proposed that constructing simultaneity in values, a Schmittian strategy of 
decisionism, is an antagonistic system of Politics, for managing the Political.  The literature 
suggests that Schmittian strategies are prominent in many organisations and as a basis for the 
production of strategy knowledge.  For instance, in scientific management, debate over the 
performance of a role is an excluded possibility.  Yet, ironically, the different approaches to 
organisational friction in the literature indicate that the concept is contested; that the concept 
of friction reveals the Political among researchers.  The continued foundation of simultaneity 
in strategic management discourse is critiqued as a social construction akin to political 
hegemony, the sedimentation of a logic of equivalence, that fixes the meaning of moments 
and thus controls the conditions in which discursive change is defined by repressing the 
Political. 
7.2.2 | Reality Distortion 
In constructing the boundaries of the field of strategy discourse, hierarchical organisational 
structures privilege some agents over others.  The power of those who direct the organisation 
is therefore often dispersed into delegated roles of authority within an organisational 
structure. The perspectives of subordinate agents are subject to those of privileged agents.   
As strategy contains a notion of motion, privileged agents have more say in directing the 
organisation, over whether changes should be made and what form they should take.  
Privileged agents are change agents, and change agents have more influence, more relative 
power within an organisation.  The inertial strategic frame is enforced by change agents, who 
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evaluate what is frictional.  In making these judgments, organisational participants exercise 
the power relation that is legitimized by their role in the organisational structure.   
Newton associated inertia with mass, such that the more mass something has, the more inert 
it is, the more resistant to changes in motion.  In the discourse of physics, Einstein’s concepts 
overturned Newton’s including showing that mass distorts space and time – that space and 
time are a combined ‘field’ that is influenced by mass.  Moreover, that when the trajectories 
of passing things intersect, each influences the trajectory of the other, but the lighter passing 
thing is subject to the influence of the heavier.  Both things can be treated as reference 
frames, meaning that the reference frame of the lighter thing is subject to the influence of the 
heavier.  This influence is known as gravity.   
Again, Foucault goes further than Einstein.  In physics, Einstein describes how spacetime 
reacts the same everywhere and there is but one spacetime, and retains the concept of the 
absolute in this way.  In discourse theory, Foucault describes not one field, but a multiplicity 
of fields, between which the properties of the ‘same’ statement can differ.  In other words, 
Foucault proposes that different fields of discourse have different interactions with the same 
statement: 
The statement […] is endowed with a certain modifiable heaviness, a weight 
relative to the field in which it is placed,  constancy that allows of various uses, a 
temporal permanence that does not sleep on its past (2002: 117-118) 
Discursively, it might be said that statements made by change agents carry more weight in 
the organisational strategy discourse, and the direction of subordinate agents is distorted by 
the perspectives, the qualitative gravity, of change agents.  This could apply to research 
directions, such as ISPs.  Furthermore, some statements have more weight in some discourses 
than others.  Change agents have power, therefore their statements (and judgements) carry 
more weight in some organisations and some scenarios and contexts than others.  For 
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instance, different discourses constituting the overall strategy might have different change 
agents (as seen in the data on ISP structures). 
Foucault continues with this practice, emphasizing that ‘archaeology maps the temporal 
vectors of derivation’ (Foucault, 1969: 186), and therefore can trace the influence of 
intersecting concepts, to evaluate the influence of one concept on another.  In the case of 
sedimentation of concepts, the fixing of meaning in relation to a hegemonic frame can be 
seen.  The dominant concept is the heavier concept, and distorts the field of discourse to a 
greater extent than the concepts that are dominated by it.  The concept of simultaneity sits at 
the centre of a system of meanings, like a solar presence, whose gravity traps passing things 
into an orbit, a definitional meaning relating to the solar centre. 
In special relativity, no perspective is privileged over any other, but perspectives can be 
influenced by other more weighty perspectives (due to the associated distortion in the 
spacetime field).  In discourse theory, no perspective is privileged over any other, but 
perspectives can be influenced by other more weighty perspectives (with an associated 
distortion in the discursive field).  Due to the construction of shared values, of qualitative 
simultaneity, the benchmark frame is the inertial frame.  The inertial frame is the benchmark 
frame.  If the mass of one thing is sufficiently large compared to another thing, the more 
massive thing is treated as the inertial frame for both things (such as with us on Earth).   
This description once again draws on terminology associated with the discourse of physics, 
in this case with quantitative values.  Despite this intersecting terminology, these terms can 
be considered examples of how quantitative value is reframed in discourse theory, towards a 
more qualitative meaning.  The relevance of this description is that what it means to be 
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frictional is defined in relation to a perspective that is dominated by a hegemonic reference 
frame. 
Hegemonic discourse dominates the meanings available to change, and therefore the possible 
choices of direction.  The theoretical framework proposes that simultaneity in values is, 
despite appearances, an antagonistic concept of society, in which the Political is repressed.  
Mathematically speaking, and pedantically speaking, a plural means more than one, and 
society means more than one participant.  Simultaneity in values means that, for a particular 
value, there is only one acceptable view among numerous participants: while there is a 
physical society of more than one participant, there is not a society of ideas and perspectives.  
If the benchmark for judging motion is absolute, then there would be total agreement on what 
is oppositional motion – agreement on the definition of frictional motion.  However, if this 
were the case, then there would be no need for the hierarchical system and chain of 
command, a strategy for synchronisation, in the first place.  The strategy of synchronisation 
indicates the primacy of the Political.  Simultaneity in values is the antithesis of plurality, 
and of society.  Simultaneity in values is only the basis of totalitarianism. 
Laclau and Mouffe explicitly describe hegemony as social power.  Arguably, hegemony is 
the use of power (the ability to be a benchmark) to dominate the social, it is the imposition of 
one’s personal reference frame (Political perspective) on others; hegemony is the attempt to 
construct simultaneity while knowing simultaneity does not exist.    
The perspectives of privileged agents contribute more to the design and performance of the 
strategy discourse.  Militaristic structures diffuse power asymmetrically and are inflexible, 
allowing for little adaptation in strategic instructions by personnel.  Incongruent action by 
participants is a form of friction.  However, Clausewitz takes a more nuanced approach to the 
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Political than the Schmittian approach that the literature review and genealogy suggest is the 
norm in mainstream organisational strategy: 
It would be neither possible nor correct to eliminate subjective routine or personal 
style entirely from the conduct of war.  They should be seen, rather as 
manifestations of the influence exerted on individual phenomena by the total 
character of war – an influence which, if it has not been foreseen and allowed for 
by accepted theory, may find no other means of adequate expression (2007: 105-
106) 
In context of the discussion on the definition of friction, arguably orthodox strategy discourse 
has omitted this caveat in Clausewitzian military theory. 
7.2.3 | Summary 
Without the legitimacy afforded by the concept of an absolute frame of reference, the 
labelling of particular actions and ideas as friction denotes a power relation in an 
organisation.  The labeller holds (or is attempting to hold) relative power over the labellee.   
Having established that there is a gap in the literature for a formulation of politics and power 
relations in organisational strategy research that is derived from PDT, I have, in this last 
section, discussed how friction is defined according to a political construction involving 
power relations and the domination of one arbitrary set of practices over another.  In the next 
section, I will turn to the implications of the political construction on how innovation is 
labelled, and, relatedly, on an organisation’s capacity for innovation. 
7.3 | The Political Origins of Innovation 
To repeat, simultaneity is fictional, therefore, as with friction, what is new, and what is 
innovative, is defined by relation to the socially constructed reference frame: the articulatory 
practices of the discourse.  How this power relation is performed with regard to the concept 
of innovation is the focus of this section. 
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7.3.1 | Innovation and the Political 
The genealogical findings indicate that adaptation is associated with innovation to gain 
competitive advantage as a form of relative profit.  The genealogy also suggests that the 
concept of competitive advantage currently has a meaning that is antagonistic and 
comparable to Schmittian philosophy.  The data illustrates instances in which the concept of 
innovation is associated with antagonism.  A caveat to this conception is the description of a 
friendly competitiveness with other research organisations that could be interpreted as an 
example of agonistic strategy, with competing organisations not seeking to destroy or 
dominate each other.  
As discussed, the findings of the data indicate that the strategy for a substantial part of GM 
research is to determine the function of various genes, more specifically, to identify desired 
traits, to associate them with and fix them to specific genes.  Genes are added or removed by 
virtue of the function they are determined with: known as over or under expression.  The data 
also indicates that there is a semantic caveat over what is legally considered to be ‘GM’ that 
is being utilised by aspects of the organisational strategy and some staff – an adaptation in 
response to political friction in the social environment. 
The data also indicates the performance of the concept of functionalism in the design of 
organisational structure – personal interests, characteristics, are treated as traits, in a similar 
way that gene functions are traits.  In many cases, there is a close alignment between the 
strategic remit for innovation, and creative interests of staff.  This alignment suggests a 
specific recruitment policy and that the composition of projects deliberately try to match 
personal interests of staff with the strategic goals of the groups they are a part of.  In 
modifying genetic structures, the organisational practices relocate genes according to traits 
and contextual needs – organisational strategy does something similar regarding structure. 
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As with the concept of organisational friction, the data suggests that the strategic frame of the 
organisation sets what is considered innovation.  Again, as with friction, the data illustrates 
that the judgement of innovation is associated with change agents, indicating the power 
relations involved in the concept of innovation.  For instance, in the interview accounts that 
discuss how staff are not really told if they are doing the right thing, but are clearly told if 
they are doing the wrong thing.  The direction of projects is often closely related to the 
interests of the lead scientist, who also directs and evaluates the research of participants in 
the groups that they lead.  The decisions made by change agents regarding innovation enact 
the power relations legitimised by the strategy discourse.  Therefore, the Political is present 
in the personal interests of change agents, manifest in their interpretation of the remit of ISPs 
that they lead and in their interpretation of how the actions of those they lead compare to the 
remit. 
The data findings indicate that in the strategy discourse, while patents can be attached to 
individuals, the official strategy defines innovation as a collective process involving 
numerous parties.  However, the data also indicates that individual organisational participants 
have a significant role in the emergence of innovations.  Emergences of innovation can be 
traced to the manifestations of the Political among organisational participants.  The data 
illustrates ways in which personnel draw from personal expertise and experience to think 
about uses for GM technology, to solve problems and evaluate risks (practical friction) 
associated with the research.  Innovation is in this way traced to the personal interpretation of 
strategy and adaptation of ideas and procedures. 
The findings also illustrate the association of ‘blue skies’ research with the Political.  That is 
to say, strategically orientated research is defined in opposition to blue skies; if blue skies 
research is motivated by personal interest, then research defined by the organisational 
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strategy is not.  The data suggests that the remit for innovation is defined by association with 
meeting industrial needs for increased profitability – for competitive advantage. 
In the organisational strategy, discursive practices frame innovation and influence the 
construction of innovative ideas and applications – manifestations of the Political are 
directed toward the strategic goals, to become forms of innovation that are in keeping with 
the definition constructed by the strategy discourse, that are congruent with the strategic 
frame of reference.  The manifestation process of the Political is distorted by the remit of the 
ISP(s) that the participants are involved with: to be in line with the strategic objective of the 
organisation (the system of Politics).  The activities of the research institute occur within the 
strategic frame of the EU, which also sets what is considered innovation.  Antagonisms and 
agonisms emerge within negotiations over strategic direction at various levels of 
organisation. 
The data findings indicate that the individual is not entirely subsumed by any organisation, 
but retains the potential for the emergence of the Political despite alignment to an 
organisational frame.  In short, it may be that innovations in the case organisation are indeed 
a process of contributions as the official strategy defines them to be, but even then, the 
contributions are associated with individuals, drawing on their experience and knowledge, 
meaning that, relative to the organisation, innovations arguably derive in no small part from 
the constitutive outside.   
The emergence of innovation is traced back to personal interpretations of the constitutive 
outside, formed in relation to personal interests and experience (the Political), manifest 
within conditions of expression set by organisational strategy.  While organisational strategy 
is formed within conditions of expression set by wider organisations.  This thesis proposes 
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that each organisational participant is a bridge between the social organisation and the 
constitutive outside.  The findings suggest that despite the strategic correlation of staff traits 
with structural positions, innovation is associated with manifestation of the Political, rather 
than the product of design. 
Personal interpretations of the constitutive outside are appropriated or rejected by relation to 
the inertial boundaries of strategy discourse, and the personal interpretations of change 
agents that enforce the frame.  In this way, personal interpretations are a source of innovation 
as well as friction – they are the same source, it is only a matter of how they are labelled 
within social relations of power. 
Alternative reference frames, and personal adaptation, could be a potent source of strategic 
renewal and innovation.  However, the organisational strategy, when hegemonic, can 
perceive individual adaptation as employee resistance, as negative friction; considered 
problematic, the hegemonic strategy represses and sublimates it.  Antagonistic and 
Decisionist strategies for a system of Politics, of organisation, miss out on the potential in 
personal adaptation for strategic renewal, adaption, and survival.   For this reason, I propose 
that the construction of simultaneity, of shared values, as an organisational strategy, is a 
significant factor in organisational inertia, both deliberate and unintended. 
To harness this potency for innovation in alternative reference frames means designing a 
strategy of Politics for managing the Political that does not repress the Political, but allows 
emergences to bubble up and disperse through the organisation.  In short, a strategy of 
agonism might be more conducive to this aim than a strategy of antagonism and Decisionism.  
An organisational inertial frame that is not constructed by a Hegemon, but is proportionally 
representative of the reference frames of the organisational constituents; an organisational 
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inertial frame that is not presented as absolute, enacted by Mouffian (not Schmittian) change 
agents, a role that is not structurally defined as hierarchical; an organisational inertial frame 
that is agonistic, not antagonistic, is a strategy that offers a more ethical basis for managing 
the Political, one that might also carry with it the additional economic reward of increased 
levels of innovation. 
7.3.2 | Reframing Strategic Inertia, Adaptation and Friction  
This thesis proposes a theorisation of the core concepts in which they are rearticulated.  The 
theorization emphasises the binary opposition between discursive inertia and discursive 
change, and that this opposition forms a frontier that can be associated with the concept of 
friction.  When there is political hegemony, one side of the frontier dominates the other.  The 
perspective of the dominant side becomes the dominant frame of reference, a construction of 
shared vales, a qualitative simultaneity.  Qualitative simultaneity, the dominant frame, is 
often treated as absolute (under the assumption that simultaneity exists as an absolute 
reference frame), and therefore unquestionable.  The perspective of the dominant reference 
frame becomes the reference frame for both.  In the discourse of physics, to describe motion 
according to Newtonian laws, a reference frame must be inertial.  The side that is dominated 
is labeled as frictional, by relation to the dominant frame of reference, to the benchmark of 
qualitative simultaneity, not according to a benchmark derived from an absolute.  Therefore, 
if the concept of simultaneity influences the judgement of what is frictional, the strategic 
frame, that change agents regulate, could be responsible for the precipitous labelling of much 
adaptation and innovation as being frictional. 
As discussed, change agents act as custodians of the inertial frame.  Change agents are 
organisational participants like any other, but who, in performing the role, are more socially 
powerful – this is because when policing the discursive boundary they are wielding the 
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power associated with the strategic frame.  In other words, the power is in the strategic 
frame, and is dispersed into the role of change agents, such that the role is like a shell, that is 
then filled by an organisational participant, and, in so doing, the shell is also imbued with the 
personal perspectives of the participant, which can potentially differ from the strategic frame.  
In this way, in the performance of the role of change agent, the power associated with the 
role, defined by the strategic frame, can become associated with the personal perspective of 
the participant, in instances in which the personal perspectives of the participant differ from 
the strategic frame. 
In short, the judgements made by change agents include personal interpretation – of both the 
inertial frame and the Political moment.  In its enactment via change agents, the inertial 
frame is hazy, tempered by the Political residing in the change agent.  The Political moment 
reveals the Political in the adaptor, and also in the change agent that judges the adaptation.  
This could work to the advantage of the adaptor, or not, depending on the decision of the 
change agent. 
Clausewitzian friction, in terms of individual error, could be applied to change agents in the 
precipitous labeling of friction.  These frictions are derived from the Political of the change 
agent, their personal interpretation can lead to an error in judgement, but this judgement still 
derives to some extent from the strategic frame that defines the benchmark for differentiating 
between friction and adaptation.   
Power is distributed unevenly among change agents in organisations – lower levels of change 
agents may not have any influence on the design of strategy.  For this reason, the term 
Directors has been used to specify change agents at the top of the hierarchy.  Relatedly, to 
place blame with change agents is to repeat the top-down perspective of friction that is 
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typical of the strategy literature, it is to ignore that the strategy legitimates the structure that 
places change agents in a position of power from which errors in judgement are then made.  
Therefore, the strategy discourse is also the problem when errors of judgement are made, 
along with the Directors that construct the boundaries of the discourse. 
As an organisational strategy for managing the Political, the official definition of dissent is 
part of a system of Politics.  The definition of dissent indicates the boundary that the 
Political must cross to be acceptable to the system of Politics – in other words, the boundary 
that personal adaptation must cross to become acceptable to the organisational strategy.  The 
system of Politics (organisational strategy) manages the Political by subsuming it into 
strategic research design. 
What is considered to be frictional might suggest the conditions of expression set by the 
discursive practices, with friction representing the incongruent instances of the Political.  
Some forms of the Political can instigate radical renewal in discursive practices, others are 
rejected as friction.  Arguably, both of these forms of the Political are of a similar level of 
incongruence with the discursive practices, it is the discursive practices that set the 
conditions by which one form is innovative, and the other is frictional. 
As standardisation is the conceptual kin of normalization, it represents the bracketing of 
possible practice for the purpose of efficiency – a Taylor-esque one-best-way.  Therefore, 
within the logic of scientific management and orthodox approaches to strategy, difference 
might be definitionally associated with inefficiency of process, for being in binary opposition 
with standardized, normalized, functional practice.  Moreover, the influence of economic 
theory introduces Rational Choice Theory to the problematisation of innovation, which 
suggests that the more radical forms of innovation begin as part of the (RCT defined) realm 
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of the ‘irrational’, a position from where innovation must prove its rationality via the 
economic meaning of utility, namely profitability.   
Like Foucault, and the majority of strategy approaches in the literature, the official strategy 
of the case organisation rejects the notion of an autonomous inventor.  However, as with 
PDT’s conception of the Political and the constitutive outside, the data suggests that 
innovation can be traced to an Eureka moment for an individual – the theoretical framework 
and the data analysis suggest that the emergence of organisational adaptation and innovation 
could occur at the level of agency, at the Political.  Nonetheless, the extent to which Eureka 
moments contribute to an innovation is arguably immeasurable.   
In context of the theoretical framework, it might be suggested that the frictional frontier 
between strategic change and inertia is mirrored in the friction between agency-structure 
power relations.  Moreover, that innovation arises from friction, that innovation is associated 
with emergences of the Political within an organisational system of Politics (organisational 
strategy). 
The genealogy suggests that there is a Schmittian interpretation of evolution and competition 
in the orthodox strategy discourse and in the data that associates innovation with antagonism 
– to the extent that antagonistic strategy is performed down to the level of product design.  
For instance, within a hegemonic frame, whoever judges which genes have which functions, 
which functions are associated with which biological traits, which traits are 
desirable/undesirable, and why, holds a Schmittian position of power.  This is an example of 
how the philosophy of Decionism is performed in the way that strategy frames innovation.  
This is also an example of how qualitative simultaneity is antagonistic.  There is an 
implication that mainstream approaches to organisational strategy (systems of Politics to 
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manage the Political) apply Schmittian ideals of antagonism and Decionism to the concept of 
innovation. 
As part of this thesis, I have proposed that the association between friction and antagonism is 
not synonymous (as argued by Schmitt).  By unfixing this dominant association, space is 
created for agonistic associations of friction.  In turn this creates space for associations 
between innovation with agonism.  In context of the theoretical framework, agonism 
provides an alternative to the antagonistic strategy that is prevalent in organisations.  The 
theoretical framework describes how strategy discourse forms a boundary between frictional 
and non-frictional dissent.  The boundary formed by antagonistic strategy is a frontier frozen 
in time; while the boundary formed by agonistic strategy is reinterpretable (‘fuzzy’) and 
dynamic (‘fizzy’). 
In the evaluation of what constitutes frictional or innovational dissent, systems of Politics 
(organisational strategies) might be antagonistic and seek to fix the definitional boundary, or 
agonistic and facilitate reinterpretation of the definition.  An antagonistic system of Politics 
will likely repress manifestations of the Political more than an agonistic system.  
Antagonistic strategies repress innovations by subsuming the Political to the system of 
Politics, whereas agonistic strategies foster a culture of innovation by allowing for the 
Political to become manifest within organisational strategy discourse.  Agonism allows for 
the Political to manifest and aims for synthesis, not domination.  Therefore, this thesis 
proposes that agonistic strategies are more conducive to innovation than antagonistic 
strategies, which can stifle innovation. 
Applied to an intra- organisational strategy, an agonistic approach would not treat differing 
interpretations as a competition to ascertain the most convincing/correct, because a discursive 
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approach would understand that this would be an exercise in rhetorical ability, rather than an 
indication of truth value.  Instead, agonism would treat conflicting ideas as ‘friendly 
competitors’, competition motivates, but the life or death aspect of competition can be 
discarded within civilian organisations not involved in actual military combat; nor involved 
in an evolutionary contest defined by linear and teleological progression.  Therefore, agonism 
does not conclude in the elimination of one side of an argument, neither does it end in each 
side ‘agreeing to disagree’, but it involves the process of synthesis, of establishing mutual 
ground, as opposed to establishing hegemonic ground. 
In contrast to the mechanistic and systematic approaches to innovation, and more in common 
with the approaches to innovation that emphasize the role of individuals and subversion of 
the system, this thesis proposes that it is the Political moment, the personal interpretation of 
the constitutive outside, that holds the potential for innovation.  For organisational 
participants, this moment is always related to the system of discourse, meaning innovation 
cannot be separated from the system of discourse, but that innovation does not and cannot 
emerge without the personal perspectives of organisational participants.   
7.4 | Conclusion and Contribution 
The analysis of the performance of the concepts within an organisation that constructs GMOs 
has grounded the theoretical work and added weight to the contribution of the theoretical 
framework to the strategic management literature.   
This chapter discussed the implications of the PDT critique of the core concepts, brought into 
relief in context of the case study.  From this position, the contribution of this thesis to the 
literature of strategic management is proposed to the academy.  The contributions are 
summarised as follows: 
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7.4.1 | Research Question: What are the core concepts of strategic 
management discourse, and how do they combine in the field of 
discourse? 
In the strategic management discourse, the three core concepts are inertia, friction and 
adaptation.  These concepts are combined in a system of relational meaning, in a way that 
connects the other discourses from which the core concepts are constituted.  Namely, 
Newtonian physics, Clausewitzian military theory and a Hobbesian interpretation of 
Darwinian evolution are merged together by extension.  In combination, the influences of 
Newton, Clausewitz and Darwin constitute a common perspective: reality (both nature and 
psyche) is deterministic (and therefore measurable); competition for survival is absolute and 
independent of ideational construction, and; the presence of difference (or absence of 
homogeneity) results in competitive elimination.  In this way, the core concepts reproduce a 
dominant frame of reference (Newton) that treats evolution (Darwin) as a conflict 
(Clausewitz), in context of which the merits of adaptation (Darwin) are typically evaluated 
quantitatively (Newton) within asymmetric power relations (Clausewitz). 
The genealogy suggests that, in organisational strategy, the Newtonian principle of 
simultaneity is prevalent, and forms the dominant basis of the notion of time and change.  
Nonetheless, simultaneity is no longer a favoured in the discourse of physics.  Arguably, 
simultaneity is such an implicit assumption that is not the subject of analysis in 
organisational strategy literature.   
The articulatory framework of the discourse of strategic management, treated as the inertial 
frame of reference, is also treated as absolute, in that it imposes simultaneity on practitioners 
and researchers alike.  The articulatory practices, that connect the core concepts of strategy 
discourse in relational meaning, define the lens through which alternative perspectives of 
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organisational strategy are evaluated.   I propose that the concept of simultaneity is the 
dominant articulatory practice of the strategic management discourse.  Therefore, concepts 
that are incongruent with simultaneity (such as special relativity, and discourse theory) are 
excluded from the orthodox approaches to strategic management – we might say that they are 
deemed frictional to the concept of functional utility when applied to knowledge ad practice. 
The analysis suggests that we willingly simplify our reality for practical purposes; despite 
disproval, simultaneity remains a dominant node for vast swathes of discourses, including 
strategic management.  For this reason, it makes sense to be very careful when 
problematising organisational strategy, for excluding alternative perspectives on the basis of 
simultaneity and mechanical principles is not a defensible position.  For, 
As long as we can resist the vanity that we are gaining an objective truth or reality, 
we will not misunderstand our achievements, and will stand on defensible 
philosophical foundations (Powell, 2001: 886).  
I propose that in a discourse of strategic management that is based on simultaneity, 
functionalism and survival through attrition, we are in danger of reproducing antagonistic 
interpretations of reality and embedding ourselves within them, while denying the legitimacy 
of alternatives.  
7.4.2 | Research Question: What connections are there between the 
core concepts of strategy discourse and power relations at play in the 
design and performance of organisational strategy? 
Power relations and organisational politics are undertheorized in the prominent strategy 
approaches.  The literature review indicates that organisational politics and power relations 
are a fecund area of research for organisational strategy.  There is literature that engages with 
the issue of power relations.  Tensions between alternative perspectives relate strategy to a 
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system of Politics.  This is an area of study that PDT can contribute to, and to which the 
theoretical framework of this thesis contributes. 
The strategic management discourse describes quantitative motion in terms of qualitative 
values: it is preferable to go forwards not back, for instance.  In the case of inertia and 
adaptation is it preferable to stay the course or change.  Whether inertia or renewal is the 
optimum strategy for organisations is beyond this thesis to argue, however, some kind of 
contextually relevant blend of both seems appropriate.  Proponents of strategic inertia argue 
that adaptation can be risky (also drawn on friction there) to organisational survival.  The 
concepts each reflect the other here: inertia and adaptation are binary concepts – nonchange 
and change.   
The PDT theorisation I propose in this thesis is based on a frictional power relation between 
two opposing strategies of response to a competitive and changing environment.  Friction in 
this way does not apply to any form of motion, be it forwards or backwards, but to the 
interaction itself.  As there is no absolute benchmark for determining which side of a power 
relation between change and inertia is displaying frictional motion, we might then say that 
friction is the relation between the participants, and relates to the frontier between them –
friction represents the boundary that demarcates the two.   
In this theoretical framework, Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of logics of equivalence and 
difference is applied to the core concepts of inertia, adaptation and friction.  This application 
highlights that there is no objective truth to associating friction with either side: friction is a 
dynamic between the two sides of an inertia-adaptation relation – opposing strategic motions, 
opposing political motions.   
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The direction of dominance in the power relation between alternative strategic and political 
motions is discernible by which side is taken as the inertial reference frame.  The inertial 
frame – the hegemonic articulatory framework – is the benchmark by which change is 
defined (identified and given meaning).  The inertial frame holds the power to decide 
whether the other side is displaying frictional or innovative motion in Political moments.  
This power represents the power to distort the reality of others according to the will of the 
Self, and is therefore hegemonic, Schmittian and unethical. 
Therefore, I propose that PDT can be justified to bring to bear against the hegemonic 
tendencies of the core concepts that dominate strategic management discourse: the goal of 
strategy as survival via competitive advantage and elimination of competitors, the 
elimination of friction; the implementation of strategy as an absolute frame of reference, to 
which all else is a form of friction to be judged; and the double hermeneutic of 
innovation/entrepreneurial strategies, by which friction is judged.   In this thesis, the concept 
of Friction is rearticulated as a dynamic and changeable boundary, not a static and frozen 
divide. 
The review indicates that orthodox approaches to organisational strategy associate resistance 
with psychology – dissent – but only with the psychological shortcomings and the self-
interest of participants, which illustrates the negative connotation of friction that is associated 
with dissent.  The theoretical framework proposed in this thesis suggests that the orthodox 
conception of friction in strategy discourse is Schmittian, and therefore antagonistic and 
unethical.  The PDT approach of this thesis problematises the standardizing (or normalizing) 
of perspectives and practices of personnel in terms of hegemony and political repression, and 
rearticulates the concept of friction. 
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7.4.3 | Research Question: How does innovation emerge in context of 
power relations in the design and performance of strategy discourse? 
The review indicates that, while there is a minor split between conceptions of innovation as 
associated with people or process, the concept of innovation is more frequently seen as a top-
down and systemisable process that can be quantifiably measured.  Therefore, a recurring 
critique of strategic management is that the favoured mechanistic approaches subsume 
agency to structure, and then apply a positivist approach in measuring performance regarding 
innovation.  These perspectives of innovation do not sufficiently engage with questions of 
agency-structure and power relations regarding how innovation is conceptualised in strategic 
management literature.  While the system based approach to innovation appears to be 
favoured in strategic management literature, there are, nonetheless, approaches that associate 
innovation with the individual.  The approach taken by this thesis complements such 
approaches by bringing out the political interactions on the ideational level.  I propose that 
innovation is associated with manifestations of the Political, rather than the product of 
design. 
The role of ideas is not often considered in orthodox strategy approaches.  The theoretical 
approach of this thesis contributes to ways in which ideation can be included in the 
consideration of the emergence of innovation, and relates them to the personal perspectives 
of organisational participants, without subsuming them to organisational structure, as is the 
wont of orthodox approaches to strategy. 
Personal adaptations that are systematized by an organisation cease to be innovative, 
therefore innovation is found when participants differ from the systemised procedures and 
institutionalised perspectives – in dissent – whether dissenting acts are treated as friction or 
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as innovation is generally approached from the organisational perspective according to 
change agents, and the wider discursive environment.   
As concepts in organisational strategy can arguably be considered to derive in part from 
military theory, the system of Politics in business organisations following an orthodox 
approach to strategy is one that is relatively intolerant of political differences, both within 
and outside the organisation.  The raison d'être of the military is conflict.  Thus the 
militaristic system deplores internal friction, but relies on external friction for its survival.  
Moreover, military structure requires external friction to justify the low tolerance approach to 
internal friction.  Yet innovation is associated with competitive advantage, and innovation is 
associated with the Political, which is frictional to a hegemonic system of Politics.  The 
militaristic approach to this bind is that innovation is friction, ill-discipline – unless is from 
the commander – the Hegemon.  In orthodox approaches to organisational strategy, change 
and innovation is typically the remit of management. 
A hegemonic reference frame judges difference to be innovation when it does not contradict 
the strategic frame, when it can be appropriated and put to work in reconstituting and 
maintaining the hegemony; while difference is judged to be friction when it cannot be 
appropriated, when it represents an incongruent reference frame.  For an inertial reference 
frame to be presented as absolute is hegemonic.  I propose that a hegemonic reference frame 
is unethical, and is also counter-productive regarding a capacity for renewal, adaptation and 
innovation. 
On the basis of this thesis, I propose a problematisation of organisational inertia for 
organisations pursuing a strategy of adaptation and renewal: to remobilise inert concepts in 
the strategy discourse, beginning with simultaneity.  For practitioners, this means reviewing 
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inert concepts and protocols in the design and implementation of organisational strategy.  It 
is suggested here that this might develop the capability for innovation by facilitating more 
individual creativity, by relaxing the domination of discursive practices (rules, regulations) in 
the strategy discourse of an organisation. 
Unlike the principles of (un)scientific management, PDT is interested in the legitimacy of 
alternative perspectives and offers a way to problematise strategy and change in a manner 
that takes into account the ethical and political aspects of strategic management.  On the basis 
of this theoretical framework, this thesis argues that a constructionist methodology has much 
to offer organisational strategy, not least, regarding the untapped capability for organisational 
innovation within every human resource of an organisation.  
Agonism could be thought of as a theory of negotiation that facilitates reinterpretation: when 
an antagonism emerges and persists, a strategy for dissolving a sedimented frontier is to 
establish common ground while respecting the legitimacy of the Other.  Moreover, agonism 
also represents a strategy for preventing antagonisms from emerging – for preventing 
contests between hegemonies-in-waiting – as logics of equivalence would not be the basis of 
social cohesion, the logic of difference is the basis of social cohesion instead.  For a non 
decisionist strategy for managing the Political, cohesion based on difference is not 
paradoxical: as, mathematically, society requires there to be more than one, a society that is 
discursively homogenous cannot be considered a society.  In this way, as a strategy, agonism 
is open to reinterpretation.  Agonism is a strategy of reinterpretation that facilitates its own 
reinterpretation. 
On the basis of this thesis, PDT is seen as an apt approach for strategic management research 
in problematising power relations involved in the co-construction of systems of association 
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(as well as conflicts, external and internal to an organisation).  I propose that a PDT critique 
of strategic frames provides a more textured description of political frames and power 
relations than is usually found in the strategy literature, a description that allows for a 
rearticulation of innovation. 
7.4.4 | Summary 
Which adaptations are considered to be innovation and which friction, and why, are at the 
heart of this thesis.  The review indicates that strategy research focuses on the core concepts 
of adaptation, friction and inertia in context of simultaneity, evolution and competitive 
advantage regarding selection pressure.  In this thesis, the PDT approach frames the strategy 
discourse, in its current conception, as an antagonistic system of Politics that, instead of 
adaptation and innovation, leads, ultimately, to conceptual inertia and stagnation, by 
repressing emergences of the Political. 
The contribution of this thesis is to identify the hegemonic status of the core concepts of 
strategy discourse, and a web of connections governed by the dominant articulatory practice 
of simultaneity.  The thesis makes a further contribution by critiquing the legitimacy of the 
current meaning of the core concepts, by dislocating the concepts from the hegemonic web 
that is formed around them, namely, by rejecting the concept of simultaneity that forms the 
dominant articulatory practice of orthodox approaches to organisational strategy.  The thesis 
makes a final contribution in proposing a strategy of agonism as an alternative to orthodox 
approaches based on simultaneity.  Rather than replacing one despotic concept with another, 
the suggestion of agonistic strategy is made because agonism allows for its own 
reinterpretation, thus does not represent a sedimented centre of a discourse.  In this way, 
agonism is less susceptible to stagnation, and more amenable to innovation. 
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7.4.5 | Reflection on the Conceptual Framework 
It is possible that the appeal to special relativity that is made in the argument of this thesis, as 
a means of questioning the hegemonic status of Newtonian simultaneity in strategic 
management thought and practice, might be interpreted as being part of the theoretical 
framework to the extent that it holds a position of primacy over the discursive.  Such an 
interpetation might then contend that the theoretical framework of this thesis merely 
reinforces a form of repressive naturalism when considering the construction of meaning of 
sociological connections and human relationships. Therefore, it is worth clarifying the 
approach of this thesis with regard to the interpretation outlined above and its implications – 
I apologise for any repetition of previous content.  
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the claims of scientific strategic management to be a 
science.  The genealogy attempts to demonstrate the context in which Foucault proposes his 
conception of inertia, and to compare it with the concept of inertia in the discourse of 
strategic management.  As strategic management is predominantly structuralist, it therein 
derives the meaning of inertia from Newton and the discourse of physics becomes a 
necessary discursive formation to include in the analysis.   
A | Motion 
Simultaneity is identified in the strategic management literature as the basis of the 
prominence of scientific approaches to organisational activity and therefore of positivistic 
measurement and structuralist synchronization of both quantitative and qualitative values.  In 
Newton’s laws of motion, motion is described in terms of two variables (direction and speed) 
which are collectively referred to as a vector that represents the state of motion.  Newton’s 
first law defines the state of inertia as the natural state of all things and that inertia refers to a 
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state of motion that is unchanging/constant (constant speed and direction – which includes 
stationary objects with no discernible speed and direction but is not solely defined by them).   
Newton’s conception of inertia also contains the connotation of an innate force of resistance 
to changes in a given state of motion.  In other words, for the state of motion of something to 
change, an external force acting on that something is required.   Newton’s second law relates 
the mass of the object in motion to the amount of external force required to inititate a change 
in its state of motion.  We have here the notion of inertia as unchanging motion and changing 
motion as an adapted course/trajectory related to an external force of change.   
The state of motion of an object is contingent and not related to a singular force.  When 
considering several external forces acting on an object, Newton’s equation combines these 
forces to form a net (or sum) force acting on the object in question – a resultant force 
represented by a net vector that indicates (predicts) the speed and direction of the object in 
question resulting from the external forces acting on it.  The force of resistance that is 
directly opposed to this net vector is defined by Newton as friction.  Forces acting on the 
object that are tangential to the frictional vector technically are not friction.  I.e. tangential 
forces are comparable to adaptive forces more than they are to frictional forces – the concept 
of friction for Newton only applies to force directly opposed to the state of motion of the 
object that is resultant from all forces acting on the object.   
Therefore, it can be suggested that the three concepts analysed in strategic management 
discourse – inertia, adaptation and friction – are each derived in some way from the notion of 
motion and further analysis suggests that each perpetuates the concept of simultaneity 
associated with Newton’s conception of inertia and the first law of motion.  Newton 
proposed simultaneity (absolute time and absolute space) as an absolute frame of reference 
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that is an universal benchmark by which to measure the motion and interaction of things.  As 
discussed, structuralism goes further than Newton’s analysis and applies this principle to 
social activity.  Simultaneity has been taken up in structuralist strategic management not just 
in the concept of strategic inertia but to the extent that it frames reality for organisational 
members.  Simultaneity is the basis of structuralist approaches to studying social activity but 
the concept of inertia is not synonymous with simultaneity. 
The notion of motion is indeed retained and reproduced by the theoretical framework of the 
thesis but it is detached from simultaneity by drawing from Foucault’s conception of inertia, 
which does not contain an absolute frame of reference nor attempts to describe and predict 
social activity according to objective laws.   
B | Frames of Reference 
It is therefore in context of the Foucaultian conception of inertia and the PDT conception of 
hegemonic formations that the appeal to special relativity is made: on the grounds that 
structuralist strategy and the attempt to reduce organisational activity to objective laws is 
derived from the reproduction of the concept of simultaneity – meanwhile the discourse of 
physics (that structuralism aims to emulate at the level of social activity) has dispensed wth 
the concept of simultaneity – relativity replaces simultaneity (one absolute physical frame) 
with relative physical frames of reference.   
Einstein shows that frames of reference are subject to motion as much as the events seen 
through their lens and therefore are not absolute – different frames provide different accounts 
of an event in space and time – these different accounts can both be accurate despite their 
contradiction but each account is not accurate for the other.  Moreover, regarding frames of 
reference that are inert, Newton’s laws of motion are for the most part impressively accurate 
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regarding non-sentient motion.  However, in frames of reference that are accelerating or 
decelerating (changing state of motion) Newton’s laws are not accurate.  Simultaneity of 
events in time and space does not exist. 
The concept of inertia in strategic management is inapproproriate for application to social 
activity insofar as the orthodox interpetation of strategic inertia is structuralist and based on 
simultaneity.  The engagement with special relativity is to engage with those who favour 
approaches to strategic management derived from natural science and structuralism.  It is to 
make the point that in natural science there is room for individual interpretation of events – 
that individual interpretation is not absurd by definition as it is in context of simultaneity.   
The theoretical framework argues that the continuation of simultaneity in strategic 
management is an example of conceptual sedimentation – that the concept is embedded 
within strategic management discourse and has remained so despite the abandonment of 
simultaneity in physics.  The genealogy reframes inertia by uncoupling it from simultaneity.  
Due to the connection between friction and adaption to inertia in the discourse of motion, 
framed as they are by Newtonian mechanics, reframing inertia also reframes the notions of 
friction and adaptation by uncoupling them from simultaneity by extension.  The current 
structuralist application of the concepts of friction and adaptation are both shown to be on 
shaky ground. 
C | Use of Terminology 
Foucault’s warning of polymorphous vocabulary raises an issue.  By comparing both the 
scientific and discursive accounts of events, made by different people, in different socio-
historical contexts, the related but additional charge could be made against the framework of 
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this thesis that it is in search of polymorphous vocabulary.  Therefore, the terminological 
similarities are worth discussing in further detail.  
The framework of this thesis draws from the terminology proposed by Foucault and Laclau 
and Mouffe.  In so doing it is possible that the thesis could be interpreted as reducing 
discourse theory to the logic of the natural sciences.  The same charge then could be made 
against Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe.   
Terms such as inertia, diachronous, elements and sedimentation are found in the discourse 
theory of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe.   Terms such as sedimentation and inertia could 
be considered to be priorly claimed by the natural sciences – otherwise there would be no 
charge of replicating the logic of the natural sciences via their usage in this thesis.  These 
terms are prominent signifiers in the discourse of natural science, they are nodes.   
It is my contention that the selection of these terms by Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe and 
their meaning within the natural sciences is not merely coincidental but strategic – a 
deliberate strategy to rearticulate the terms and in doing so to dislocate them from their 
sedimented meanings and relations within the discourse of natural science.  To use these 
terms with an alternative epistemology and ontology to the natural sciences is to challenge 
the monopolisation of these terms as part of a structuralist perspective.  By targeting central 
principles of natural science – of structuralism – discourse theory works to rearticulate these 
nodes so as to reveal their history and contingency.  Therefore, within an interpretation that 
this thesis reproduces the logic of natural science there is a presupposition that those terms 
belong to the natural sciences and the natural sciences alone, that their association with 
structuralism is somehow a priori.  I would suggest that to take this position displays 
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historial apriori and is closer to replicating the logic of natural science and structuralism than 
the approach of this thesis. 
The intention is to continue in the approach of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe – that is to 
rearticulate not reinforce the nodes of the discourse of natural sciences as they are applied to 
social activity.  Therefore, I defend myself against the charge that I am reproducing the 
logics that I am critiquing, on the grounds that such a charge makes the assumption that the 
continuation of a signifier is synonymous with the continuation of a previous meaning and 
logic – that prior meanings and logics are not detachable or rearticulatable.   
Through the lens of PDT, the meanings associated with the nodal concepts of inertia, friction 
and adaptation are critiqued, such that while I do reproduce the signifiers, the associated 
meanings are rearticulated.  Meanwhile, the connotation of motion is maintained.  Again, the 
notion of motion is not the preserve of natural science – objective laws predicting motion are 
– but not the concept of motion itself.  By decoupling the notion of simultaneity from frames 
through which sense is made of motion and events, the grip that structuralism has on 
organisational strategy is loosened and by substituting simultaneity with political power the 
implications for strategic management become clear.  Discourse theory offers a means to 
reconceptualise the nodes of strategic management regarding differing opinions and 
perspectives – an approach that is more ethically justified than the dismissal of alternatives 
by appealing to the (elsewhere abandonded) logic of simultaneity.  The relevance of 
discourse theory for strategic management is illustrated with reference to Rabinow’s concern 
that ‘deploying ready-made solutions from the past when history has moved on, concepts 
changed, milieus altered, constitutes a major mistake, one matched in its gravity only by 
those seeking to annul history’ (1996: 86).   
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